Collected Works on Gender and Corruption

Volume I

Compiled by Jeffrey Coonjohn

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this book is twofold: to compile in a single source several prominent articles concerning gender and corruption for academic purposes, and; second, to expand the reach of those articles beyond the English speaking world. This book begins with two controversial articles from 2001 both of which take an academic swat at a hornet's nest with their findings that greater representation of women in government lowers the level of corruption. We follow these controversial papers with two counter arguments supporting the premise that it is not the "fairer" sex but the fairer systems that result in reduced corruption—arguing that women tend to have greater representation in fairer systems. We then provide two short papers—one published by Transparency International and the other published by U4—examining the current state of gender and corruption. Finally, we conclude with a 2009 paper on gender, culture and corruption that interprets apparent differences in gender behavior as reflective of cultural differences—not necessarily one system being more equitable than another. Providing these papers in a single source condenses recent discussions so that students can explore whether and how gender impacts or is affected by corruption.

The second half of this book is devoted to a complete translation of the published works in Farsi. This translation is intended to facilitate academic discussion in Afghanistan, Iran and Tajikistan where cultural and equitable differences concerning gender are very pronounced. Consequently, an academic understanding of the issues might advance research in the field of gender and corruption—supporting or rejecting existing premises.

Referring to this collection as Volume I infers that there is, or will be, a Volume II. The second volume in this series will present articles concerning gender and corruption so that students can use their understanding to identify issues and to critically analyze the issues presented. While the two volumes will provide students with significant understanding of gender and corruption, the volumes are intended to supplement a general lecture on corruption, anti-corruption, ethics and gender.

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2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Gender and Corruption 1

Author: Anand Swamy, Stephen Knack, Young Lee, and Omar Azfar
Publication: Journal of Development Economics, Volume 64, Issue 1, Pages 25-55
Year: February 2001
Abstract: Using several independent data sets, we investigate the relationship between gender and corruption. We show using micro-data that women are less involved in bribery, and are less likely to condone bribe-taking. Cross-country data show that corruption is less severe where women hold a larger share of parliamentary seats and senior positions in the government bureaucracy, and comprise a larger share of the labor force.

Are Women Really the "Fairer" Sex? Corruption and Women in Government 23

Author: David Dollar, Raymond Fisman & Roberta Gatti
Publication: Journal of Economic Behavior, Volume 46, Issue 4, Pages 423-429
Year: December 2001
Abstract: Numerous behavioral studies have found women to be more trust-worthy and public-spirited than men. These results suggest that women should be particularly effective in promoting honest government. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the greater the representation of women in parliament, the lower the level of corruption. We find this association in a large cross-section of countries; the result is robust to a wide range of specifications.

Fairer Sex or Fairer System? Gender and Corruption Revisited.....31

Author: Hung-En Sung
Publication: Social Forces, Volume 82, No. 2, pages 703-723
Year: 2003
Abstract: Two recent influential studies found that larger representations of women in government reduced corruption. Assuming that the observed gender differentials were caused by women's inclinations toward honesty and the common good, both studies advocated increased female participation in government to combat corruption. This study argues that the observed association between gender and corruption is spurious and mainly caused by its context, liberal democracy—a political system that promotes gender equality and better governance. Data favors this "fairer system" thesis.

Political Cleaners: How Women are the New Anti-Corruption Force. Does the Evidence Wash..... 47

Author: Anne Marie Goetz
Publication: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex
Year: 2003
Abstract: This study challenges evidence that that women tend to be less corrupt than men. However, gender does shape opportunities for corruption – women in public office are generally excluded from male-dominated patronage and power networks. Recommendations include focusing on institutional reforms that promote interests of gender and social equity rather than investing in the myth of women's incorruptible nature.

Gender and Corruption: Understanding and Undoing the Linkages 63

Author: Transparency International
Publication: Transparency International-Secretariat's Policy and Research Department
Year: 2007 (revised 2008)
Abstract: Policy-makers increasingly are seeking to 'mainstream' gender into anti-corruption initiatives by taking into account the implications that planned interventions have on women and men. Such considerations can lead to better designed and targeted policies to combat corruption. They can also create the space for civil society to become engaged and carry out more effective corruption monitoring, which contributes to improvements in policy formulation. However, research findings on the subject have varied over the years and there is still no clear consensus about the interrelationship between gender and corruption. This paper will explore recent evidence on the topic in an attempt to determine whether and how women have an impact on — and are affected by — corruption.

The State of Research on Gender and Corruption 69

Author: Farzana Nawaz, U4 Helpdesk and Transparency International
Publication: U4 Expert Answer
Year: June 2009
Abstract: Corruption may affect progress towards gender equality and women's empowerment by limiting women's capacities to claim their rights. Evidence is inconclusive on whether women are more or less prone to corruption than men. A review of recent literature indicates that a more important dimension is corruption's disproportionate impact on women. This appears to be particularly the case in fragile state settings. Research shows that good practice to mitigate the effects of corruption on women include improved female participation in oversight processes and accountability systems.

Gender, Culture, and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis 77

Author: Vivi Alatasa, Lisa Cameron, Ananish Chaudhuric, Nisvan Erkalb and Lata Gangadharanb
Publication: Southern Economic Association, Volume 75, Number 3, pages 663-680
Year: January 2009
Abstract: A substantial body of recent research looks at differences in the behavior of men and women in diverse economic transactions. We contribute to this literature by investigating gender differences in behavior when confronted with a common bribery problem. Our study departs from the previous literature on gender and corruption by using economic experiments. Based on data collected in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, we show that while women in Australia are less tolerant of corruption than men in Australia, no significant gender differences are seen in India, Indonesia and Singapore. Hence, our findings suggest that the gender differences reported in previous studies may not be as universal as stated, and may be more culture specific. We also explore behavioral differences by gender across countries and find larger variations in women's behavior toward corruption than in men's across the countries in our sample.

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GENDER AND CORRUPTION: WORKING PAPER #232

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IRIS Center, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park.

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ABSTRACT

Using several independent data sets, we investigate an aspect of corruption that has received little attention: its differential incidence by gender. We show using micro data that women are less involved in bribery, and are less likely to condone bribe taking. Cross-country data show that corruption is less severe where women comprise a larger share of the labor force, and where women hold a larger share of parliamentary seats.

[1] ASwamy@Williams.edu, Sknack@WorldBank.Org, Young@iris.econ.umd.edu, Omar@iris.econ.umd.edu. We thank Gary Anderson and Jeffery Livingston for valuable research assistance. World Values Survey data are available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR); neither the ICPSR nor the original collectors of the data are responsible for analysis and interpretations of the data contained herein. We are extremely grateful to the World Bank, especially to Amitabha Mukherjee and Randi Ryterman, for making available the Georgia corruption survey. We also thank Barbara Bergmann, Roger Betancourt, Chris Clague, Jean Ensminger, Avner Greif, Tony Lanyi, Margaret Madajewicz, Mieke Meurs, and participants in the ISNIE conference in Washington DC in September 1999 for helpful comments

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I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been a concerted effort, by various national governments and international organizations, to increase the representation of women in public life. A prominent example is the recent (unsuccessful) initiative to pass legislation to reserve one-third of the seats in India's parliament for women (The Hindu, 1999). What would be the consequences of such policies? Proponents suggest that women may make different policy choices than men, and indeed, there is some evidence supporting this proposition[2]. Recently, however, an even more provocative claim has been made: in several different locations, influential public officials have advocated increasing representation of women on the grounds that this will lower the extent of corruption[3]. In Mexico city the police chief has taken away ticket-writing authority from the city's 900 male traffic policemen and created a new force consisting exclusively of women, hoping to reduce corruption (Moore, 1999). A similar policy has also been introduced in Lima, Peru where, it is claimed, there has been a fall in corruption after the introduction of women (McDermott, 1999)[4]. There is, however, so far as we know, no rigorous statistical evidence on gender differences in corrupt behavior. We present such evidence in this paper[5].

We explore three data sets and present evidence that (a) in hypothetical situations women are less likely to condone corruption, (b) women managers are less involved in bribery, and (c) countries which have greater representation of women in public life have lower levels of corruption. This evidence, taken together, provides some support for the idea that, at least in the short run, increased presence of women in public life will reduce levels of corruption.

Claims about gender differences can easily be misinterpreted. It is therefore important for us to clarify that we do not claim to have discovered some essential, permanent, or biologically determined differences between men and women. Indeed, the gender differences we observe may be attributable to socialization, or to differences in access to networks of corruption, or in knowledge of how to engage in corrupt practices, or to other factors. We do not attempt to identify these underlying factors, but rather to document several statistically robust relationships that point towards a gender differential in the incidence of corruption. We offer no theory about the origin of this differential, and acknowledge that various alternative explanations are possible.

Our evidence is organized as follows. We first present data from the World Values Survey, in which men and women in a large number of developed and developing countries were asked a series of questions regarding their attitudes in hypothetical situations in which there was room for dishonest or opportunistic behavior. We show that men were more likely to choose options that are equivalent to the "defect" option in a prisoners' dilemma game. After showing gender differences in a range of attitudes, we present more detailed multivariate evidence on gender differentials in the attitude to bribery. We then present evidence of behavior in actual as opposed to hypothetical situations. Using a survey of enterprise owners and

[2] For example, Fukuyama (1998, 24) reports that the percentages of American women who supported U.S. involvement in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War, were 7 to 10 points less than the corresponding percentages for men. A study by the Center for American Women in Politics (Dodson and Carroll, I991) documents substantial differences between men and women in their attitudes towards prohibition of abortion (79% women oppose versus 61% men), towards the death penalty (49% women oppose versus 33% men), and towards more nuclear plants (84% women oppose, compared to 71% men).

[3] The adverse consequences of corruption have been discussed by Klitgaard (1988), Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995 and 1998), and Olson, Sarna, and Swamy (1999).

[4] Walsh (1985) reports that the Mexican city of Cuernavaca also chose to increase the number of women police officers with the expectation that they would be more honest than men. This initiative was apparently never implemented.

[5] There is some anecdotal evidence. A study of politicians and civil servants in Mumbai, India (Honour, Barry, and Palnitkar, 1998, 195) concluded that "women's corruption was not as marked as men's...." Kaufman (1998) presents a scatterplot showing a correlation between corruption and an index of women's rights and emphasizes the need for more detailed investigation of this association.

managers in the Central Asian republic of Georgia we show that officials in firms owned or managed by men are significantly more likely to be involved in bribe-giving.

One concern in the above analyses is that corruption is self-reported. Because of this, it is conceivable that our results reflect gender differentials in *acknowledgment* of corruption, rather than in *incidence* of corruption. Data on corruption which are not self-reported are available only at the national level. Using corruption indices developed by Transparency International and Political Risk Services, we find that greater participation by women in market work and public life is associated with lower levels of corruption. This result is of value not only because national-level corruption data are not self-reported, but also because it shows that gender differentials have macro-level impacts. These findings are consistent with arguments that, at least in the short run, policies designed to increase the role of women in commerce and politics, commonly justified on grounds of gender equity and poverty alleviation, may also have an efficiency payoff, by lowering corruption.

II. MICRO-EVIDENCE: THE WORLD VALUES SURVEYS

The World Values Surveys are a set of surveys carried out in dozens of developed and developing countries in the early 1980s and the early 1990s. The purpose of these surveys was to collect information on the attitudes and values of the peoples of various societies around the world. An effort was made to ensure that in each case the sample was nationally representative[6]. We use data from 18 surveys in 1981 and 43 surveys in 1990-91.

In addition to hundreds of other items, these surveys inquire about the acceptability of various dishonest or illegal behaviors. For each behavior respondents are asked to place themselves on a l-10 scale, where 1 indicates that the behavior can "never be justified" and 10 indicates it can "always be justified." For most items in most countries, the natural cut-off point is at the value 1, as a majority of respondents typically assert (fortunately) that the behavior can never be justified. Aggregating over all countries in the surveys, the gender gap consistently favors women, as shown in Table 1. For all 12 items listed, a significantly higher percentage of women than men believe that the illegal or dishonest behavior is never justifiable. The gap ranges from more than 9 percentage points for driving under the influence to about 4 points for claiming government benefits for which one is ineligible. In all cases the gender differences are significant at the.0001 level.

The case of greatest interest to us is "someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties": 27.6% of men but only 22.7% of women agree that this behavior is sometimes or always justifiable; this means men are twenty percent more likely to condone corruption than women, a substantial difference. However, this comparison of proportions could be misleading if men and women differed systematically in some other characteristic that also affects the attitude to bribery. In tables 2a, 2b, and 2c, we show that this result is robust to tests that control for other respondent characteristics. Our dependent variable takes the value 1 if the respondent says that bribery is "never justified," and zero otherwise. Our main interest is in the coefficient on the gender dummy (1 if male). There is some evidence that rule-breaking is higher among young people (Fukuyama, 1998), so we include age as a regressor. Marriage is often believed to alter public behavior; this is reflected, for instance, in lower rates of incarceration among married men, as compared to single men (Akerlof, 1998). To account for this, we include a dummy which takes the value 1 if the respondent is married. Commitment to a religion is often believed to affect behavior[7]; therefore, we include a

[6] Inglehart et. al. (1998) provide details on the procedures followed in the various surveys in the 1990s. The surveys in the Western countries were carried out by experienced survey organizations, many linked with the Gallup chain. In other countries they were carried out by academies of science, or by university-based institutes. Inglehart (p. 471) writes:"In most countries stratified multistage random sampling was used, with samples selected in two stages. First a random selection of sample locations was made ensuring that all types of location were represented in proportion to their population. Next, a random selection of individuals was drawn up."

[7] This could be because, as argued by Strate et. al. (19X9),"... Church attendance involves a sense of personal affiliation with an institution in which communal values and social obligations are regularly emphasized."

dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual responded yes to the question "are you a religious person?" We also include another dummy which takes the value 1 if the respondent frequently attends religious services. Finally, the education dummy takes the value 1 if the respondent was schooled beyond age 16[8].

In table 2a we pool the data across countries and estimate a logit model. In order to control for unobservable country characteristics that might otherwise bias our results, we include a dummy for each country. The coefficient on the gender dummy (1 if male) is negative and is statistically significant at any reasonable level. The marginal effect corresponding to this coefficient is 3.9%, i.e., all else being equal, a man's likelihood of responding that accepting a bribe is "never justified" is 3.9 percentage points less than the likelihood for a woman. As expected, married people, older people, people who consider themselves religious, and those who regularly attend religious services are all more likely to say that bribery is never justified. The marginal effects are quite substantial, especially for being married[9] (2.4 percentage points), being a "religious person" (3.7 percentage points), and attending religious services regularly (4.3 percentage points).

It is possible that a large gender differential in a subset of countries is driving the results in table 2a. Therefore we ran the regressions separately for each country and found, in tables 2b and 2c, that the gender differential is observed in most countries, although the estimated effects vary widely across countries. We ran logit regressions for 43 countries for 1991 and 18 countries for 1981, using the same specification used in table 2a. In 1991 we see that in 36 of 43 countries the gender differential favors women; in 22 of these countries the differential is statistically significant at 5%. There are only 7 countries in which the gender differential favors men and only 2 of these differentials are statistically significant at 5%. In the data from 1981 (table 2c) the gender differential favors women in all 18 countries; the differential is statistically significant at 5% in 9 of these. Thus, the gender differential in the attitude to corruption seems to be a more or less worldwide phenomenon.

A possible response to these findings is that women may disapprove of corruption more only because they are less likely than men to be employed. Persons not employed may be less able to benefit from corruption[10], or norms regarding bribery may be different among employed and non-employed persons (e.g. the latter may be more naive or idealistic). Accordingly, we re-ran the regression in table 2a, including a dummy variable for the employment status of the individual. The employment dummy failed to enter significantly and the coefficient on the gender dummy was virtually unchanged, indicating that the gender differential in attitudes is not an artifact of male-female differences in employment rates.

The above analysis is based on attitudes regarding the acceptability of taking bribes. In the following section we present evidence of actual differences in involvement in bribery, drawing on an enterprise survey in Georgia.

[8] Inclusion of additional education dummies did not alter our central result regarding the gender differential. The data do not allow us to construct a variable equal to years of education completed.

[9] There is some evidence that marriage is particularly effective in reducing anti-social behavior of men (e.g., Akerlof, 1998). To test whether marriage has a different impact on men and women, we interacted the gender and marriage dummies. The interaction term was insignificant, i.e., we could not reject the null hypothesis that attitudes toward bribery are equally sensitive to marital status for men and women.

[10] We thank Margaret Madajewicz for this point.

III. MICRO-EVIDENCE: AN ENTERPRISE SURVEY IN GEORGIA

In 1996 the President of the World Bank offered to support member countries' efforts to reduce corruption. Georgia was among the first to accept the offer. To this end, the World Bank developed a set of diagnostic surveys focusing on corruption in the public sector, targeted at households, enterprises, and public officials. We were fortunate to be given access to the data collected in these surveys, which were implemented in 1998. Only the enterprise survey allows disaggregation by gender; we analyze these data, focusing on differences between firms owned/managed by men and those owned/managed by women.

We have data on 350 firms covering four broad sectors: trade, manufacturing, services, and agriculture. We categorize them in three groups: large (more than 50 employees, 25% of our sample), medium (between 10 and 50 employees, 3l%), and small (less than 10 employees, 44%). Firms in the capital were over-sampled, with 70% of the surveyed firms located in Tbilisi. The incidence of corruption is high, as firms reported paying an average of 233 lari per month in bribes, which is equivalent to 9% of average turnover (Anderson et al., 1999).

Managers were asked about contact with and illegal payments to 18 different agencies[11]. We stacked the data so we have 6300 observations (350 times 18) on potential contact and payment. We dropped observations where no contact was reported, leaving us with 2322 observations[12]. Table 3 shows the means of several relevant variables such as firm size, sector, and age and education of the manager, for the entire sample, and separately for men-owned/managed and women-owned/managed enterprises. It should be noted that these summary statistics are computed over observations, where each observation represents a contact between a firm and an agency.

Our analysis starts with the response to the following question:"How frequently do the officials providing the service require unofficial payments? Please answer on a scale of 1 to 7, where l=Never, 2=1-20% of the time, 3=21-40% of the time, 4=41-60% of the time, 5=61-80% of the time, 6=81-99% of the time, and 7= Always." Table 3 shows that, on average, firms owned/managed by women give bribes on approximately 5% of the occasions that they come in contact with a government agency. The percentage is twice as large for firms owned/managed by men[13]. Thus, the descriptive evidence is strongly suggestive of a gender differential in involvement in bribery.

How should this evidence be interpreted? The way the question (which is usually addressed to the firm's owner/manager) is phrased, it appears that the impetus for the bribe is coming from the official, not from the owner/manager. However, questions on bribery are usually put in this way to avoid placing the onus of the bribe on the respondent, in the hope of eliciting an honest response. Therefore, an obvious interpretation of these results is that female owners/managers are less likely to offer bribes than male owners/managers. However, other interpretations are possible. It could be that women are less likely to belong to bribe-sharing "old boy" networks, and hence may be less prone to be asked for bribes. It could also be that, due to less individual or collective experience in the labor force, women have not yet "learned" how to engage in corruption. Here we document the presence of a statistically robust gender differential, but do not attempt to distinguish among these alternative interpretations.

Table 4 examines whether this gender differential remains after we control for other firm characteristics[14]. We estimate three models, each of which has a different

[11] The full list of contact agencies is as follows: phone installation, enterprise registration, water, electricity, inspection of weights and measurements, fire inspection, sanitary inspection, tax and finance inspection, tax clearance (for example in government privatization), other clearance to participate in government procurement, export license or permit, import license or permit, customs at border crossing, registration of property-ownership, lease of state-owned commercial real estate, state banking services, building permits, and road police.

[12] The probability of contact did not vary with gender.

[13] A firm in the range 2l-40% was assigned the value 30%, and so on.

[14] In the regression analysis we use the subset of the data which we expect is most reliable, where the respondent was the owner/senior manager. Using the full sample yields similar results.

dependent variable. Given there are seven categorical outcomes which can be meaningfully ranked, one possibility is to estimate an ordered probit model. The dependent variable here takes values 1 through 7, with 1 being the category "never." However, if we are only interested in the distinction between firms which never give bribes and those who sometimes do, a probit model is appropriate. Here the dependent variable takes the value 0 if the firm never gives a bribe, and 1 if it sometimes does. Finally, we present OLS estimates, assigning to each firm (for each point of contact) a bribe-giving percentage equal to the mid-point of its category[15] and using this percentage as the dependent variable. Thus, the dependent variable now takes the values 0%, 10%, etc. Though OLS is not quite appropriate, given the discontinuous nature of this dependent variable, it serves as a useful point of comparison. In all three sets of estimates the standard errors are corrected for (potential) within-firm autocorrelation in the error terms.

We have relied on the literature on Georgia, and on corruption more broadly, to guide our choice of control variables. Since a firm's size can affect its ability to pay, as well as its bargaining power or "connections," we include size dummies (small and medium, with large being the excluded category). Depending on the sector in which the firm operates, its dependence on governmental services, and hence its temptation to bribe, may vary; therefore, we have included sector dummies (manufacturing, services, and trade, with agriculture being the excluded category). We also include dummies for the level of education of the owner/manager; these could partially reflect influence or connections as, for example, in "old boy networks." The dummies are for university and post-university, with the excluded category being those who do not have a university education.

Since some governmental agencies are likely to be more corrupt than others, we include dummies for the agency with which the firm is having contact. Because these dummies are so numerous (18 agencies, hence 17 dummies) these coefficients are not reported. Participation by the state and foreign participation could also affect bribe-giving[16], and dummies are included for these.

Column 1 of table 4 presents ordered probit estimates. The positive coefficient on the gender dummy indicates that, all else being equal, a firm owned/managed by a man is likely to be in a higher category than a firm owned/managed by a woman; the coefficient is statistically significant at well below 1%. However, we need a more precise interpretation. The model can be used to obtain predictions of the probability that the firm is in each of the seven categories (never, l-l0%, etc.). The bulk of the outcomes (83%) fall in the "never" category and no other category has more than 5% of the observations. Hence the transition of greatest interest is from the "never" category to any other. Therefore, a natural way in which to use the ordered probit estimates is to compute the effect of n unit increase in the explanatory variable on the probability that the firm is in any one of the six categories besides "never." We see in column 2 that the presence of a male owner-manager increases by 13.7 percentage points the probability that the firm is in a category other than "never." This is a huge effect, given that 83% of outcomes are in the "never" category. Firm size also has a substantial impact: compared to a large firm, the probability that a medium or small-sized firm falls outside the "never" category increases by 15.6 and 26.9 percentage points respectively.

Column 3 presents probit estimates; as mentioned above, the dependent variable takes the value 0 if the firm is in the "never" category and 1 otherwise. Again, the male dummy has a positive coefficient which suggests that, all else being equal, a firm owned/managed by a man is less likely to be in the "never" category than a firm owned/managed by a woman. Column 4 presents marginal effects, i.e., the effect of a unit increase in the explanatory variable on the probability that the firm is not in the "never" category. We see that the marginal effect of a male owner/manager is

[15] See footnote 12.

[16] State-ownership should reduce bribe-giving if this gives the firm better contacts within the government. Miller et al. (1999) report that in formerly communist countries officials treat other officials better than they do private citizens. Foreign ownership may act to increase bribe-giving, since foreign-owned firms may be perceived to be richer, and more able to pay

13.4 percentage points. This effect is reassuringly close to our 13.7 percentage point estimate from the ordered probit model.

The OLS estimates in column 5 have a different interpretation. Each coefficient now shows the impact of a unit increase in the explanatory variable on the probability that a firm gives a bribe. The results indicate that, all else being equal, the presence of a male owner-manager increases the incidence of bribe-giving by 10.4 percentage points. Thus, all three models estimated clearly indicate a higher involvement in bribery among male owner-managers. We also investigated whether there were gender differences in the amounts, as well as frequency, of payments and found that conditional on a bribe having been paid, there is no significant gender differential in the amount. This result is consistent with other findings from the Georgian data which suggest that bribe markets in Georgia operate at known prices and agents essentially have discretion only over whether or not to pay (Anderson et al., 1999).

Having seen evidence from micro-data based surveys, in the next section we turn our attention to analysis of country-level data. These cross-country analyses complement the micro-level evidence in two important ways. First, as earlier mentioned, national-level corruption ratings are not self-reported, so that any gender differentials cannot be produced by male-female differences in the willingness to acknowledge corruption. Second, micro-level evidence carries no necessary implications for the macro-level relationship between women's participation and the severity of corruption in public life. For example, male-female differences in attitudes and behavior may be too small for an increase in women's participation in commerce and government to move society from a highly corrupt to a less corrupt equilibrium. Or, women may have little influence on the way public life is conducted, even when their participation rates rise, as long as they remain in the minority.

IV. Macro-Evidence: Cross-Country Data

Our first concern is measurement. In the analysis above, where we are looking at bribery by individual firms, we focused on the gender of the owner/manager. What is the appropriate index of women's involvement when we are looking at a country as a whole? A reasonable measure of the power wielded by women in public life is the percentage of legislators in the national parliament that is female[17]. This variable has the advantage of being easy to construct, and errors in measurement are unlikely. We supplement this variable with a broader measure of women's participation in public life, the percentage of the labor force comprised by women[18].

Perhaps the most widely used index of corruption at present is the "Corruption Perceptions Index" (TI98), constructed by Transparency International. The TI98 index combines the information available in a large number of surveys conducted by the following organizations: Economist Intelligence Unit, Gallup International, the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Political Risk Services, the World Bank, and the World Economic Forum. This index can in principle vary between 0 and 10, which would be the score for a corruption-free country[19]. The mean is 4.9, the minimum is 1.4 (Cameroon), and the maximum is 10 (Denmark). As an alternative corruption indicator with data for a larger number of countries, we use the "corruption in government" index for 1995 from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), introduced by Knack and Keefer (1995). This index can in principle vary between 0 and 6, with higher values representing less corruption. For 1995 the mean is 3.72, the minimum is 1 (Sierra Leone), and the maximum is 6 (several countries, including Switzerland and Sweden). By incorporating judgments of several independent sources, the TI index is presumably less subject to measurement error than the

[17] This variable is also being used by Roberta Gatti and her collaborators at the World Bank to look at a similar issue.

[18] See Table 5 for data sources and summary statistics for variables used in the cross-country tests.

[19] Details of the method of construction are provided by Lambsdorff (1998).

ICRG index. The broader country coverage of ICRG, however, permits the inclusion of a larger and more diverse set of countries—particularly small and poor nations—improving the generalizability of our findings.

Although our main interest is the relationship between the level of corruption and women's participation, we need to control for other potential determinants of corruption. Because the development of institutions to restrain corruption may be a costly long-term process undertaken more easily by richer countries, we control for (the log of) per capita income. To the extent that formulation, implementation, and public knowledge of written codes and laws reduce corruption, a more educated population may be less tolerant of corruption. Therefore, we control for the average years of education completed by adults. If there are economies or diseconomies of scale in institutional development, the size of the country can affect the level of corruption. To reflect this we include log of the country's population as a regressor.

We also control for the presence of institutions that may restrain corruption. By increasing the threat of exposure, an independent media can increase the costs of corrupt behavior. Independent judiciaries may reduce the incidence of corruption, at least within the executive branch. Finally, multi-party competition may reduce corruption because each party has the incentive to expose the others' wrongdoing[20]. We measure these corruption-restraining institutions using several 4-point indexes constructed from Humana (1991). One of these indexes evaluates the independence of the courts, while another evaluates the degree of multiparty competition in elections. For an overall measure of media independence, we take the average of the following three separate indexes: censorship of the press, independence of newspapers, and independence of TV and Radio. Because the media independence, judiciary independence and multiparty competition indexes are highly correlated, including all of them in our regressions would reduce the precision of our estimates. Therefore, we have constructed an overall index of "Corruption-Restraining Institutions" by averaging the three indexes.

Ethnically diverse societies may be more fractionalized, and officials may have less (or more) compunctions about demanding a bribe from someone of a different ethnicity; therefore, we include the percentage of population belonging to the largest ethnic group as a regressor. This percentage varies between 17 (Zaire and Uganda) and 100 (Korea, Iceland, and Malta). It is also possible that social cohesion may be lower and hence corruption may be higher in countries where inequality is high; to account for this possibility we include the Gini coefficient for income distribution. The most unequal countries in our data are Sierra Leone (62.3%) and Brazil (60.1%) and the most equal countries are Austria (23.1%) and Denmark (24.7%).

We include several variables to reflect other characteristics of the government. It is often argued that corruption is high when officials are badly paid (Haque and Sahay, 1996). Therefore, we include the average government wage as a multiple of per capita GDP[21]. The mean value is close to three, with considerable variation across countries. Corruption may also be linked to the history of colonialism. On the one hand some colonial administrations are alleged to have been relatively honest; an example is the Indian Civil Service, which was supposedly part of the "steel frame" that held up the British administration in Gulurlial India. On the other hand, if colonial administrations were authoritarian and distant from local populations, and if the bureaucracies of newly independent states inherited this culture, ex-colonies may have higher levels of corruption. We include a dummy which takes the value 1 if the country has never been a colony. It has also been argued that the character of British colonialism was different from others, so we include a dummy (1 if former British colony) to allow for this possibility[22].

Estimates from the cross-country tests are presented in tables 6a and 6b, where the dependent variables are TI98 and ICRG95, respectively. In the first four regressions in

[20] For a discussion of this and related issues see Shleifer and Vishny (1998).

[21] These data were assembled for the early 1990s by Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997).

[22] Treisman (1998) finds that ex-British colonies are rated as less corrupt.

each table our measure of women's participation is the percentage of the lower house of the national parliament that is female; in the second four regressions we use the percentage of the labor force that is female.

In the first four columns of table 6a we see that a higher percentage of women in parliament is strongly associated with higher values of TI98 (i.e., lower levels of corruption). In all four cases the coefficient is clearly statistically significant at any reasonable level. The smallest of these coefficients, 0.071, can be interpreted as follows: a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of the lower house of parliament that is women (8.8) is associated with an increase of about 0.6 in TI98. This is a substantial effect, given the mean of TI98 is 4.9.

In the fifth column our measure of women's participation is the percentage of the labor force that is women. A percentage point increase in this variable is associated with an increase in TI98 of 0.047, and a standard deviation increase is associated with an increase in TI98 of 0.36. The coefficient on women's labor force share declines in column 6 when we add controls for colonial heritage and ethnic uniformity, but is still significant at 10%. In the last two columns the magnitude of the coefficient remains roughly the same as in column 6, but is no longer statistically significant. This is a consequence of the fact that the sample size has declined due to limited data availability on the additional control variables, rather than due to the influence of the new control variables themselves[23].

Overall, table 6a provide s strong evidence that women's presence in parliament is negatively correlated with corruption. Women's labor force share shows a similar negative correlation with corruption, although the results are more sensitive to changes in the sample necessitated by limited data availability on some control variables.

Table 6a contains three other significant results. Richer countries have lower levels of corruption; roughly speaking, a 1% increase in per capita GNP is associated with an increase of 0.015-0.020 in TI98. Larger countries score more poorly, as a doubling of population is associated with R decline of approximately 0.1-0.3 in TI98. Former British colonies have markedly higher values of TI98, as in Treisman (1998), with the effect varying from 1.0-2.2.

Table 6b repeats the analysis with the alternative dependent variable, ICRG95. As in table 6a a higher women's share in parliament is associated with lower levels of corruption (higher values of ICRG95); the coefficient is highly significant in columns l-4. The smallest value, 0.048, can be interpreted as follows: a one standard deviation increase in women's share in parliament is associated with an increase of 0.42 in the ICRG index, which is more than 10% of its mean value (3.72). The coefficient in column 5 implies that a standard deviation increase in women's labor force share is associated with an increase of 0.24 in ICRG95. As in table 6a, our regressions show that women's share of the labor force is negatively correlated with corruption as hypothesized, but the results are more sensitive to sample changes than results obtained using women in parliament as our measure of women's participation.

The other variables that invariably entered significantly in table 6a—per capita income, population, and the British colony dummy—enter significantly in some but not all regressions in table 6b. Government wages are significant in column 3 (with women in parliament as the women's participation variable) but not in column 7 (where share in the labor force is the women's participation variable). Income inequality is significant in column 8 (with women's labor- force share) but not in column 4 (with women's share in parliament). Schooling, with a consistently positive but insignificant coefficient in table 6a, is a significant determinant of corruption in most specifications in table 6b. However, because our samples are restricted by the availability of data on the women's participation variables, we are reluctant to draw strong inferences from these findings on schooling, government wages, and inequality, which we treat as control variables. A thorough investigation of hypotheses regarding these other determinants of corruption is beyond the scope of this study.

[23] Retaining the samples used in columns 7 and 8 hut using the specification of column 6, women's labor force share is insignificant. Thus the change in results for women's labor force share from column 6 to columns 7 and 8 is attributable to the change in sample and not to the change in specification.

V. Robustness of Cross-Country Findings

The findings presented in tables 6a and 6b are robust to using several alternative methodologies which are discussed below. The statistical results discussed in this section are not presented in tables in the interest of brevity, but are available on request from the authors.

1. Ordinal Versus Cardinal Measures: Strictly speaking, the TI and ICRG corruption indexes could both be viewed as ordinal and not interval scales. However, women's participation variables continue to be statistically significant if we estimate ordered logit models, rather than the OLS models reported in tables 6a and 6b[24].

2. Other Corruption Measures: We used the recent "graft" index developed by Kauffman et al. (1999) at the World Bank as our dependent variable, and obtained similar results. The Kauffman et al. index is constructed using many of the same sources as TI, but a somewhat different methodology. It is correlated with the TI index at.98, but covers many more countries.

3. Outliers and Data Quality: Results change very little when we run median regressions or robust regressions, indicating that they are not driven by a small number of outlying observations We also ran weighted least squares for the TI98 regressions, with the weight proportional to the number of surveys used (which varies from 3 to 12) in constructing each TI value. This procedure, which reduces the possibility that the results are driven by a few countries with poor-quality data on corruption, yields coefficient estimates for the women's participation variables very similar to those produced by OLS.

4. Omitted Variables: Findings on the relationship between corruption and women's participation arc also robust to the inclusion of additional control variables. We added a set of continent dummies (Africa, Latin America, East Asia, and OECD, with the rest of the world as the omitted category), to account for any omitted variables related to corruption or women's participation rates (or the ways in which they are measured) that vary primarily across continents or country groupings. For example, it is conceivable that the low corruption, high women's participation countries are all developed countries, and that corruption and women's participation are unrelated within the group of developed countries, or within the group of developing countries. However, the inclusion of the OECD and continent dummies has little effect on the women's participation results. Similarly, adding the agricultural share of the labor force as a regressor does not affect any of our findings. We also found that controlling for trade openness and the black market foreign exchange premium did not meaningfully affect our main findings[25].

It could be that more corrupt countries also discriminate more against women, which leads to lower levels of participation by them. In this scenario the observed correlation between women's participation and corruption is spurious, and driven by the omitted variable "level of discrimination against women." We evaluated (and ruled out) this possibility by controlling for the level of gender discrimination using four alternative measures; the gap between men's and women's educational attainment, the gap between men's and women's life expectancy, and Humana's (1991) measures of "political and legal equality" and "social and economic equality" between men and women. Inclusion of these controls changes the women's participation estimates only trivially, with coefficients rising (showing a larger decrease in corruption for a given increase in women's participation) more often than falling.

5. Simultaneity Bias: A common problem in cross-sectional analyses, especially when using macro-data, is simultaneity bias. In our context the question is, could it be that the observed correlation between women's participation and corruption reflects the impact of corruption on women's participation? The usual econometric solution to this problem, instrumental variable

[24] In an ordered logit model estimated using the ICRG data (say) the six values of the dependent variable (1 through 6) are treated as six ordered categories.

[25] Foreign exchange and trade restrictions can encourage corruption through the creation of rents controlled by public officials.

estimation, is not practical for us because of the small sample sizes and difficulty of finding valid instruments for women's participation. However, when we consider the specific channels through which corruption can affect women's participation we see that simultaneity bias cannot account for our results.

Suppose corruption is modeled as a tax on labor supply, as revenues diverted to bureaucrats reduce the return to private sector entrepreneurs and workers. Like other taxes, corruption could reduce women's share in the labor force, as it is well known that women's labor supply is more elastic than men's. However, such a model cannot explain the relation between corruption and women's share in parliament. Nor does it provide an explanation for the micro-level gender differences in attitudes and behavior presented in sections II and III.

It could also be argued that high corruption countries have fewer working women because women choose not to work in the face of high levels of corruption. Suppose that for people who are averse to corruption, participation in a corrupt system is like a "psychic tax." As societies become more corrupt, the burden of this psychic tax increases for corruption-averse people, but not for others. Since, on average, women are more corruption-averse than men (as shown above), more of them will drop out of the labor force, in the more corrupt societies.

Though this argument is logical, its fundamental premise, that women's attitudes to corruption affect their likelihood of entering the labor force, is not consistent with findings we obtained on employment status from the World Values Survey data. We estimated a logit model using the data for women; the dependent variable was assigned the value 1 if she was employed and zero otherwise. We found that the attitude to corruption did not enter significantly in this model, despite a sample size of about 40,000[26]. The simultaneity argument implies that the employment and attitudes toward corruption relationship will be stronger where corruption is more severe, but no significant relationship is found even when we restrict the sample to World Values Survey respondents who live in high-corruption countries (as indicated by TI or ICRG scores). Thus the data do not support the hypothesis that lower participation by women in high-corruption countries is because of their greater aversion to corruption.

[26] The corruption variable constructed from the World Values Survey data is described in section II. The other explanatory variables included were marital status, age, age squared, education, and the presence of children in the home (all of which are highly significant), and fixed country effects (which are jointly significant).

VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks

The results presented in this paper reveal a strong empirical regularity. We first showed, using data from a large number of countries, that in hypothetical situations women are more likely than men to disapprove of the practice of accepting bribes. We then found, using data from Georgia, that firms owned or managed by women are less likely to be involved in bribe-giving. Finally, our analysis of country-level data indicated that higher levels of women's participation in public life are associated with lower levels of corruption.

The World Values Survey results can be criticized on the grounds that they represent hypothetical choices, and the data on corruption from Georgia can be questioned because they are self-reported. However, these criticisms cannot be leveled at our cross-country analyses: the ICRG index was constructed by external observers, and Transparency International's index of corruption was constructed using a "survey of surveys," many of which involved external observers (and none of which involved an observer's evaluation of his or her own personal behavior).

The results from Georgia, wherein firms owned or managed by women report lower levels of bribe-giving, could, in principle, follow from the way women are selected into the labor force. If employers discriminate against women, only those women who are exceptionally capable or honest may become owners/managers, and the gender differential we are observing may be the difference between average men and exceptional women. Arguing along similar lines, a greater presence of women in the labor force could improve average outcomes because labor force participation rates for women are still low, and the women entering the labor force are from the "better" part of the women's distribution, rather than because the distribution of attitudes to corruption differs between men and women. However, if indeed women are performing better because we are still in the better part of the women's distribution, this only strengthens the case for increasing their representation. It should also be noted that we found with the World Values Survey data, that in the entire sample of men (employed and not employed) the percentage who say bribery is never justified is lower than in the entire sample of women. This differential cannot be explained by appealing to a selection argument, Furthermore, our cross-country findings are unaffected by taking discrimination into account.

Although some objection can be raised to each of our diverse pieces of evidence, we maintain that the most parsimonious interpretation is that gender-based differences in corrupt behavior exist and that increasing women's presence in public life can reduce levels of corruption, at least in the short run. We are agnostic regarding whether these differences are attributable to socialization, biology, access to networks of corruption, knowledge of corrupt practices, or other factors, and whether they are temporary or permanent. Overall, our findings provide some support for the view that policies to increase the role of women in politics and commerce-usually proposed with gender-equity or poverty-alleviation goals in mind-can be useful tools in combating corruption.

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TABLES

Table 1. Gender and Socially Cooperative Attitudes
World Values Surveys

	% saying the behavior "can never be justified"	
	Male	Female
1) Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to	63.7	67.9
2) Avoiding a fare on public transport	60.3	64.9
3) Cheating on taxes if you have the chance	54.4	61.5
4) Buying something you knew was stolen	72.9	79.5
5) Taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else	83.1	87.2
6) Keeping money that you have found	43.9	51.6
7) Lying in your own interest	45.1	50.9
8) Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties	72.4	77.3
9) Fighting with the police	52.0	57.1
10) Failing to report damage you've done accidentally to a parked vehicle	61.8	67.6
11) Throwing away litter in a public place	69.1	74.4
12) Driving under the influence of alcohol	74.2	83.4

* Sample sizes vary between 52,107 and 83,532. All differences are significant at the .0001 level.

Table 2a. Logit regression, World Values Survey data
Dependent variable = 1 if bribery is "never justified," = 0 otherwise
(standard error in parentheses)

	Coefficient	Marginal Effect in percent
Male = 1	-0.220" (0.018)	-3.9
attended school until age 16 or more	- 0.010 (0.021)	-0.2
married = 1	0.137" (0.021)	2.4
attends religious services regularly	0.120* (0.024)	4.3
"religious person"	0.205* (0.019)	3.7
Age in years	0.041* (0.003)	1.0
Age Squared	-0.0002* (0.00003)	-0.0
N	77,314	

Note: * = Significant at 5%. Dummies were included for each country. Marginal effects were computed at the sample means.

Table 2b. Country-wise Logit regression, World Values Survey data, 3.990-1 991
Dependent variable = 1 if bribery is "never justified", = 0 otherwise
(standard error in parentheses)

Country	No. of Observations	Male β	Standard error	Marg. Eff (%)
Latvia	890	-0.6227"	0.1675	-9.9
Sweden	1040	-0.6394"	0.1467	-9.8
Estonia	999	-0.5299"	0.1449	-9.5
Netherlands	1002	-0.5007*	0.1444	-9.4
Bulgaria	1015	-0.5949"	0.1642	-8.9
Mexico	1497	-0.3 180"	0.1079	-7.9
Japan	977	-0.3280"	0.1455	-7.6
France	983	-0.3315*	0.1396	-7.6
Switzerland	1357	-0.4932"	0.1462	-7.0
S. Africa	2676	-0.4151"	0.0982	-6.9
Russia	1909	-0.5107'	0.13G4	-6.4
W. Germany	2049	-0.2969"	0.0951	-6.2
Canada	1704	-0.3621"	0.1185	-6.1
Denmark	1020	X.7553"	0.3.391	-5.7
Iceland	696	-0.4310"	0.2195	-5.6
Belgium	2671	-0.2146*	0.0817	-5.0
E. Germany	1329	-0.2316	0.1183	-4.8
Ireland	996	-0.3815"	0.1867	-4.8
N. Ireland	303	-0.2651	0.3443	-4.4
Britain	1478	-0.1992	0.1266	-4.1
Brazil	1761	-0.3288"	0.1499	-3.3
Norway	1226	-0.2377	0.1497	-3.3
Finland	580	-0.1717	0.1927	-3.1
China	995	-0.2581	0.1963	-3.0
Hungary	979	-0.1270	0.1379	-2.9
Argentina	986	-0.6029*	0.3037	-2.8
Spain	4048	-0.1597"	0.0804	-2.8
Portugal	1148	-0.0952	0.1395	-2.7
Turkey	1017	-0.3424	0.2690	-2.5
Chile	1478	-0.1191	0.1479	-2.4
Czechoslovakia	1396	-0.0770	0.1109	-1.8
Poland	931	-0.1116	0.1782	-1.7

Country	No. of Observations	Male β	Standard error	Marg. Eff (%)
USA	1821	-0.0049	0.1219	-1:5
Slovenia	1003	-0.7230*	0.1689	-1.4
Moscow	995	-0.1340	0.1499	-1.3
Austria	1445	-0.4124*	0.1221	-0.8
Italy	2014	0.0050	0.1084	0.1
Lithuania	978	0.0600	0.1389	1.3
India	2476	0.1028	0.1171	1.3
Nigeria	991	0.0692	0.1413	1.6
S. Korea	1246	0.1793	0.1598	2.4
Belarus	997	0.3223”	0.1490	6.6
Romania	1088	0.3542*	0.1373	7.7

* = Significant at 5%.

Table 2c. Country-wise Logit regression, World Values Survey data, 1981
Dependent variable = 1 if bribery is “never justified”, = 0 otherwise
(standard error in parentheses)

Country	No. of Observations	Male β	Standard error	Marg. Eff. (%)
Netherlands	1175	-0.5626”	0.1278	-11.9
Belgium	1053	-0.4902”	0.1314	-9.7
Japan	1077	-0.4488”	0.1347	-8.6
France	1161	-0.3697*	0.1255	-8.3
Sweden	938	-0.4384”	0.1550	-7.1
Iceland	917	-0.5886”	0.1882	-6.5
Argentina	879	-0.3575”	0.1812	-4.7
Denmark	1175	-0.6837”	0.2332	-3.7
N. Ireland	310	-0.4144	0.3857	-3.4
Norway	1228	-0.2748	0.1577	-3.4
Spain	2206	-0.2121”	0.1076	-3.3
Britain	1208	-0.2040	0.1444	-2.6
Italy	1305	-0.1251	0.1242	-2.6
W. Germany	1303	-0.1064	0.1188	-2.3
USA	2278	-0.0926	0.1080	-1.5
Australia	1209	-0.083 1	0.1442	-1.3
Canada	1243	-0.0919	0.1406	-1.3
Ireland	1173	-0.0162	0.1524	-0.5

* = Significant at 5%.

Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations, Georgia Survey, Stacked Data (N=2322)

	Unit	Whole sample (n=2322)	Male Owner/Senior Manager (n=1934)	Female Owner/Senior Manager (n=388)
Frequency of bribes	Percent	10.14 (26.44)	11.16 (27.61)	5.05 (18.81)
Amount of bribes	Lari	15.41 (382.35; n=2262)	18.19 (418.80; n=1885)	1.52 (6.79; n=377)
Size of firms – Small	Proportion	0.39 (0.49)	0.34 (0.47)	0.63 (0.48)
- Medium	Proportion	0.35 (0.48)	0.36 (0.48)	0.26 (0.44)
- Large	Proportion	0.27 (0.44)	0.30 (0.46)	0.10 (0.30)
Majority state ownership	Proportion	0.09 (0.29)	0.10 (0.30)	0.05 (0.21)
Foreign participation	Proportion	0.47 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.24 (0.43)
Sector – Trade	Proportion	0.51 (0.50)	0.48 (0.50)	0.67 (0.47)
- Manufacturing	Proportion	0.25 (0.44)	0.29 (0.45)	0.09 (0.29)
- Services	Proportion	0.48 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.42 (0.49)
Edu of senior manager - Univ.	Proportion	0.85 (0.36)	0.85 (0.35)	0.83 (0.38)
- post university	Proportion	0.08 (0.28)	0.09 (0.29)	0.04 (0.20)

Note: The proportions in various sectors add up to more than 100% because some firms are in more than one sector (say, Trade and Manufacturing).

Table 4. Georgian Enterprises, Patterns of Bribe Paying

Type of procedure	(1) Ordered Probit	(2) Ord. Probit Marginal Effect (%)	(3) Probit	(4) Probit Marginal Effect (%)	(5) OLS
Male owner / senior manager	0.673** (0.171)	13.7	0.659** (0.186)	13.38	10.363** (2.458)
Size of firms – Small (reference group = Large)	1.073** (0.301)	26.9	1.194** (0.328)	29.77	12.384** (3.708)
- Medium	0 578** (0.282)	15.57	0.677** (0.309)	18.37	4.180 (2.631)
Majority state ownership	-0.547* (0.3 16)	-10.66	-0.577* (0.34)	-11.0	-5 902** (1.849)
Foreign participation	0.084 (0.177)	2.09	0.098 (0.178)	2.43	0.085 (3.174)
Sector - Trade (reference group = Agriculture)	-0.041 (0.164)	-1.01	-0.029 (0.186)	-0.72	-0.08 (3.044)
- Manufacturing	0.109 (0.194)	2.76	0.303 (0.224)	7.98	-1.374 (2.884)
- Services	0.156 (0.171)	3.88	0.215 (0.185)	5.35	1.929 (3.339)
Edu of senior manager - Univ. (reference group = below Univ.)	-0.162 (0.201)	-4.20	-0.266 (0.237)	-7.06	-2.848 (3.612)
- post university	0.100 (0.343)	2.57	0.032 (0.394)	0.81	1.518 (6.914)
constant			-2.760** (0.533)		10.903** (6.625)
No of observations	2219		2219		2219
Adjusted/Pseudo R square	0.087		0.14		0.118

Notes: (1) Dummies were included for agency with which firm was in contact.
(2) Standard errors have been corrected for within-firm autocorrelation of error terms.
(3) We used data only for firms where the owner/senior manager was the respondent.
(4) Marginal effects were computed at the sample means.

**Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level.

Table 5. Summary Statistics and Data Sources for Cross-country Regressions

Variable	Year	Source	Unit	Mean (std. deviations)	N
TI98 Corruption Index	1998	Transparency International	1 =worst 10=best	4.99 (2.44)	79
ICRG Corruption Index	1995	Political Risk Services	1= worst 6 = best	3.72 (1.21)	90
Percent of labor force that is women	1990	WISTAT	Percent	36.33 (7.70)	69
Percent of women legislators in lower chamber	1991	WISTAT	percent	10.78 (8.76)	63
GNP Per Capita	1996	World Rank	US dollars	7662 (6458)	74
Population	1995	World Bank	millions	58.99 (174.41)	76
Average schooling years of population aged 15 or more	1990	Barro and Lee	Year	6.45 (2.52)	72
Index of Corruption-Restraining Institutions	1991	Humana	1 =worst 4 = best	2.77 (1.04)	75
Avg. govt. wage/Per capita GDP	1995	Schiavo-Campo et al.	fraction	2.85 (2.07)	60
Proportion of largest ethnic group	1990	Sullivan	percent	73.75 (24.46)	69
Gini-coefficient	1992	World Bank	percent	40.88 (9.41)	62
British colony dummy			dummy	0.32	78
Never been a colony dummy			dummy	0.36	78

Table 6a: Determinants of Corruption, Cross-Country Regressions, OLS
Dependent variable: Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 1998

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Parliament, percent women	0.071"" (0.014)	0.095** (0.013)	0.095** (0.018)	0.089** (0.017)				
Labor force, percent women					0.047** (0.022)	0.032" (0.019)	0.038 (0.024)	0.028 (0.021)
Lag (GNP per capita, 1995)	1.729"" (0.334)	1.805"" (0.229)	1.781** (0.355)	1.742** (0.286)	1.649** (0.322)	1.726** (0.304)	1.490** (0.452)	1.953** (0.380)
Lcg (population, 1995)	-0.200" (0.104)	-0.194"" (0.070)	-0.214"" (0.090)	-0.163" (0.094)	-0.340"" (0.110)	-0.345"" (0.101)	-0.372** (0.131)	-0.301"" (0.125)
Average years of schooling 1990	0.070 (0.119)	0.023 (0.075)	0.060 (0.093)	0.056 (0.119)	0.097 (0.117)	0.062 (11.101)	0.073 (0.115)	0.003 (0.153)
Former British Colony (dummy)		2.057** (0.354)	2.180** (0.414)	1.744** (0.476)		1.590"" (3.371)	1.878** (0.448)	1.034** (0.456)
Never colonized (dummy)		0.479 (0.418)	0.576 (0.599)	0.237 (0.607)		3.721 (3.493)	0.920 (0.630)	-0.118 (0.706)
Percent in largest ethnic group		0.004 (0.007)	0.009 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)		3.001 (0.008)	0.007 (0.009)	0.004 (0.009)
Corruption-restraining institutions			-0.016 (0.287)				0.377 (0.326)	
Government wage/GDP per capita			0.110 (0.100)				0.058 (0.129)	
Gini coefficient, income inequality				-0.002 (0.021)				-0.034 (0.022)
Constant	-10.307 (2.373)	-12.356 (1.541)	-12.763 (2.223)	-11.523 (1.908)	-10.286 (2.333)	-11.051 (2.045)	-11.099 (2.842)	-10927 (2.443)
N	57	57	47	47	66	65	52	51
R2	.76	.86	.88	.85	.71	.77	.81	.79

Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed using White's heteroskedastic-consistent variance/covariance matrix.
**Significant at.05 for 2-tailed test; * significant at .10.

ARE WOMEN REALLY THE "FAIRER" SEX? CORRUPTION AND WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT

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ABSTRACT:

Numerous behavioral studies have found women to be more trust-worthy and public-spirited than men. These results suggest that women should be particularly effective in promoting honest government. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the greater the representation of women in parliament, the lower the level of corruption. We find this association in a large cross-section of countries; the result is robust to a wide range of specifications.

JEL Codes: H10; J16

Keywords: Corruption; Gender; Government

We thank Paolo Mauro for allowing us to use his data set. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the authors' own and do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank or its member countries.

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INTRODUCTION

Over the past couple of decades, a considerable body of work has emerged that has found systematic differences in behavioral characteristics across gender. The basic hypothesis proposed by this literature is that men are more individually oriented (selfish) than women. This has been demonstrated to be the case in a wide range of institutional contexts, through both experimental and survey-based studies. For example, women are more likely to exhibit 'helping' behavior (Eagly and Crowley, 1986); vote based on social issues (Goertzel, 1983); score more highly on 'integrity tests' (Ones and Viswesvaran, 1998); take stronger stances on ethical behavior (Glover et al, 1997; Reiss and Mitra, 1998); and behave more generously when faced with economic decisions (Eckel and Grossman, 1998)[27].

These results imply that women will be less likely to sacrifice the common good for personal (material) gain. This may be particularly relevant for the role of women in government since, almost by definition, one of the most significant difficulties faced by public bureaucracies is designing institutions that discourage their agents from acting opportunistically, at the expense of the public. Of course, governments worldwide remain male-dominated, and some political scientists and feminist scholars have cited this fact in explaining the poor functioning and lack of responsiveness of many governments (see, for example, Staudt, 1998). More to the point, increasing the direct participation of women in government could serve to mitigate these problems. In reference to the potential role of women in the Russian government, political scientist Valerii Tishkov has argued quite forcefully that "women bring enriching values [to government]." As a result, they "rarely succumb to authoritarian styles of behavior and prefer not to maintain the sort of expensive entourage which often accompanies high-placed (male) officials. Finally, the presence of women in the higher echelons of the hierarchical structures exercises an extremely positive influence on the behavior of their male colleagues by restraining, disciplining and elevating the latters' behavior."

Given the prevalence of the perceptions outlined in the preceding paragraph, surprisingly little work has been done to evaluate the underlying idea: that increased female participation leads to more honest government. In this paper, we make a first attempt at evaluating this hypothesis by examining the relationship between female participation in government legislatures and the level of perceived corruption in a sample of more than 100 countries. We find a strong, negative, and statistically significant relationship between the proportion of women in a country's legislature and the level of corruption, as measured by the ICRG corruption index.

The paper will proceed as follows: Section I will briefly outline the data that were collected for this project; in Section II, we present our basic econometric results and their interpretation; finally, Section III contains a discussion of the results and our conclusions.

[27] Admittedly, the evidence from 'economic' experiments is somewhat mixed. However, the most recent work, cited above, gives probably the cleanest results in this area. Eckel and Grossman (1998) find that in a double-blind dictator game, women donate twice as much as men to their anonymous partners when any factors that might confound co-operation are eliminated.

I. DATA

Our data for this paper are drawn from a wide range of sources. A more detailed description of the variables and their sources may be found in the Appendix.

As our principal measure of corruption, we use the *International Country Risk Guide's* corruption index (*CORRUPT*); this is the measure that has been most commonly used in previous work in the economics literature, and also has the widest coverage of the standard corruption indices. This variable is meant to capture the likelihood that high government officials will demand special payments, and the extent to which illegal payments are expected throughout low levels of government. In addition to allowing for consistency with previous studies, *CORRUPT* has the advantage of having the broadest coverage of countries, which maximizes our sample size. The index itself takes on values ranging from zero (most corrupt) to six (least corrupt); hence, the index is *decreasing* in the level of corruption. We will briefly discuss other frequently used measures of corruption in a later section.

Our measure of female involvement in government comes from the Inter-parliamentary Union's survey, *Women in Parliaments: 1945-1995*. This publication lists the proportion of parliamentary seats that were held by women in the upper and lower Houses in each country. The variable *PARL* is the average of these two proportions; in countries with only a single chamber, *PARL* was set equal to the proportion of women in that chamber.

We expect both the level of corruption and political opportunities available to women to be affected by the overall level of social and economic development. Hence, we include log(*GDP*) and log(*GDP*) squared as controls. Similarly, reduced corruption and increased women's political opportunities may both result from increased political and civil freedom; to control for this possibility, we include Gastil's Civil Liberties index (*CIVIL*) as a control. A number of other variables have been shown to be important explanatory variables in corruption regressions; to reduce the likelihood of omitted variable bias, we also run specifications using these variables[28]. These variables include: the log of population (log(*POP*)); average years of schooling (*SCHOOL*); openness to trade (*OPEN*); and ethnic fractionalization (*ETHNIC*). Finally, we include specifications with regional dummies, colonial dummies, and legal origin dummies[29].

There is some variation in our variables across years, but we are limited to 1985, 1990, and 1995 because these are the only years for which *PARL* and *CORRUPT* are available.

Summary statistics are listed in Table 1, both for the full sample, as well as the lowest and highest quartiles, by GDP. The raw correlation between *CORRUPT* and *PARL* is very high (0.38). However, as Table 1 makes clear, both variables are also correlated with overall development, as proxied by per capita income. To examine the extent to which there is an independent relationship between *CORRUPT* and *PARL*, we proceed to the regressions in Section II.

[28] See Ades and Di Tella (1997) and Gatti (1999) to see explanations for the inclusion of these variables.

[29] Staudt (1998) claims that one variable that has a significant impact on female representation in government is whether a country has a system of proportional representation. Her argument is that this electoral arrangement provides an incentive for parties to compete along an ideological continuum, which results in higher minority (and female) representation. It may be argued that the resulting fractionalization of government could reduce corruption (due to the presence of many watchdogs). We have collected data on government fractionalization, and do not find this to be correlated with women in parliament or corruption, not surprisingly, therefore, the inclusion of government fractionalization in our regressions does not affect the other coefficients.

II. Empirical Results

Our basic specification is the following:

$$CORRUPT_{iy} = \alpha + \beta_1 * PARL_{iy} + \beta_2 * \log(GDP_{iy}) + \beta_3 * [\log(GDP_{iy})]_2 + \beta_4 * CIVIL_{iy} + \beta_5 * Y90_{iy} + \beta_6 * Y95_{iy} + \varepsilon_{iy}$$

where i and y are country and year indices respectively. The first column of Table 1 shows the results from this regression, where the reported standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and allow for the clustering of residuals by country. The coefficient on *PARL* is significantly positive at 1 percent; its size, 3.53, implies that a one standard deviation increase in *PARL* (0.08) will result in a decline in corruption, as measured by *CORRUPT*, of 20 percent of a standard deviation. Thus, the presence of female parliamentarians apparently has a significant, negative effect on corruption.

To investigate the possibility that the preceding result may be driven by outliers, we repeated the previous regression, omitting observations with very high leverage according to the method of Kmenta (1986)[30]. The result, listed in the second column, suggests an even larger effect from female political participation, with a coefficient on *PARL* of 4.48.

The remaining columns of Table 1 show the results of alternative specifications. Few of the added variables are significant; moreover, the coefficient on *PARL* is hardly affected by the choice of specification.

Another concern regarding the chosen specification relates to our choice of *CORRUPT* as a measure of corruption. As explained above, we consider this to be the most appropriate measure currently available. Nonetheless, we repeated our analyses using the two other corruption indices that are commonly used in the economics literature. These include the so-called German Exporter corruption index (GCI), developed by Peter Neumann (1994), and the *World Competitiveness Report's* corruption index (WCRCI); see the Appendix for descriptions of these variables. With WCRCI as our dependent variable, we obtained results that were extremely similar to those reported above, in terms of both the significance and magnitude of the effect of *PARL*. When GCI was used, the coefficient on *PARL* was of the correct sign, though not significant, in the basic model; the sign, size, and significance of the coefficient were highly sensitive to the choice of specification.

Obviously, some care is required in interpreting our results. Since we are dealing with cross-country data, it may be that some unobserved variable is causing both high female participation in government and low corruption. We have tried to mitigate these concerns by including in our regressions variables to control for various underlying institutional characteristics that would most likely be responsible for such a spurious correlation.

[30] These outliers are excluded from all subsequent regressions. While we obtained similar results with outliers included, countries where outliers were found to have highly variable values of *PARL*, bringing into question the validity of these observations (for example, the value of *PARL* for Romania went from 0.15 in 1975, to 0.32 in 1980, before declining to 0.02 in 1985 and 1990; its current level is 0.12).

III. Conclusions

There exists a substantial literature in the social sciences which suggests that women may have higher standards of ethical behavior and be more concerned with the common good. Consistent with this micro-level evidence, we find that at the country level, higher rates of female participation in government are associated with lower levels of corruption.

Increasing the presence of women in government may be valued for its own sake, for reasons of gender equality.

However, our results suggest that there may be extremely important spinoffs stemming from increasing female representation: if women are less likely than men to behave opportunistically, then bringing more women into government may have significant benefits for society in general.

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DATA APPENDIX

WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT	Percentage of seats occupied by women in the lower and upper chamber. Source: Women in Parliaments.
CORRUPTION	Corruption, index ranging from 0 to 6 (6=lower corruption) for 1982-1995. Source: International Country Risk Guide.
GDP	Real GDP per capita in constant dollars, chain Index deflated, expressed in international prices, base 1985. Source: WDI, World Bank.
CIVIL LIBERTIES	Gastil index of civil liberties. Values from 1 to 7, (1=most freedom) are attributed to countries taking into consideration such issues as freedom of press, of political association and trade unions. The index is available for the years 1972-95. Source: Banks.
SCHOOLING	Average years of schooling in the adult population, available for 1960-1990. Source: Barro-Lee (1993).
FRACTIONALIZATION	Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index (measures the probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group). Source: Mauro, initially from the Atlas Narodov Mira (Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of the USSR, Moscow, 1964) and Taylor and Hudson (World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 1972).
LEGAL ORIGIN	Origin of a country legal system. Source: La Porta et al (1998).
OPENNESS	Share of import in GDP. Source: WDI, World Bank.
REGIONAL DUMMIES	World Bank classification.
COLONIAL DUMMIES	Indicators of colonial affiliation. Sources: CIA World Factbook.
POPULATION	Source: WDI, World Bank.

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF CORRUPTION

GERMAN EXPORTERS	Total proportion of deals involving kickbacks, according to German exporters. Source: Neumann (1994); obtained from Paolo Mauro.
WCO	Corruption index from the *World Competitiveness Report*; extent to which improper practices (such as bribing and corruption) prevail in the public sector. Source: obtained from Paolo Mauro.

TABLES

Table 1. Summary statistics, 1990

	All Countries	Poorest Quartile (income below $1169)	Richest Quartile (income above $6866)
Income	4639.0	717.0	11824.0
Corruption (ICRG index)	3.35	2.74	4.64
Women in parliament (%)	10	7	17
Civil liberties	3.99	5.61	1.75
Average years of schooling	5.35	1.99	8.18

Table 2. OLS estimates. Dependent variable: Absence of corruption, ICRG index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Percentage of women in parliament	3.53 (3.1)	4.48 (3.92)	4.53 (3.85)	4.15 (3.00)	4.07 (2.82)	4.59 (4.03)	3.97 (3.39)	4.37 (3.68)	4.35 (4.62)	3.26 (1.83)
Log of GDP	-2.55 (1.58)	-3.45 (2.54)	-3.45 (-2.53)	-3.15 (-1.75)	-3.10 (-1.71)	-3.38 (-2.47)	-4.60 (-3.00)	-0.32 (-0.16)	-2.68 (-2.43)	-3.76 (-2.47)
Log of GDP squared	0.20 (2.00)	0.25 (2.96)	0.25 (2.94)	0.25 (2.24)	0.24 (2.16)	0.25 (2.9)	0.32 (3.46)	0.05 (0.45)	0.20 (2.86)	0.27 (2.84)
Civil liberties	-0.08 (1.61)	-0.05 (-0.86)	-0.05 (-0.92)	-0.04 (-0.56)	-0.04 (-0.53)	-0.04 (-0.72)	-0.05 (-0.88)	-0.15 (-2.55)	-0.07 (-1.32)	-0.07 (-1.19)
Log of population			0.01 (0.29)							
Schooling sample				Yes						
Schooling					0.02 (0.41)					
Openness						0.002 (0.89)				
Ethnic fractionalization							-0.0006 (-0.13)			
Regional dummies								Yes (P=0.00)		
Colonial dummies control									Yes (P=0.00)	
Legal origin										Yes (P=0.01)
Excluding outliers	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	270	259	259	144	144	255	232	259	259	259
R2	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.57	0.57	0.51	0.57	0.58	0.55	0.53

t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for heteroschedasticity and for correlation within country clusters. When various dummies are included as controls, p-values for the joint significance of such dummies are reported. Outliers are identified based on hat matrix diagnostics (Bulgaria, Finland, Guyana, Norway, Romania, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, Zaire).

FAIRER SEX OR FAIRER SYSTEM? GENDER AND CORRUPTION REVISITED[31]

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ABSTRACT:

Two recent influential studies found that larger representations of women in government reduced corruption. Assuming that the observed gender differentials were caused by women's inclinations toward honesty and the common good, both studies advocated increased female participation in government to combat corruption. This study argues that the observed association between gender and corruption is spurious and mainly caused by its context, liberal democracy - a political system that promotes gender equality and better governance. Data favor this "fairer system" thesis.

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most stunning findings in recent corruption research is the discovery of the negative relationship between women in government and corruption. It is claimed that "higher rates of female participation in government are associated with lower levels of corruption" (Dollar, Fisman & Gatti 2001:427). Why does female participation reduce government corruption? Several plausible explanations based on extant psychological and sociological theories of deviance have been contemplated, although none has been empirically tested. The argument centering on the rule-abiding tendency of women and the rule-breaking proclivity of men follows naturally from models that treat female participation in government as an exogenous factor. Not surprisingly, these studies conclude that "women may have higher standards of ethical behavior and be more concerned with the common good" (Dollar, Fisman & Gatti 2001:427), and that "increasing women's presence in public life can reduce levels of corruption" (Swamy et. al. 2001:26).

This study examines the new truism that women make governments more honest. In the first section I review the two studies that form the main source of this "fairer sex" claim, and I indicate that there is reason to suspect that such an assertion may be based on model misspecification or faulty inferences. Next I present an alternative fairer system explanation: Both increased female participation in government and decreased governmental corruption are contingent on higher political liberalization, suggesting that the statistical association between gender and corruption may be coincidental and not causal. Four simple hypotheses are formulated from the fairer system argument and tested with cross-national data from 99 nations or territories. This article concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of these findings for our understanding of official corruption.

THE DISCOVERY OF THE FAIRER SEX

My discussion of the fairer-sex thesis focuses on two studies published in refereed journals in 2001. One, the result of research by David Dollar, Sandra Fisman, and Roberta Gatti, first appeared as a World Bank working paper in October 1999, and the revised version was published in the *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* in 2001 (Dollar, Fisman & Gatti 2001; Swamy et al. 2001). The other, the result of research by Anand Swamy and colleagues, was first available as a working paper by the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS), University of Maryland, in November 1999 and published in the *Journal of Development Economics* in 2001. The earlier versions of these research analyses have been available to the public for some time, and their findings and conclusions were widely reported and disseminated by the media and nongovernment organizations (i.e., Crawford 2001; Transparency International 2000).

Dollar and colleagues use, as their point of departure, past behavioral findings that women are more inclined to demonstrate altruistic and moral behaviors than men are (Eagly & Crowley 1986; Eckel & Grossman 1998; Glover et al. 1997) and public-spirited attitudes (Goertzel 1983; Ones & Viswesvaran 1998). Based on these micro-level research studies, they formulated and tested the aggregate-level hypothesis that women are more effective in promoting honest governments. Corruption in this study was measured by the corruption index compiled by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which consisted of the ICRG research staff's subjective ratings of both the likelihood of bribe solicitation by public officials and the levels of bribery in government (Howell, Coplin & O'Leary 1998). The regression modeling of country-level panel data included controls for population, civil liberties, population, average schooling, trade openness, ethnic fractionalization, and colonial history, and yielded robust backing to the formulated hypothesis. The authors concluded that the greater the representation of women in parliaments, the lower the level of corruption.

In contrast to the World Bank-sponsored study, which only reviewed scientific literature on the presumed moral superiority of women, the IRIS study, conducted by Swami and colleagues, actually measured and corroborated this inverse relationship between women in government and corruption by analyzing data from World Values Surveys, which found that women were more likely than men to condemn bribe-taking. Findings from a related examination of business people in the Republic of Georgia also reported that female business owners and managers were less likely to give bribes than their male counterparts. Finally, Swami and colleagues concluded with a cross-national comparison that replicated findings from Dollar and colleagues' study. Relying on the Corruption Perception Index, which was constructed by Transparency International (2001) from annual surveys of high-ranking business executives and analysts around the world, they examined the relationship between women in government and corruption in 93 countries, controlling for GNP per capita, average schooling, religious composition, ethnic composition and political freedoms. Countries that had larger representations of women in parliament or the private management sector suffered lower levels of corruption.

Despite differences in data and methods of analysis, these two studies share two fundamental similarities. First, they openly use cross-level individualistic and ecological inferences to formulate probabilistic hypotheses as well as to draw policy implications for their findings. Second, both studies report a statistically nonspurious and policy-relevant relationship between female participation in government and reduced corruption. These two common traits define the outlook and impact of both studies.

Both of these studies make causal inferences that cross different levels of analysis. On the one hand, they rely on individual-level findings of female honesty to propose hypotheses about groups (e.g., female citizens are less tolerant of corrupt ion, therefore larger representations of women in government prevent corruption). By attempting to construct aggregate observations of corruption from knowledge of individual behavior, they risk aggregative error associated with the individualist fallacy. This kind of cross-level thinking, not new in public policy debate, has often proved misleading. For example, since attitudinal surveys have repeatedly shown that African Americans tend to hold more liberal social and political views, some American researchers have advocated increasing black representation in judicial positions of influence to improve justice and equality in sentencing (Pitkins 1972; Washington 1998). Evaluations of judicial decision-making suggest, however, that the relationship between judges' ethnicity and sentencing outcomes are complex (Welch, Combs & Gruhl 1988; Holmes et al. 1993), and that more often than not, black judges' sentencing behaviors are not different from those of their white colleagues (Spohn 1990a, 1990b). It seems quite difficult to produce desired aggregate policy outcomes by engineering individual preferences or prejudices.

On the other hand, both studies under discussion here used aggregate data to make inferences about the nature of individuals (i.e., gender differentials from cross-national analyses were used to demonstrate that male government officials are more corruption-prone). According to Swami and colleagues, the individual-level finding of female disapproval of corruption and the aggregate- level finding of lower levels of corruption in countries with higher female representation in government "reinforce each other, and taken together, make a strong case" (2001:51). Similarly, Dollar and colleagues conclude that "consistent with this micro-level evidence [i.e., past findings of female honesty and altruism], we find that at the country level, higher rates of female participation in government are associated with lower levels of corruption" (2001:427). But the theoretical consistency across levels reported in these studies is simply an exercise of cross-level inferences forced by statistical under-identification- that is, by the lack of relevant information with which to determine the process at work that connects female participation in government to reduced corruption (Achen & Shively 1995). As a consequence, the policy recommendations suggested in these two studies originated from the cross-level inferences that researchers assumed to be true and valid, and not directly from their data.

The main conclusion or "stylized fact" that emerged from these two studies is the existence of a robust statistical association between female participation in government and lower levels of corruption in government at the aggregate level of analysis. In regard to the causal mechanisms that lead to this phenomenon, there can only be speculations, in the absence of empirically tested explanations. Dollar and colleagues conceded that the observed relationship between gender and corruption might be spurious. "It may be that some unobserved variable is causing both high female participation and low corruption" (2001:427). Potential confounding factors were controlled for during multivariate analyses, although the imposition of statistical controls was not theory-d rive n. When the strong relationship between gender and corruption seemed insensitive to these statistical controls, researchers eagerly proposed to fight corruption by increasing female involvement in public life. Despite their words of caution, authors of these two studies appeared to believe that the association between gender and corruption was not only statistically significant, but also ontologically causal and politically relevant.

AN ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT: THE FAIRER SYSTEM

Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the nineteenth century that expanded educational opportunities for women went along with a social structure that was generally more participatory and, hence, more receptive to democracy ([1835] 2000). Following the same reasoning, I will argue here that the association between gender and corruption at the cross-national level is at least partially spurious and that both female participation in government, and lower levels of corruption, are dependent on a liberal democratic polity. This argument adopts a structural perspective that seeks to find a macro-level explanation to a macro-level problem.

Liberal democracy is "a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property" (Zakaria 1997). Democratic governments are produced by open and impartial elections; constitutional liberalism defends fundamental individual rights through limited government, checks and balances, equality under the law, an independent judiciary, and separation of church and state. Although both democracy and constitutional liberalism represent long-standing traditions in Western history, the first modern liberal democracy was born in 1893, when New Zealand gave voting rights to women (Reynolds 1999).

The structure of a political system can encourage or prevent women's entry to that very system. Since constitutional liberalism argues that human beings have certain inalienable rights and that governments must secure them, female involvement in public affairs has been a hallmark of liberal democracies (Kumar 1999). Recent cross- national analyses concluded that the representation of women in national legislatures was dependent on the presence of a proportional representation system and an egalitarian atmosphere that stressed gender equality (Paxton 1997; Reynolds 1999). Systemic and ideological factors were found to be the main determinants of female participation in national politics. A more important conclusion was that democratic elections themselves are not sufficient to bring women into the highest legislative or executive positions; rather it is the liberal tradition of fairness, pluralism, and tolerance that facilitates the entry and permanence of women in key political positions (Reynolds 1999).

Liberal democratic polity not only improves women's political standing in a country, but also reduces the incidence of corruption. First, although competitive elections are not a panacea against corruption, they motivate opposition candidates to expose corrupt incumbents (Haywood 1997; Rose- Ackerman 1999). The threat of realistic political challengers or alternatives can greatly control the greed of those in power and minimize opportunities for dishonest deals that could be rampant when there is longevity of power. In addition to competitive elections, liberal democracy breeds two institutional watchdogs that are well equipped to combat corrupt practices in government: an independent judiciary and free journalism (Sung 2002). An independent judiciary that punishes offenses by the powerful, along with an investigative

journalistic tradition that questions official practices, are necessary guarantors of government transparency and accountability. In open societies, these two institutions expose official malfeasance as scandals and prosecute wrongdoers without impunity. Where a free press is maintained, an effective judiciary is in place, and the citizenry is permitted to express their opinions and preferences through the ballot box, one would expect to find a cleaner government.

The generic indices of "civil liberties" and "political rights" from the Freedom House were included as control variables in the World Bank and the IRIS studies respectively, but did not influence the outcome to the extent that the "fairer system" theory would have predicted (Dollar et al. 2001, Swami et al. 2001). Gender variables remained statistically and substantively significant even after these political measures were held constant. The rating system employed by Freedom House's survey team was based on a large number of checklist questions tapping many different dimensions of a country's polity (Karatnycky 2001). The "civil liberties" measure covered 14 major liberty- related issues ranging from freedom of assembly to freedom from exploitation by landlords, whereas the "political rights" variable was composed of 10 scores reflecting citizens' participation in politics, extending from open elections to the state's influence in the ethnic composition of the country. The excessive (albeit rich) comprehensiveness, and thus vagueness, of these operational indicators renders them extremely abstract and somewhat hard to interpret. In particular, these global indicators do not convey any specific information on key individual social and political institutions-such as party-based political competition, the rule of law, and the existence of an independent investigative journalism- that define the liberality and democratic nature of a polity (Carothers 1998; Isham, Kaufmann & Pritchett 1997; Zakaria 1997). More seriously, the concepts of freedom from government corruption and gender equality were both incorporated in the construction of the civil liberties index; therefore the inclusion of the latter as an independent variable becomes a tautological misspecification. These problems with the Freedom House indexes indicate that potential disturbances from the key factors defining the "fairness" of the political system were neither conceptually contemplated nor empirically controlled for in the two reviewed studies.

Unlike the bivariate nonspurious model suggested by the World Bank and IRIS studies, the alternative "fairer system" model presented here recognizes the existence of a statistical association between gender and corruption, but argues that when appropriate measures of liberal democracy are introduced into the equation, the original gender-corruption correlation becomes spurious. In sum, liberal democratic institutions and spirit increase female participation in government and restrain systemic corruption, but the latter two factors are not causally related.

HYPOTHESES

The alternative argument presented above is translated into four testable propositions, to be tested with cross-national data.

- *Hypothesis 1:* Liberal democracy and female participation in government are positively correlated.
- *Hypothesis 2:* Both liberal democracy and female participation in government are negatively associated with corruption.
- *Hypothesis 3:* When the strengths of liberal democratic institutions are held constant, .the negative relationship between female participation and corruption becomes spurious.
- *Hypothesis 4:* When the levels of female participation in government are held constant, the negative relationship between liberal democracy and corruption remains significant.

If analytical results are consistent with all four hypotheses, the "fairer system" thesis is accepted and the "fairer sex" thesis rejected. If hypothesis 3 is falsified, the "fairer sex" thesis remains a valid argument. If hypothesis 4 is falsified, the "fairer system" thesis fails as a viable theory.

DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODS

Data to test the four formulated hypotheses are drawn from a number of sources. Transparency International produces an annual corruption ranking based on the perceived level of government corruption reported by senior managers and analysts working for national or multinational investment and trade firms (Galtung 1999). Survey respondents provided local estimates of the degree of corruption, given the meaning of "corruption" in their own cultural context. The 99 countries and territories ranked in 1999 form the sample of this analysis (see Appendix).

Female participation in government is operationalized as the proportion of women among ministerial officials, the proportion of women among sub- ministerial officials, and the proportion of women among parliamentarians. Information about executive officials is collected from the United Nations (2000), and parliamentary data are gathered from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2000).

In order to avoid the shortcomings of the IRIS and World Bank studies Dollar et al. 2001 Swami et al. 2001), I gave up the use of generic indicators from the Freedom House and opted for more direct and specific measurement of institutional features that characterize a liberal democracy. In this study, liberal democracy is therefore operationalized by three indexes (rule of law, freedom of press, and democratic elections) obtained from the Fraser Institute (Gwartney & Lawson 2000) and the Freedom House (1999, 2000), respectively. To generate the rule of law index, the Fraser Institute modified and converted the judicial independence index originally compiled by the World Economic Forum (2000), which comprised appraisals from more than 4,000 respondents around the world, as to whether the local judiciary was independent and not subject to political interference. The press freedom rating is performed annually by Freedom House's researchers based on observations and analyses from their staff, external consultants, human rights organizations, international news media, and various government agencies, including the U.S. State Department. It examines and rates each country's laws and regulations governing media content, incidents and patterns of political control and intimidation of the press, and the presence of economic press u res that influence media content. The electoral democracy variable simply identifies countries that have elected heads of state through universal and fair suffrage.

Table 1: Description of Variables

Name	Description	Mean	S.D.	Missing
Corruption a	Corruption perception index 1999 (Transparency International 2000)	4.60	2.36	0
GNP	Gross national product per capita 1999 (World Bank 2001)	8042.63	10601.22	0
Poverty	Percent population below poverty line (World Bank 2001)	23.61	15.04	23
Illiteracy	Percent population aged 15 or above illiterate 1998 (Central Intelligence Agency 1999)	12.52	15.91	3
Women in cabinet	Percent Ministerial officials female 1998 (United Nations 2000)	9.44	8.23	2
Women in government	Percent subministerial officials female 1998 (United Nations 2000)	8.28	11.30	2
Women in parliament	Percent Parliamentarians female 1998 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2000)	12.37	8.10	2
Rule of law	Rule of law index 1997 (Gwartney & Lawson 2000)	6.83	2.49	14
Freedom of press a	Freedom of press ratings 1999 (Freedom House 2000)	39.84	21.78	
Electoral democracy b	Electoral democracies 1999 (Freedom House 2000)	Yes: 73 (73.73%) No: 26 (26.26%)		0

a Variable values are inverted (multiplied by - 1) in statistical analyses to allow easier interpretation of coefficients (the higher the score or rating, the more accentuated is the phenomenon named).
b Dichotomous variable (O = no; 1= yes).

Three indicators of socioeconomic development often associated with corruption are introduced as control variables in the multivariate analyses. These are the gross national product per capita and the proportion of population below the poverty line, both collected from a World Bank publication (2001), and the illiteracy rate, which is gathered from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's annual factbook (1999).

It should be noted that since objective hard data on abstract hypothetical constructs such as corruption and the rule of law were difficult to come by, individual-level survey data were collapsed into country-level indicators by international rating organizations. In this methodological context, survey respondents were much more than discrete individuals, they were treated as members of a collective (Lazarsfeld & Menzel 196l). When survey data were aggregated to country level, they provided information on the analytical properties of the country and thus allowed examination of relationships among the analytical properties (corruption, the rule of law, and illiteracy), structural properties (poverty and women in government), and global properties (GN P, press freedom, and electoral democracy) of countries at the same macro-level of analysis. On the one hand, this macro-level convergence of operational definitions limited the interpretation of data and the discussion of findings to a single level of analysis. On the other hand, it helped to avoid cross-level inferences that compromised the IRIS and World Bank studies.

The hypotheses were tested by examining correlation coefficients between corruption, measures of female participation in government, and liberal democracy, at both bivariate and multivariate levels. Multiple regression analysis was conducted on each measure of women in government separately as well as on the entire set of gender variables simultaneously to detect both the anticipated statistical association between liberal democratic polity and the spuriousness of the ostensible gender-corruption relationship. Changes in the regression coefficients corresponding to the gender variables were evaluated to assess the strength or spuriousness of the hypothesized relationships. Since the problem of missing data was not serious and the sample size was limited, pairwise deletion was implemented (Little & Schenker, 1995). Results from the same procedures using listwise deletion yielded similar findings, which demonstrated in turn the stoutness of findings reported in this article.[2] Given the directionality of the hypotheses, one-tail significance tests are reported.

Table 2: Intercorrelations among Variables

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Corruption	----				
2. GNP	.856*** (99)	----			
3. Poverty	.541*** (76)	.490*** (76)	----		
4. Illiteracy	.403*** (96)	.463*** (96)	.535*** (75)	-----	
5.Women in cabinet	-.566*** (97)	.512*** (97)	-.415*** (76)	.331** (94)	-----
6.Women in government	-.261* (97)	.132 (97)	-.251* (76)	-.151 (94)	.368*** (97)
7. Women in parliament	-.571*** (97)	.503*** (97)	-.265* (76)	-.258* (94)	.599*** (97)
8. Rule of law	-.696*** (85)	.666*** (85)	-.305** (71)	-.304** (84)	.359** (83)
9. Freedom of press	-.689*** (98)	.630*** (98)	-.471*** (71)	-.388*** (95)	.489*** (97)
10. Electoral democracy	-.256*** (99)	.255** (99)	-.313** (76)	-.370*** (96)	.242* (97)

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (one-tail test)

RESULTS

Hypothesis 1: Liberal democracy and female participation in government are positively correlated.

Bivariate correlations provide very strong support for this hypothesis (Table 2). The nine correlations that connect the three measures of female participation in government and the three measures of liberal democracy are all positive in direction, mostly statistically significant, and substantively powerful. Correlation coefficients range from .145 (between women in subministerial positions and rule of law) to .515 (between women in parliament seats and rule of law).

Table 2: Intercorrelations among Variables (cont'd)

	6	7	8	9	10
1. Corruption					
2. GNP					
3. Poverty					
4. Illiteracy					
5.Women in cabinet					
6.Women in government	-----				
7. Women in parliament	.281** (97)	----			
8. Rule of law	.145 (83)	.515*** (83)	----		
9. Freedom of press	.275** (97)	.453*** (97)	.498*** (84)	-----	
10. Electoral democracy	.149 (97)	.157 (97)	.104 (85)	.626*** (98)	----

*p < .05 **p< .01 ***p < .001 (one-tail test)

The measure of women in ministerial positions is the gender variable most consistently and strongly associated with rule of law (.359), freedom of press (.489), and democratic elections (.242). The proportion of women occupying subministerial positions maintains the weakest positive relationships with the same operational indicators of liberal democracy (.145, .275, and .149 respectively). By the same token, freedom of press emerges as the aspect of liberal democracy that has the closest relationships with women in cabinet positions (.489), women in noncabinet positions (.275), and women in parliament seats (.453). In comparison, having an electoral democracy is only moderately or weakly correlated with the same gender variables (.242, .149, and .157 respectively).

Hypothesis 2: Both liberal democracy and female participation in government are negatively associated with corruption.

This proposition is also largely corroborated (see Table 2). The three measures of women in government, as well as the three indicators of liberal democracy, are all very strongly correlated to lower levels of corruption. At this (bivariate) level of analysis, an increased role for women in national politics appears as powerfully linked to lower levels of corruption as having vigorous political and civic institutions defending individual rights and exercising freedoms.

Table 3: Regression Analysis Relating to Women in Cabinet (Ministerial Position) with Corruption

	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	S.E.	β	B	S.E.	β
Control variables						
GNP	-.000	.000	-.737***	-.000	.000	-.514
Poverty	.025	.012	.015*	.022	.011	.138*
Illiteracy	-.010	.011	-.072	-.009	.010	-.059
Female participation						
Women in cabinet	-.042	.020	-.147*	-.030	.019	-.105
Liberal democracy						
Rule of law	----	----	----	-.174	.071	-.184**
Freedom of press[a]	----	----	----	-.025	.010	-.235**
Electoral democracy	----	----	----	.467	.404	.087
R^2		.770***		.818***		
Incremental R^2		----		.047***		

(N = 99)
* p < .05 ** p < .01 p < .001 (one-tail test)

Table 4: Regression Analysis Relating Women in Government (Subministerial Officials) with Corruption

	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	S.E.	β	B	S.E.	β
Control variables						
GNP	-.000	.000	-.794***	-.000	.000	-.557***
Poverty	.025	.012	.157*	.022	.011	.139*
Illiteracy	-.010	.011	-.068	-.008	.010	-.056
Female participation						
Women in government	-.041	.019	-.127*	-.023	.018	-.083
Liberal democracy						
Rule of law	----	----	----	-.169	.071	-.178**
Freedom of press [a]	----	----	----	-.026	.010	-.238**
Electoral democracy	----	----	----	.470	.405	.088
R^2		.770***			.816***	
Incremental R^2		----			.046***	

(N = 99)
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p <.001 (one-tail test)

Table 5: Regression Analysis Relating Women in Parliaments with Corruption

	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	S.E.	β	B	S.E.	β
Control variables						
GNP	-.000	.000	-.706***	-.000	.000	-.523***
Poverty	.029	.011	.184*	.024	.011	.156*
Illiteracy	-.011	.011	-.070	-.009	.010	-.058
Female participation						
Women in parliaments	-.054	.019	-.185*	-.032	.019	-.109
Liberal democracy						
Rule of law	----	----	----	-.145	.073	-.153*
Freedom of press	----	----	----	-.026	.010	-.237**
Electoral democracy	----	----	----	.456	.403	.085
R^2		.781***			.818***	
Incremental R^2		----			.037***	

(N = 99)

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p <.001 (one-tail test)

Table 6: Regression Analysis Relating All Measures of Female Participation in Government with Corruption

	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	S.E.	β	B	S.E.	β
Control variables						
GNP	-.000	.000	-.708***	-.000	.000	-.526***
Poverty	.024	.012	.156*	.021	.011	.136*
Illiteracy	-.011	.010	-.073	-.009	.010	-.060
Female participation						
Women in cabinet	-.014	.023	-.049*	-.016	.022	-.054
Women in government	-.026	.020	-.082*	-.018	.019	-.056
Women in parliaments	-.041	.022	-.140*	-.021	.022	-.070
Liberal democracy						
Rule of law	----	----	----	-.166	.074	-.161*
Freedom of press	----	----	----	-.023	.010	-.214*
Electoral democracy	----	----	----	.432	.404	.081
R^2		.768***			.807***	
Incremental R^2		----			.034**	

(N = 99)

* p < .05 ** p<.01 *** p < .001 (one-tail test)

Table 7: Regression Analysis Relating All Measures of Female Participation in Government with Corruption, Using Listwise Deletion

	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	S.E.	β	B	S.E.	β
Control variables						
GNP	-.000	.000	-.606***	-.000	.000	-.403***
Poverty	.036	.015	.199*	.035	.015	.198*
Illiteracy	-.011	.013	-.074	-.004	.013	-.027
Female participation						
Women in cabinet	-.033	.024	-.120*	-.028	.023	-.103
Women in government	-.005	.024	-.017	-.015	.024	-.050
Women in parliaments	-.053	.025	-.190*	-.023	.025	-.082
Liberal democracy						
Rule of law	----	----	----	-.184	.078	-.196*
Freedom of press [a]	----	----	----	-.024	.011	-.206*
Electoral democracy	----	----	---	.824	.481	.148*
R^2		.789***			.823***	
Incremental R^2		----			.039**	

(N == 69)

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (one-tail test)

Supportive evidence for this hypothesis is strong. Multivariate findings firmly indicate that the negative correlations between gender variables and corruption are essentially mediated by the degree of liberal democratization. Table 3 displays findings from the model that focus on the influence of women in ministerial positions on corruption. The regression coefficient decreases in strength and ceases to be statistically significant after the three liberal democracy variables are introduced into the equation. The same patterns of spuriousness are repeated in subsequent multivariate assessments of the impact of women in subministerial positions and women occupying parliament seats on corruption (Tables 4 and 5). When liberal democratic institutions are controlled for, gender factors drop dramatically in both statistical significance and substantive relevance.

When the three gender measures are simultaneously incorporated into one regression model, the picture becomes even clearer (Table 6). The significance of the variables of female participation in government is already weak before the interfering disturbance of liberal democratic institutions is controlled for. Although the negative relationship of these variables with corruption is detectable, only the proportion of female parliamentarians reaches the conventional statistical significance threshold. When the influence of liberal democracy is held constant, the three gender variables become the weakest predictors of corruption in the full model, as measured by standardized regression coefficients. When interpreted vis-a-vis the variables defining liberal democracy, the relevance of gender predictors is negligible.

Hypothesis 4: When the levels of female participation in government are held constant, the negative relationship between liberal democracy and corruption remains significant.

The findings strongly (but not totally) corroborate this hypothesis. Unmistakable evidence supports the

hypothesized anticorruption effects of constitutional liberalism. Rule of law and freedom of press maintain their powerful negative relationships with corruption in all multivariate models. Separation of powers and protection of fundamental freedoms provide effective buffers against unscrupulous dealings among government officials. Nevertheless, the positive impact of electoral democracy on corruption in the same multivariate models is unexpected. Polities based on democratic elections are consistently associated positively with corruption, although none of them attains the conventional statistical significance level. This outcome, however, is not totally counterintuitive. Although free and open elections promote competition and increase transparency and accountability in a nation's political life, electoral campaigns are often opportunities for dishonest influence peddling and vote buying (Della Porta & Yannucci 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999). If an independent judiciary and an effective investigative journalism are not in place, officials working for a democratically elected regime can prey on its citizens in the form of graft and unscrupulous rents. Corrupt democracies abound, while widespread corruption rarely roots in countries with a long- standing tradition of constitutional liberalism.

Among the three control variables included in multivariate equations, GNP stands out as the most influential correlate of corruption. The very powerful negative association between GNP and corruption, across the different models, suggests that high economic performance is in essence incompatible with poor public governance. After all, systematic corruption causes massive economic inefficiencies by distorting resource allocation and capital flows (Kaufmann & Wei 1999; Wei 2000) and invariably hampers economic growth in the long run (Mauro 1995; Mo 2001). The statistically significant and positive correlation between poverty a n d corrupt ion confirms recommendations from past research that antipoverty components, especially wage enhancement programs for civil servants, need to be added to anticorruption campaigns in developing countries (Ghazanfar & May 2000; Van Rijckeghem & Weder 2001). The illiteracy rate maintained an important negative bivariate association with corruption that became marginal in multivariate equations. It appears that to a large extent, economic development and democratic institutions mediate between and explain changes in illiteracy and corruption, which are at most very weakly correlated.

CONCLUSIONS

Findings from this study indicate that although female participation in government may be correlated to lower levels of corruption under some circumstances, this association loses significance when the effects of constitutional liberalism are appropriately controlled for. More specifically, the role of the judiciary and the press are of singular importance; as the main institutional guardians against governmental excesses, they can either condone or restrict the magnitude of the problem of corruption. As the statistical evidence demonstrates, the alleged anticorruption effects of women in government are at least partly spurious. Liberal democratic structures and ideology that promote equality, fairness, and meritocracy also encourage and create realistic opportunities for female participation in executive and legislative positions of leadership (Paxton 1997; Reynolds 1999). Gender equality and government accountability are both great achievements of modern liberal democracy (O'Donnell 1998; Plattner 1999).

This conclusion also questions the wisdom of recommending staffing government agencies with female citizens as a policy initiative to fight corruption. Criminological findings from individual-level research must be interpreted in their adequate contexts. In addition to gender, age is also a very significant demographic correlate of white-collar crime (Benson 2001; Weisburd & Waring 2001). Criminals who steal in the course of their normal business activities reach the apex of their criminal careers in mid-adulthood. Should we then use this statistical fact to advocate for an age-based selection in the recruitment of civil servants as a preventive measure? Such a move would be politically untenable and logically fallacious. Social scientists should use extreme caution in making policy recommendations based on individual-level data or

inferences, because public policies operate and are evaluated at the aggregate level. In this case, the best antidote to systematic corruption is the strengthening of political, economic, and civic mechanisms that promote competition, transparency and accountability in both the economy and government decision making. To encourage female participation in public life is a noble and just end in itself, but would not by itself be an effective means to a clean government.

Establishing an empirical relationship between two macro-level phenomena is generally possible, but ruling out alternative explanations for the nature of the association can often be difficult, particularly when information at the appropriate level of analysis is not available. In the study presented in this article, I have challenged the assertion that gender and corruption are causally associated at the aggregate level due to the intrinsic corrupt tendencies of male individuals. Instead, I have recast the problem as a case of three-factor relationships, and reviewed the ways in which the association between women in government and lower levels of corruption can be better explained by the presence of functioning liberal democratic institutions. Despite its persuasiveness and the solid empirical support it has received from this study, however, the "fairer system" thesis must be further evaluated with assessments using different data, operational definitions, and samples, before the mam intervening mechanisms can be more unmistakably depicted.

NOTES

l. The two apparently simple indexes in fact gauged a myriad of social, political, and economic rights known for their complexity. According to Freedom House's description of its rating methodology (Karatnycky 2001), the civil-liberties checklist contains the following items: (1) Arc there free and independent media of cultural communication? (2)Are there free religious organizations and free private and public religious expression? (3) Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? (4) Do people have the right to form political organizations? (5) Are there free professional and occupational organizations with effective collective bargaining? (6) Is there an independent judiciary? (7) Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal adjudications? (8) Is there protection from political terror or government abuse of coercive authority? (9) Is there freedom from extreme government unaccountability and corruption? (10) Is there open and free private discussion? (11) Docs the state restrict choice of residence, political preferences, physical movement, or employment? (12) Do citizens have the rights to establish, own, and transfer private properties without being unduly influenced by state agents? (13) Is there gender equality, as well as the ability to choose a marriage partner and family size? (14) Is there equality of opportunity, including freedom from exploitation by or dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, and bureaucrats, and an absence of other types of obstacles to a share of legitimate economic gains?

In contrast, the political rights checklist includes the following ten questions: (1) Is the head of state freely and fairly elected? (2) Are the legislative representatives freely and fairly elected? (3) Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest tabulation of ballots? (4) Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power? (5) Are people free to organize in different political parties or other organization of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing groupings? (6) Is there a significant and effective opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to gain power through elections? (7) Is the citizenry free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group? (8) Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minorities have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process? (9) For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for consultation with the citizenry, promote policy debate, and allow the right to petition the ruler? (10) Is the government deliberately

changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to tip the political balance in favor of another group?

2. An example of the consistency of the regression results across methods of case deletion is provided in Table 7. When the hierarchical regression procedure was performed with simultaneous inclusion of the three gender variables using the stricter listwise deletion, the sample size was reduced to 69 cases. But even with this reduced sample, the same picture emerged. The introduction of liberal democracy variables decreased the coefficients for gender variables and exposed the spuriousness of the gender-corruption association. When using the pairwise deletion (see Table 6), the influence of electoral democracy was only marginally significant, but the shift to listwise deletion caused an appreciable increase in the statistical strength of its effect on corruption, suggesting the need to conceptually account for the positive relationship between democratic elections and higher levels of corruption.

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APPENDIX

Countries and Territories Included in the Analysis

Albania	Czech Republic	Israel	Namibia	Spain
Argentina	Denmark	Italy	Netherlands	Sweden
Armenia	Ecuador	Jamaica	New Zealand	Switzerland
Australia	Egypt	Japan	Nicaragua	Taiwan
Austria	El Salvador	Jordan	Nigeria	Tanzania
Azerbaijan	Estonia	Kazakhstan	Norway	Thailand
Belarus	Finland	Kenya	Pakistan	Tunisia
Belgium	France	Kyrgyz Republic	Paraguay	Turkey
Bolivia	Georgia	Latvia	Peru	Uganda
Botswana	Germany	Lithuania	Philippines	Ukraine
Brazil	Ghana	Luxembourg	Poland	United Kingdom
Bulgaria	Greece	Macedonia	Portugal	United States
Cameroon	Guatemala	Malawi	Romania	Uruguay
Canada	Honduras	Malaysia	Russia	Uzbekistan
Chile	Hong Kong	Mauritius	Senegal	Venezuela
China	Hungary	Mexico	Singapore	Vietnam
Colombia	Iceland	Moldova	Slovak Republic	Yugoslavia
Costa Rica	India	Mongolia	Slovenia	Zambia
Cote d'Ivoire	Indonesia	Morocco	South Africa	Zimbabwe
Croatia	Ireland	Mozambique	South Korea	

POLITICAL CLEANERS: WOMEN AS THE NEW ANTI-CORRUPTION FORCE?

Authors: Anne Marie Goetz

ABSTRACT:

There is currently a myth in the making: that women are less corrupt than men. Recently some aid donors have cited statistical evidence that countries with larger numbers of women in politics and in the workforce have lower levels of corruption. That this finding can be explained by the fact that there are more women in politics and the workforce in liberal democracies that are anyway less corrupt than poorer less liberal regimes does not detract from the eagerness with which some development actors are seizing upon the potential role women might play in fighting corruption. The myth of women's incorruptibility is not, of course, new. It is grounded in essentialist notions of women's higher moral nature and an assumed propensity to bring this to bear on public life, and particularly on the conduct of politics. After demonstrating that some of the recent studies about gender and corruption record *perceptions* about propensities to engage in corrupt behaviour, this contribution suggests rather that the gendered nature of access to politics and public life shapes *opportunities* for corruption. In addition, corruption can be experienced differently by women and men, which has implications for anti-corruption strategies. A gendered analysis of corruption is in fact a useful entry-point to the examination of the gendered nature of accountability failures, and of gender-specific gaps in current attempts to promote good governance.

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1. INTRODUCTION

A myth in the making—that women tend to be less corrupt than men—is being widely circulated. For instance, the World Bank's most important recent policy statement on gender equality, *Engendering Development*, asserts a strong relationship between relatively high levels of female involvement in public life and low levels of government corruption. The report concludes that this finding lends 'additional support for having more women in politics and in the labor force—since they could be an effective force for good government and business trust' (World Bank, 2001: 96). Thus the challenge of increasing the numbers of women in public life, long defended by feminists as a matter of human rights and democratic justice, can now be seen to have an efficiency payoff— more women in power may have the effect of reducing corruption—although, as we shall see, the causal relationship between numbers of women in the public arena and the extent or type of corrupt activity is not very clear. Like any instrumentalist argument, the 'women are less corrupt than men' justification for bringing women into politics and public institutions is not just vulnerable to exposure as a myth; it puts women's engagement in the public arena on the wrong foot. Women are seen as instruments to achieve a broader development goal, not welcomed to public office as a matter of their democratic and employment rights. The new stress on women's gender as a useful instrument for good governance is another example of the dangers of using the notion of 'women' as a single category in social analysis and in development policy. Critical social differences between women disappear before the presumed fact of the probity and virtues inherent to their gender. But politics is the very worst place to ignore differences between women: arrangements for the inclusion of women in politics that are insensitive to differences of race, class, and ethnicity between women will see elite women capturing public office[32].

This article first explores the emergence of the myth of women's lesser propensity to engage in corrupt activity. It shows that the notion that women are less corrupt than men, more likely to behave with probity and integrity, is ironically the reverse of a myth that has kept them out of the public realm for centuries. That earlier myth justified women's exclusion from politics and public administration on the grounds that their rootedness in the world of care and family left them ill-equipped for rational public debate using principles of impartiality and universality. Next, the article examines the evidence for the new image of women as 'political cleaners', demonstrating that this is mainly based upon assumptions about women's inherent probity made by a range of actors, including women themselves. The article then argues that gender does indeed shape *opportunities* for corruption, but this is different from the new myth that women's gender determines their *reactions* to corruption.

We can understand these gendered opportunities by examining how women are recruited into and treated within key institutions that shape public life: political parties and state bureaucracies; this contribution examines cases from South Asia to illustrate this. What matters is not the 'simple access' (Jónasdóttir, 1988) of women to power and public life. What matters is the *means* of their access (have women come through the women's movement or through democratic party processes that connect them to a social base pressing for equity?) and the nature of the institutions in which they function (how do these institutions hold public actors to account? To what constituencies do public actors answer?). The article concludes by asking whether it is useful to analyse problems of governance—or accountability failures—from a gender perspective. This is a question about what governments can do for women, as opposed to what women can do for good governance.

[32] This is exactly the point made by opponents of the proposed 84th Constitutional amendment in India, to reserve seats for women-only competition in the national parliament. Opponents say that this will reverse the trend to greater caste diversity in parliament by bringing more upper caste MPs —upper caste women—to office.

THE MYTH: WOMEN AS 'POLITICAL CLEANERS'

Experiments are underway in some contexts to feminize notoriously corrupt public agencies. For instance, in 1998 Peru's President Fujimori announced that the 2,500-strong traffic police force in Lima would be completely transformed into an all-women force. In June 2003, the Mexican Customs Service announced that its new crack force of anti-corruption officers on land and sea borders would be entirely female (*The Herald Tribune*, 2003). In other contexts we can see similar assumptions about women's probity guiding the portfolios given to women new to office. In Uganda for instance, the vast majority of positions as treasurer in the new local government system are assigned to women, where it is hoped they will apply their prudence in managing domestic accounts to curb mis-spending in local public office.

These integrity experiments call upon women to use their gender as the intrinsic regulator of probity in public action. Consider the justification for selecting only women provided by Commander Pedro Montoya, when training an all-female motorcycle brigade of traffic cops in Lima: 'the women are more honest and morally firm than the men. It's undeniable'. Montoya went on to posit that women are more honest because of their role in the family. He asserted that they have an aversion to taking money from male drivers, because they feel this act would resemble prostitution[33]. Thus, while the positive motive for women's less corrupt behaviour is that women's experiences as nurturers and family managers are the basis for a more caring and honest approach to interactions with clients or colleagues in public sector jobs, Montoya also hints at a darker incentive. Engagement in nefarious acts—being seen taking money from men who are not relatives—has drastic implications for women's sexual integrity. Sexual impropriety is very rarely an implication when men engage in dirty deals, though of course politicians and officials suffer from any hint of male homosexual encounters: the mere suggestion of such was enough to blackmail male public officials in the West until very recently.

In Commander Montoya's defence of women's virtues as traffic cops, we see that two of the justifications used by politicians and philosophers in Europe for centuries for keeping women out of public life are now being used to bring them in. Women's caring roles in the private arena of the home are now seen as a positive qualification for public service, and the fear that a public life might compromise women's sexual integrity has now been dropped as the main reason for keeping them at home. Instead, it is hoped that the risk of being branded as sexually immoral will discourage women in public life from dabbling in dirty deals in dark places.

It is not just male reformers hoping to capitalize on women's supposed integrity who use these images. Women leaders do the same. Around the world, women leaders often try to deflect the mistrust and criticism with which the public regard them because of their gender with reassurances that their interest in politics is as mothers, as guardians, as carers of the nation[34]. Right-wing parties and right-wing political leaders love the rhetoric of women's inherent probity. For women leaders in fundamentalist religious or chauvinistic nationalist parties, rhetoric about women's purity, integrity, and self-sacrifice can be employed to explain away personal characteristics and behaviours that would otherwise be unacceptable and that directly contradict their conservative social policies, such as, their unmarried status or their striking militancy and calls to violence[35].

This idea of linking notions of womanly virtue with incorruptibility is not new. It is based upon essentialist

[33] Associated Press, *CNN*, 21 August 1998.

[34] See Jayalalitha's public imagery machine centred on the image of 'Tamilttaay'—mother, desirable woman, and virginal goddess (Bannerjee, 2004), Indira Gandhi as Mother India, even Margaret Thatcher the tea maker for her kitchen cabinet.

[35] Consider for instance the public rhetoric of Uma Bharti or Sadhvi Rithambara of the Baratiya Janata Party in India. Both are single, never-married women who flaunt rules about the conduct of unmarried women; see Basu (1995) for a discussion of how these and other women leaders in the Hindu fundamentalist party BJP 'invert' feminist discourses to justify their decidedly non-traditional activities and personal lives.

notions of women's higher moral nature and their propensity to bring their finer moral sensibilities to bear on public life, and particularly on the conduct of politics—an argument which was much used by suffragettes a century ago. Ironically, it directly contradicts another essentialist notion that has for so long denied women direct access to politics—articulated by philosophers from Plato to Rousseau—about women's inherent incapacity for abstract thought, and their unfitness to govern because of their inability to grasp basic notions of justice and ethical reasoning[36]. In Rousseau's conception, for instance, this unfitness comes from their 'natural' role as caretakers and custodians of affectivity, desire, and the body in the home. If appeals to personal connections and desires were allowed to move public debates, the principles of universality, impartiality, and justice would be subverted, as too would the convenient separation between the private and the public realms[37].

In the twentieth century, Western psychology attempted to provide a scientific basis to these sexist assumptions about women's essential nature, starting with Freud's (1925: 257–8) insistence that women 'show less sense of justice than men, . . . are less ready to submit to the great exigencies of life, . . . are more often influenced in their judgments by feelings of affection or hostility'. In Kohlberg's famous experiments about resolutions of moral dilemmas, women are assumed to be able to reach only stage three in a six-stage measure of moral development. Kohlberg saw women to be deficient in moral judgement because they think of morality in interpersonal terms where goodness is equated with helping and pleasing others—a conception of goodness that may be functional in private but is inadequate to the needs of public life, where relationships must be subordinated to rules, and rules to universal principles of justice (Gilligan, 1982: 18).

The current view of women's inherent probity and hence appropriateness as leaders, bureaucrats, police officers and customs officials sees this old myth flipped around. The very traits that traditionally branded women as deficient in moral development, their concern to help and to please, are now seen as functional for good governance reforms in developing and transitional societies. Not only are women's domestic virtues seen as functional for combating corruption, but they may remedy a wider range of current political ills. According to Uganda's President Museveni, for instance, who has cultivated the female electorate as his support base: 'Women have stabilised politics in a way because they tend not to be so opportunistic. . . They are not so reckless like men' (quoted in Simmons and Wright, 2000).

For the last century at least, feminist activists and scholars have contributed to this kind of expectation that women can transform power and politics, appealing selectively to essentialist ideas about women's effectiveness as conflict mediators, as moderators between extreme positions, as effective managers of the public purse. Anne Phillips (1991: 62–3) sets out the three most common justifications employed by feminists for bringing women into politics: first, the argument that women can bring to politics a different set of values, experiences, and expertises—'that they will enrich our political life, usually in the direction of a more caring, compassionate society'. Second is the more radical argument that because women and men are in conflict, women must be present in public life to represent women's interests as a gender. The third is that it is simply a matter of justice: 'just as it is unjust that women should be cooks but not engineers . . . so it is unjust that they should be excluded from the central activities in the political realm'.

Phillips (ibid.: 63) then demolishes the first argument on the grounds that it is based on unproven essentialist assumptions, and also that the values women bring to politics could even be undemocratic, given their lack of schooling in democratic practice. She challenges the second point on the familiar grounds that women do not constitute a single interest group. She also argues that given the way votes are assigned to seats in most electoral systems, no woman political candidate can seriously present herself as representing women alone, but has to look to the common interests of her constituency. She concludes that the only argument for women's inclusion in politics that can be defended is the one drawn from

[36] Two excellent discussions of what male philosophers over the centuries have said about women to justify their confinement to the household and their incapacity for engagement in public debate and decision making can be found in Lloyd (1984) and Okin (1979).

[37] For studies of Rousseau's perspectives on women, see Schwartz (1984).

principles of justice, and this case for justice 'says nothing about what women will do if they get into politics'.

Arguments based upon fairness, however, are less persuasive to policy makers than instrumentalist ones that imply that the conduct and substance of politics will change. Thus many feminist students of politics, including myself, have combined the justice argument either with the expectation that women can transform politics, or with the insistence that women are needed to represent women's interests. There is indeed evidence from industrialized democracies that women in politics do focus more than men on passing legislation and implementing policies in areas benefiting women, such as child support programmes, family leave legislation, abortion rights, prevention of violence against women, and gender equity in education (Burrell, 1994: 151–2; Rule and Hill, 1996). The same appears to be true for developing countries in which changes to electoral rules or the reservation of local and national government seats have brought more women into politics. Uganda and South Africa—countries in which more than a quarter of the legislature is female—have seen the revision of laws on rape, domestic violence, and domestic relations (Goetz, 2003; Hassim, 2003; Meintjes, 2003). In Indian local government, where one third of seats are reserved for women, observers in Karnataka, Rajasthan, West Bengal and Maharashtra report that local spending patterns are now a little more responsive to poor women's concerns (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2001: 19; Datta, 1998; Kudva, 2003; Mayaram and Pal, 1996).

Assumptions about women's responsiveness to other women have also been made about women in service bureaucracies. Research in industrialized country bureaucracies has shown that bureaucrats from minority or socially excluded groups do indeed use their discretion to reduce the discrimination which minority clients have suffered (Meier et al., 1989; Selden, 1997), but there has been rather less work on this in the South, and it has produced less emphatic findings. My own work on women fieldworkers in government and NGO micro-finance programmes in Bangladesh (where they were minorities in a male-dominated work environment) established that women fieldworkers and managers did identify with some of the problems of their female clientele and acted as advocates for them within their organizations, exhibiting a form of 'local heroism' on behalf of poor women (Goetz, 2001). The work of Simmons (1996) on family planning programmes in Bangladesh finds, similarly, that women staff represented a new advocacy resource for poor women in the rural context. But work by Jewkes et al. (1998) in South Africa, and Sargent (1989) in Benin, on nurses and midwives in maternity clinics, find alarming levels of abuse of pregnant patients by women staff.

The point of this very brief review of feminist work on women politicians and public servants is to suggest that feminist scholars and advocates have contributed to the myth of women's special contribution to politics. However, few have gone so far as to suggest that women are less corrupt than men. Very little of the feminist literature on women in politics and bureaucracies has focused upon women's reaction to and engagement in corruption. The obvious reason for this is that it is extremely difficult to research. Most of the evidence on women's corruption or lack of it in politics or public services is anecdotal, and this is why a series of World Bank studies of this question, using cross-national regressions, attracted so much interest.

THE EVIDENCE

We have already noted that international development agencies are taking an interest in the relationship between proportions of women making up political assemblies, and levels of corruption. The basis for this interest comes from two studies published in 2001. The first, 'Gender and Corruption', by Anand Swamy, Steve Knack, Young Lee and Omar Azfar, was produced by the IRIS Center, University of Maryland in April 1999 (see Swamy et al., 2001). The second, 'Are Women Really the "Fairer" Sex?', by David Dollar, Raymond Fisman, and Roberta Gatti (2001) came from the World Bank's Development Research Group.

Both papers suffer from a problem afflicting any statistical analysis addressing corruption: the difficulty of finding a

consistent or accurate measure of corruption. Corruption is a 'consensual crime'—both partners consent to the crime (however unwillingly) and neither reports it. Not only is it difficult to measure corruption, but it is hard to define it. Is corruption simply about the theft of public resources for private profit? What about actions that do not involve theft of money or property, such as cheating in elections? What about the systematic exercise of bias in the allocation of public services or in the treatment given to clients by public officials, be they doctors or teachers or licence-issuers?

In Dollar et al. (2001), the authors use the International Country Risk Guide's corruption index to measure corruption levels in the 100+ countries that they include in their analysis. This index is based upon other standard corruption indices, and all of these are based upon *perceived* levels of corruption as reported by business people, usually foreign investors, and sometimes by in-country bureaucrats and journalists. In other words, this measure of corruption is both relatively subjective, shaped by cultural prejudices of outsiders, and reflects the concerns of investors, and is a good illustration of the normative nature of definitions and measures of corruption. It does not capture forms of corruption that may most concern the average citizen or poor people in the country in question.

The Dollar et al. study seeks to establish a relationship between numbers of women in parliament and levels of corruption, and uses levels of GDP and levels of civil liberties as controls on its findings. It finds a very high level of raw correlation between low corruption scores and relatively high numbers of women in parliaments (0.38), and finds that a one standard deviation increase in levels of women in parliament from the average of 10.9 per cent in its sample will result in a 10 per cent decline in corruption. They also find that both variables are strongly correlated with overall development (as proxied by per capita income), and with other features of political openness such as the extent of civil liberties, average years of schooling, trade openness, and low ethnic fractionalization. Nevertheless, they find that the influence of women in parliament is large in magnitude, highly significant, and robust through a large variety of regressions. The authors conclude: 'women may have higher standards of ethical behaviour and be more concerned with the common good' (Dollar et al., 2001: 427). As Andrew Mason, one of the authors of the World Bank's 2001 *Engendering Development* report sensibly commented on these findings: 'Whether this means that women are inherently more moral beings than men, I don't know'. Rather, he added, a higher level of women's political and economic participation is likely to signify that a country is more open in general, with more transparent government and a more democratic approach[38]. Though this is unlikely to explain why numbers of women in office remain relatively low in transparent and open democracies like the US or Canada, it is probably the most sensible way to interpret very broad-brush findings such as those provided in regressions of cross-national data[39].

The Swamy et al. (2001) study uses the same technique to show that in addition to large numbers of women in parliament, when women comprise a larger share of the labour force, overall levels of corruption are likely to be less severe. This study also uses micro-level data from a study of 350 firms in Georgia in 1996, where the pressure to give bribes results in serious losses—at least 9 per cent of the annual turnover. On average, women owners/managers of firms admit to giving bribes on approximately 5 per cent of the occasions that they come in contact with a government agency. The percentage is twice as large for firms

[38] See 'World Bank to Rate All Projects for Gender Impact', Women's eNews website: www.womensenews.org, 4 April 2002.

[39] This is exactly the conclusion drawn by a critic of both the Dollar et al. (2001) and the Swamy et al. (2001) studies, who uses statistical analysis to show that the observed association between gender and corruption is spurious and is mainly caused by its context—liberal democracy (Sung, 2003). Sung's careful review of these two studies draws out other problems not discussed here, such as the misleading implications of proposing hypotheses about group behaviour on the basis of individual-level findings about female honesty, and the failure to impose theory-driven statistical controls to the data, resulting in a failure to pick up on the role of constitutional liberalism in both reducing corruption and promoting women's presence in public office. Like my own analysis, Sung also identifies a failure in the Dollar et al. and Swamy et al. studies to examine the *processes* that connect female participation in government to reduced corruption (Sung, 2003: 703–6).

owned/managed by men. The authors feel this is suggestive of a marked gender differential in the propensity to bribe.

The Swamy et al. paper also used data from World Values Surveys which, in addition to hundreds of other items, asked men and women about the acceptability of various dishonest or illegal behaviours. Aggregating over all countries in surveys from 1981 and 1991, a gender gap emerged that consistently showed greater honesty on the part of women. For all twelve items listed, a higher percentage of women than men believe that the illegal or dishonest behaviour is never justifiable. The case of greatest interest is responses to the question about 'someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties': 72.4 per cent of men and 77.3 per cent of women agree that this is 'never justified'. The paper goes on to test this result against all manner of other variables and finds that gender consistently overrides other variables in producing a more ethical stance on probity in public life. The authors conclude from this and the results of behavioural studies that women are more trustworthy and public-spirited than men. A policy inference is drawn: 'increasing women's presence in public life can reduce levels of corruption' (Swamy et al., 2001: 36).

What is notable about the evidence in these studies is that it is based upon women's and men's reports and assumptions about the way gender shapes people's *reactions* to corruption, to the demand to give a bribe or the opportunity to take one. But it might well be that these studies are missing something. Perhaps gender relations condition the *opportunities* for corrupt or opportunistic behaviour. Perhaps gender relations limit those opportunities. They would do so if, for instance, corruption functions primarily through all-male networks and in forums from which women are socially excluded. This, as much as anything, might explain apparently low levels of female corruption, or of women's low levels of positive responses to opportunities for illegal behaviour. And this might change when all-female networks are established, when workplaces become more feminized, or when women take top leadership positions that enable them to re-direct networks of illicit exchange to their own benefit.

How Opportunities for Corruption are Shaped by Gender

Women are relative newcomers to public office. We know that their recruitment to and treatment within the arenas of politics and public administration differ from the experiences of men, but we don't know much about how this results in different opportunities for them to engage in illicit acts. Using examples from South Asia, I will show how gender mediates women's access to the public sphere, and once there, to opportunities for illicit earnings. Interacting with class, religion, family connections, and caste relations, gender greatly restricts the access of the majority of women to political parties and to public sector jobs. In politics, this produces a markedly skewed distribution of women, with a tiny number of extremely elite women at the apex of weak party structures, and with larger numbers of women involved only when needed as voters or to increase the visibility of public demonstrations. In bureaucracies, gender biases limit the numbers of women to legislated minimum levels that quickly become ceilings. In both politics and public administration, women who want to get ahead, like men, may find it hard to avoid the informal auctions for top posts; these involve bribing politicians in exchange for a job transfer or for the award of a candidacy in a desirable constituency. However, the options that women bureaucrats and politicians have for the illicit generation of funds needed to purchase choice posts are limited by gender relations that forbid interactions with non-kin men. In socially conservative societies like India or Bangladesh, it is difficult for women to become either clients or patrons in the male-dominated patronage networks through which corrupt exchanges occur, unless they do so via mediators who are male relatives. Thus anyone's access to politics or good posts in the bureaucracy can be financially corrupting (because of the need to generate campaign funds or pay for an appointment), but for women, it can also be sexually corrupting.

Given the lack of research on how gender mediates access to networks for illicit earning, let alone the lack of explicit documentation about how such networks function, I am obliged here to grasp at straws, to pick up on rumours about

women politicians and bureaucrats recounted to me over years of research on gender and policy making, that I had mostly dismissed as ill-intentioned. The questions I am asking here have made me scrabble through parts of my own past research on women in politics and bureaucracies, which I now see offers clues. On the cutting-room floor of my 1987–91 doctoral thesis research into women fieldworkers on micro-finance programmes, for instance, I rediscovered interviews and case studies about women development workers who admitted to or were accused of corruption. In the next two sections I consider how the ways women are recruited to and treated within parties and public bureaucracies affect their experiences of corruption.

Political Parties

If we are hoping that women in political leadership will prove themselves less corrupt than men, we need to understand the ways parties selectively recruit and socialize women to politics, whether political competition requires the use of 'muscle' and the generation of huge sums of money for campaigns, and whether parties offer women and men different opportunities for illicit or illegal activities.

A striking feature of party politics in all four countries of South Asia is the appearance of women leaders at the apex of parties at various times. This is not a reflection of women's political strength as a group in the region. In the mid-1990s, *The Economist* asserted that promoting women into high office in South and Southeast Asia because of their relationship as daughters or widows to powerful men who have been deposed or assassinated reflects the ineptitude of the region's political parties, which it called 'rotten organizations incapable of producing a real leader' (cited by Halloram, 1998). This same weakness, which is about an absence of democratic leadership selection systems and a reliance on dynastic systems of organizing power relations, also results in the marked absence of women in the rank and file or in office-holding positions below the top leader.

One way to understand this weakness is in terms of low levels of institutionalization. Political parties are considered to be institutionalized when they have, and respect, rules about candidate selection, identify policy concerns, have an organization that is distinct from the personal connections of their leaders, and when their elected members form a distinct and coherent group in the legislature (Moore, 2002; Randall and Svasand, 2002). Party institutionalization is considered essential for the consolidation of democracy in developing countries, for only when parties are stable and predictable in their membership and policy positions can voters make informed choices, secure in the knowledge that their votes will influence the policies of the government. South Asian countries do have parties with deep roots in society, well-evolved internal systems, disciplined members and consistent ideological positions (notably the left parties in Kerala and West Bengal, and up to the 1970s, the Indian National Congress). But the prevalence of personalized or dynastic leadership, patronage systems for delivering votes and generating campaign finance, and the growing electoral success of crude tactics of invoking exclusive ethnic or caste loyalties and inciting communal tensions has led to growing fragmentation and violence in party systems, and in some places the virtual disappearance of coherent policy platforms between which voters can select.

Under-institutionalization is a major reason for the relative exclusion of women as members and as candidates for public office (Norris, 1993) and for the relative hostility that political parties around the world exhibit to feminist policy priorities (Baer, 1999)[40]. This, even if under-institutionalization can mean that a female relative of a deposed or dead leader can get the top party post because of rank and file loyalty to a family dynasty, for most other

[40] Of course, well-institutionalized parties have also been resistant to women's participation—one need only look at the numbers of office bearers and electoral candidates who are women in the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in Kerala or West Bengal to see this. As Georgina Waylen (2000: 790–1) says, it is not 'that hyper-institutionalisation is good, but rather that low levels of institutionalisation produce problems and make lasting change difficult to achieve'. In contrast: 'in an institutionalised system there is stability in the rules of competition and party organisations matter: therefore rules, for example over quotas and candidate selection, can be enforced more easily'.

women, it is an insurmountable obstacle to participation. Engagement at any level in the party is dependent upon access to caste, family, and usually all-male networks of patron–client relationships. Not only does this make political parties extremely unlikely arenas in which ambitions for social change can be pursued, it can make the women who do try to seek advance within parties socially unattractive, and sometimes sexually suspect. Access to leadership positions within the party, to electoral candidacies, to finance for campaigns, is dependent upon relationships with powerful men. And such relationships, unless sanctified by kinship connections, can bring discredit to women.

Since women leaders have come laterally into parties, via personal connections to powerful men rather than rising up from the bottom, they often lack experience of political alliance building, debate, long-term strategizing, campaign resource generation, and policy development. A notable exception to this is Mamata Bannerjee, a long-time activist in the Indian Congress party, whose frustrations with central party controls led her to form the intermittently successful break-way faction in West Bengal, the All India Trinamul ('Grassroots') Congress[41]. For other women leaders, lateral and late entry to politics can mean that they lack a secure constituency base. This can encourage undemocratic and possibly also corrupt leadership practices.

This problem of a shallow political base and fleeting political apprenticeship may be one reason why some women leaders in South Asia have resorted to crude populism to build up social support, and to authoritarian tactics within their parties to undermine dissent and opposition. Indira Gandhi famously began the long process of the de-institutionalization of the Congress party when, after 1972, she put a halt to internal party elections and ensured that aspirants for party posts had to petition her directly. Driven from the beginning of her first ten-year period in power by the wish to break free of the patrician 'Syndicate' of established party notables and elites, she shattered many aspects of internal party organization and centralized power in her own person and in the person of the Congress president for each state (personally appointed by herself) (Jaffrelot, 2003: 133).

For the large number of women who are interested in political participation if not directly in leadership, parties limit access because of the masculinity of party cultures and the sexual dangers that this represents. That parties are often organized around masculine patronage networks is not a new observation and is as true in the UK or USA as in any developing country (Baer, 1999; Perrigo, 1996; Short, 1996). Proof of this can always be found in the phenomenally low numbers of women members, branch managers, and executive officers in parties around the world. In India, figures on female membership of parties are difficult to obtain, but accounts from my interviews with Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) suggest that no party save perhaps the CPI (M) in West Bengal have more than 10 per cent female membership, and even there, no women are to be found in the state-level central committee[42].

One reason that parties are ill-equipped to attract women that is rarely mentioned in analyses of South Asian politics is that parties represent an arena of sexual danger for women, and political competition brings risks of physical and sexual assault. This is not a problem for the elite women, but for others, participation in branch-level politics can be sexually compromising, exposing women to the sexual attentions of male party members[43]. In Bangladesh and Pakistan, politically active women who are not protected by high-level males are sometimes threatened with sexual assault (Jahan, 1982). Perhaps this is the reason that Jayalalitha has formed all-

[41] Unlike any of the other current heads of parties or heads of regional branches of parties—Sonia Gandhi, Jayalalitha, Mayawati—Mamata Bannerjee does not have a reputation for corruption. This is in spite of heading for a while the Union government's Railway Ministry, with a large budget and plenty of opportunities for making illicit earnings. She quit the BJP government which she was supporting over a corruption scandal implicating senior figures including in the Ministry of Defence (the Tehelka affair in Spring 2001).

[42] It is extremely difficult to obtain gender-disaggregated figures for party membership, let alone figures for aggregate membership, as parties prefer to remain vague on this point to suggest that they have a very broad, if not explicitly signed-up and fee-paying, grassroots membership.

[43] These assertions are based upon interviews with and observations of women activists in political parties and in the women's movement in Bangladesh and India.

female branches of her AIADMK—to create sexually safe arenas in which to capture women's political energies. Parties that are highly disciplined at the branch level, such as the CPI(M) or the TDP, are reported not to suffer so greatly from this problem. Likewise, parties organized on the basis of religious or ethnic chauvinism may also offer women more sexual security than do secular parties because of their traditional and therefore protective take on women's sexual integrity. Some South Asian feminist political scientists worry that this may be one of the reasons for the apparent effectiveness of religious conservative associations in attracting women, notably the family of militant Hindu chauvinist associations supporting the BJP (Basu, 1995; Sarkar and Butalia, 1995).

The point is that the ways women are recruited (or not) to the leadership and rank-and-file of political parties restrict their opportunities for engaging in corrupt activities. These restrictions have to do with women's relative exclusion from male patronage networks, and the sexual danger associated with inclusion. The policy of simply increasing the numbers of women in the political arena through reserved seats has still barely altered these patterns of exclusion in parties. There is little evidence yet that parties are responding to the increased numbers of women with political experience by recruiting or promoting them. This is because, to put it crudely, it is not women's skills or experience or talent or charisma or even hard work that matters to parties—it is mainly their gender and their family connections. Under the circumstances, if women do exhibit less corrupt reactions than men to opportunities for illicit earnings, that may simply be a sign of their freshness in office, lack of familiarity with ways of subverting the rules, and an understandable eagerness to prove themselves worthy of public office—effects that can wear off with time.

The Bureaucracy

What about women public servants: how does gender shape their opportunity structure when it comes to corruption? There are obstacles to women's employment in public bureaucracies, particularly at senior levels, the world over. Quite aside from structural problems stemming from sex-typing of women in the education system and labour markets, and from the competing demands of women's private lives, the civil service in many countries has acquired an elitist culture and has institutionalized male privilege and superiority. In South Asia, the highly competitive selection process and demanding training have been noted, until recently, for their ability to instil high levels of commitment, professionalism and probity (Heginbotham, 1975; Kothari and Roy, 1969; Potter, 1986). The selection and training processes in these professional administrative services have attracted less study for their gender biases, but percentages of women to be found in these services remain low. In Bangladesh, there is a recruitment quota system in the civil service: since 1972, about 15 per cent of posts have been reserved for women. This has in practice become a maximum ceiling for women recruits, rather than a minimum threshold.

For the few women at higher levels of public bureaucracies in South Asia, and the larger numbers at lower levels, opportunities for engagement in illicit income generation can be expected to be limited in the same ways as they are for women in politics. Women bureaucrats will have less access to networks for illicit activity—for instance through links with business—than men[44]. They are likely to have limited access to other patronage networks unless they wish to risk putting their sexual propriety on the line. This will be particularly the case in countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan that have witnessed a contemporary stiffening of Islamic mores in public life. In notes made a decade ago whilst interviewing relatively senior women in government development service bureaucracies in Bangladesh, I uncovered a number of laments made by women: they felt isolated at the workplace because there were so few other senior women and they simply could not interact with men. They felt they had been shunted into the least interesting and attractive positions, positions that were almost always gender stereotyped. They felt that their prospects for promotion or

[44] For a discussion of the importance of business links in the corruption of officials, see Honour et al. (1998: 195).

even for moving horizontally to better posts in the bureaucracy were limited because of their inability or unwillingness to curry favour with senior men (as this could only be misconstrued), or to offer bribes to party workers or to senior bureaucrats.

The bulk of my interviewees were lower-level government staff, field-workers on the state's flagship micro-finance programme. On revisiting my field notes, I was reminded of cases that I did not follow up in my search for 'local heroes'. These were rumours about fieldworkers who were bending the rules or stealing money. The types of corrupt activities involved were most commonly the siphoning-off of a 'commission' from the tiny loan given to each woman. More rarely, bigger frauds were attempted—for instance encouraging villagers to invest in some business from which the fieldworker was due to profit. Almost always, reports of this kind of activity were accompanied by scandalized accounts of sexual impropriety. Such cases were rare, and differed from the types of corrupt acts of which male fieldworkers were accused. Male fieldworkers might, for instance, make deals with local elite men whereby it was agreed that credit money could go to the wives of these elites (who were not eligible for loans because they were not poor), or they might agree with local politicians to focus loan-giving activity on that politician's constituency in exchange for a healthy commission.

Women fieldworkers tended not to engage in these kinds of deals because of the impropriety of working in this way with non-kin male strangers. But there was another type of rule-bending to which women fieldworkers admitted, and to which men did not, that was viewed with approval by women fieldworkers and women villagers alike. I found that the women fieldworkers who helped their loanees get the best returns on their money were the ones who encouraged them to engage in activities on the margins of 'straight' market engagement: speculative purchasing and hoarding of commodities like rice or firewood for re-sale at high prices in lean seasons, on-lending at high interest rates to poorer women, adulterating products by dilution or alteration (for instance, putting chili into vegetable oil and selling it as the expensive mustard-seed oil) or illegal cross-border trading in saris and other Indian goods (in a word—smuggling).

The finding that women fieldworkers tried, when they could, to bend rules to their own or their clients' advantage may suggest that opportunities for corrupt acts or illicit earning may be more open to women when these arise in a socially acceptable environment—when there are larger numbers of female staff with whom one can collude, or when there are female clients to either abuse or collude with. The studies mentioned earlier on the abuse of patients by nurses and midwives in two African countries (Jewkes et al., 1998; Sargent, 1989) likewise suggests that in a female-dominant working environment, or where women professionals are dealing with women clients or with a socially inferior class, women professionals are not averse to extorting unofficial 'payments' for services that ought to be provided as a right.

Of course, the discussion presented here is not based upon reliable evidence: much more research is needed on the interactions between women bureaucrats and clients across a range of public services to determine if indeed there are more opportunities for illicit earnings in female-dominant public environments where the sexual risk of engaging in corrupt acts is reduced. My point has been to suggest that whatever the response of women to such opportunities, we have to note that the opportunities for corruption that are open to women are themselves limited by sexual controls and their exclusion from male networks.

Gender and Corruption: The Questions We Ought to Ask

One question not currently asked in the myth-making around gender and corruption is whether women face different forms of abusive or corrupt behaviour from public officials than men. Are women asked for bribes less often than men because they are not seen to have as much money? Or do they tend, as home-managers, to face corruption of different types and at different levels than men working in the formal economy—'informal' payments for public services, payments that are not measured in formal indices of corruption levels? Is the 'currency' of corruption sometimes sexual harassment

or abuse? For instance, do officials extort sexual favours, rather than money, in return for services? Evidence that women managers of firms in Georgia may pay fewer bribes (Swamy et al., 2001) must be tested against the proposition that they may be asked for bribes less frequently by male officials than are male business managers. These are questions about gendered opportunity structures in corrupt exchanges.

By suggesting that corrupt practices may function differently by gender, I am suggesting that in all the excitement about the potential of exploiting supposed feminine virtues in the fight against corruption (what can women do for good governance?) we might overlook the challenge of combating corruption in ways that respond to women's concerns (what governments should be doing for women).

To expect that women's gender alone can act as a magic bullet to resolve a corruption problem that is much bigger than they are, that is systemic, is unrealistic to say the least. It reflects not just wishful but almost desperate thinking. If women do exhibit preferences for less corrupt behaviour, that may simply be because they have been excluded from opportunities for such behaviour, and that effect is bound to change over time as greater numbers of women enter public office. The state in Peru can only afford to pay women traffic cops in Lima a salary of just 200 dollars a month; not enough to keep a family alive. Men previously in these jobs had to supplement the salary by demanding bribes from motorists to let them off real or trumped-up traffic violations, or by selling them tickets for non-existent police charity barbeques. Women traffic officers have not yet stooped to this, perhaps out of pride in their work and also out of a desire to maintain the image of sexual purity, not taking money from strange men. But their families still have to be fed. I am afraid that women's exemplary performance in this area is a cousin to their performance in the micro-finance field: their success in managing on so little, and in managing with such impeccable credentials, is contingent on their exercise of a female-identified behavioural pattern—self-exploitation. Is that a good thing? Under the circumstances, when we look at the petty corruption encouraged in borrowers by female fieldworkers on micro-finances in Bangladesh in the late 1980s, should we read this not as a sign of venality, but of a type of rebellious empowerment simply not permitted to women in the disciplined and clean development world they are expected to construct?

If there is one thing of which we can be sure, it is this: women will not passively conform to the idealized notions of their finer moral nature when they have families to feed and if there is money to be made from public office.

A massive cultural change is underway in the public sector the world over: more and more women are entering public sector jobs and elected public office. They are bound to bring changes of style and substance, and not all in the ways that the World Bank would like to predict. Their actions will be a response to the structural contexts in which they operate. As subalternized recent entrants, unschooled in the qualities possessed by the political and administrative establishments and therefore unable to compete directly with them, they may well experiment with patterns of leadership and management that could demonstrate impeccable integrity. Or they might do the opposite, and damage democratic accountability systems.

It is a huge exaggeration to say that women are now seen as a panacea for problems of corruption in politics and public bureaucracies by the World Bank or other major development agencies. However, now that an instrumentalist argument may be available for advancing women's presence in politics and the public service, the Bank and other development agencies are taking more interest than before in the challenges of promoting women in public life. My concern in this contribution has not been to prove or disprove assertions that women are less corrupt than men. Rather, I am concerned about the way the seductiveness of a hunch about a feminine reluctance for dirty dealing is rushed into the status of a home truth in a context where 'bad governance' is now seen as the reason why countries stay poor, and donors are all looking for a quick fix for that problem. In the meantime, insufficient attention is paid to the possible reasons why women may be exhibiting greater integrity in public dealings. It may well be that women are demonstrating less corrupt behaviour when in public office precisely because they are generally excluded from male-

dominated patronage and power networks in political parties and public bureaucracies. A policy to engineer more access for women to these arenas may either produce a sub-set of public actors who are relatively isolated from the arenas in which real power is exercised, or it may mean that women make their way into these still unreformed power arenas, and join in the take. Investing in the myth of women's incorruptible nature instead of investigating the reasons for that behaviour will postpone the institutional reform necessary for a transformation of public institutions in the interests of gender and social equity.

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GENDER AND CORRUPTION: UNDERSTANDING AND UNDOING THE LINKAGES

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For more information about this working paper and others in the series, please contact Craig Fagan at the TI-Secretariat: plres [at] transparency.org.

ABSTRACT

Policy-makers increasingly are seeking to 'mainstream' gender into anti-corruption initiatives by taking into account the implications that planned interventions have on women and men. Such considerations can lead to better designed and targeted policies to combat corruption. They can also create the space for civil society to become engaged and carry out more effective corruption monitoring, which contributes to improvements in policy formulation. However, research findings on the subject have varied over the years and there is still no clear consensus about the interrelationship between gender and corruption. This paper will explore recent evidence on the topic in an attempt to determine whether and how women have an impact on—and are affected by—corruption.

1. Does Gender Influence Corruption?

In recent years a hypothesis has been put forth that women are less corrupt than men and are a positive force in political systems. It is based on the assumption that increasing women's involvement (and influence) in politics will correlate with a reduction in a country's corruption. However it ignores one important factor: gender may be conditioning opportunities for women to be corrupt.

Some noted researchers on the topic of gender and corruption, such as Ann-Marie Goetz, have begun questioning why most studies find that women appear to be less corruptable[45]. Is it because they generally have less money? Or is it a result of their dealings being typically focused on the home and outside the formal economy? One assertion is that perhaps women use 'informal' payments to access public services or are exhorted to provide sexual favours rather than money. As a result, these incidents may go underreported by current surveying techniques and are left off the radar of corruption indices.

In many countries, corruption does occur primarily through male-to-male networks and in forums where women are often excluded, such as in commerce or politics. As a result, various studies have shown that men are more likely to be victims of corruption than women[46]. In the case of Latin America men are usually the ones involved in government and business dealings and suffer increased demands for extortion and bribery when compared to women. However, if workplaces become more feminised or when women take the top leadership jobs, it cannot be taken for granted that women will be less corrupt or not form their own networks. Distorted institutions are likely to distort the individuals working in them, whatever their gender.

Women also may be making or accepting bribes but doing it from behind the scenes or through proxies. Research in South East Asia has shown that women may indirectly participate in corruption in order to get ahead in political bureaucracies. Since there is a cultural taboo against interacting with men who they are not related to, women may engage in bribery and extortion using their male relatives as the mediators. Their indirect participation may mislead observers into concluding that men are the root cause of corruption and women are less susceptible.

Attitudes towards corruption may even be more a question of culture rather than a matter tied to one's gender. Certain studies have indicated that women perceive their country to be less corrupt than their male counterparts while other findings suggest that both males and females have very similar perceptions about the problem. In some cases, women may be even more preoccupied by corruption than men—an assertion supported by TI's Global Corruption Barometer and other quantitative research[47]. One recent study showed that while women are less tolerant of corruption than men in Australia, there are no significant differences in attitudes among the sexes in India, Indonesia and Singapore.

In spite of these mixed findings, governments keen to tackle corruption have overhauled their staffs to increase women among their ranks, particularly in public service delivery

[45] Anne Marie Goetz, *Political Cleaners: How Women are the New Anti-Corruption Force. Does the Evidence Wash?* (Brighton, United Kingdom: IDS, 2003). www.u4.no/document/showdoc.cfm?id=124.

[46] It is important to note that only a limited number of tools and initiatives (about 20%) are addressing gender and poverty dimensions. Part of the reason is related to the sampling size and method. In order to disaggregate by gender and income, a large sample size is required, which most corruption measurement tools do not have. However, more specific surveys to better equip policy-makers could be developed by including questions targeting the poor or women.

[47] The survey includes 63,199 respondents in 60 countries. For more information on the Global Corruption Barometer, see: www.transparency.org/newsroom/latestnews/pressreleases/2007/20071206gcb2007en. Other TI research has explored gender differences in attitudes towards corruption and concluded that these cannot be taken as universal. These include: Corruption and Governance Measurement Tools in Latin American Countries (Berlin, Germany: TI, 2006). www.transparency.org/newsroom/latestnews/pressreleases/2006/20060814report_measurement_tools_la. See also: Transparencia México, Indice Nacional de Corrupción y Buen Gobierno (Mexico City: Transparencia México, 2005). www.transparenciamexicana.org.mx/ENCBG/.

positions. In Brazil, for example, municipal governments have experimented with hiring all-female traffic police to eradicate petty corruption. While positive results have been recorded, some observers have noted that these may be influenced by other changes that accompany staffing reforms. These include improving incentives to build workers' pride in their jobs and creating accountability mechanisms to allow for performance-based monitoring.

Even empirical results have not completely helped to resolve some of the questions about the relationship between women and corruption. Recent findings point to a statistically significant correlation between the increased participation of women in governance and reduced corruption[48]. However, no causality has been shown between gender and corruption, suggesting one's sex does not directly determine corrupt behaviour. Increasing women's role in governance should be promoted, but on the basis of equality rather than as part of an anti-corruption drive.

[48] For more on the statistical correlation between gender and corruption, see: Anand Swamy, Stephen Knack, Young Lee and Omar Azfar. 'Gender and Corruption'. *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 64, 2001, 25-55. www.williams.edu/Economics/wp/Swamygender.pdf;
David Dollar, Raymond Fisman and Roberta Gatti. '*Are Women Really the 'Fairer' Sex? Corruption and Women in Government*.' Working Paper Series, No. 4. (Washington, DC: World Bank, October 1999). www.onlinewomeninpolitics.org/beijing12/fairer.pdf.
Vivi Alatasa, Lisa Cameron, Ananish Chaudhuric, Nivan Erkalb and Lata Gangadharan. 'Gender and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis'. *Department of Economics Working Paper* 974 (Melbourne, Australia: University of Melbourne, 2006). www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/lcameron/papers/gender1.pdf.
S. Hellsten 'Trust Me! My Hands are Dirty Also: Institutionalized Corruption and the Competing Codes of Public and Private Ethics', *Professional Ethics*, Vol. 11:1, 2003. Council of Europe, Gender and Corruption in South East Europe: Making an Impact (Strasbourg, France: COE, 2004). www.coe.int/t/e/legalaffairs/legalcooperation/combatingeconomiccrime/3technicalcooperation/PACO/ PACO-Impact/PC-TP(2004)45.pdf;
Namawu Alhassan Aholo *Fighting Public Sector Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Gender Matter*, IDD, School of Public Policy, (Birmingham, United Kingdom: University of Birmingham, 2004). www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/idpm/research/events/PoliticalCorruption/documents/Alolo.doc.

2. Effects of Corruption on Women

While findings may vary on how gender and corruption interact, there is no split on the harsh effects that corruption exacts on women's lives. Women often confront social, cultural, political and institutional discrimination in their countries, which are compounded when a society is corruption ridden. With institutions already restricted for women, corruption creates additional obstacles for accessing public goods (including basic services) and their political participation.

Some ways in which women are affected disproportionately by corruption are:

- Access to decision-making. Corruption undermines a level playing field for women and men in decision-making. When political parties can be bought and sold, officials are elected through vote-buying and promotion is related to personal connections rather than merit, there are fewer opportunities for women to access decision-making circles in a country's government, political system and companies.
- Protection and advancement of rights under the law. Women's civil rights are often grossly inequitable and not protected when it comes to key social, political and economic issues: marriage and divorce, human trafficking, allegations of adultery and rape, child custody, inheritance, property rights and financial independence, among others. Under a corrupt law enforcement system, broader human rights for women and girls—as well as for minorities and less-advantaged groups—suffer (see sidebar). A corrupt judiciary perpetuates these problems and will reinforce existing discrimination, explicitly and implicitly[49]. Since women generally lack access to resources, any case brought to remedy claims against discrimination will likely be lost if the defendant can pay off the prosecutors and/or judges involved.

[49] Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, 'Gender and corruption in the administration of justice', *Global Corruption Report: Corruption in Judicial Systems*, pp121-128 (Berlin, Germany: TI, 2007). www.transparency.org/publications/gcr.

- Access to and control over resources. Corruption reduces public revenue, often resulting in lower levels of spending on education, healthcare, family benefits and other social services. These decreased outlays predominantly affect the welfare of women and children who often rely most on accessing the vital services provided by the state (although men also equally lose out when they are a household's primary care-giver and/or home-manager). Corruption in the water and energy sectors can particularly impact poor women, who bear the burden of seeking drinking water and fuel for their families[51]. Apart from basic services, corruption also increases obstacles for women wherever they must interact with the government. For example, corruption can distort women's access to credit and makes it more difficult to obtain licenses and permits—whether for starting a business, driving a car or constructing a house.

Women and corruption in Azerbaijan

The Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre (ALAC) of Transparency Azerbaijan provides legal advice and follows up on complaints of corrupt activities, many of which reflect the different types of corruption women confront.

One shocking case relates to a woman who came to the ALAC in the capital of Baku. She lodged a complaint about the corrupt behaviour of police officers who had detained her and a friend in the street for prostitution (which is not a criminal offence and can only be ticketed). After being fined, the police argued the women were 'disseminating venereal diseases' and forcibly brought them to the hospital for treatment, something well beyond their authority. The women claimed the only way they could leave the hospital was to pay a bribe to the chief doctor in exchange for their release.

As part of their response, the ALAC sent letters to the ministries of internal affairs and national security, as well as the prosecutor general's office. The government reacted by backing the police's actions although it took an important step by decomissioning the hospital as a holding facility, eliminating an important channel for bribes in the country[50].

[50] Case reported to ALAC on 27 July 2005. For more information on the case, see: www.transparency.org/publications/newsletter/2006/april2006/anticorruptionwork/azerbaijanalac.

[51] For more details, see the 'Gender and Water Alliance', which aims to mainstream gender into water policies, making sure that women are involved in the planning and carrying out of water policies (www.genderandwater.org/page/669).

3. Approaches to Mainstreaming Gender

If policy-makers are well informed about the different ways in which corruption affects men and women differently (as well as other groups), they are better equipped to design targeted and more effective anti-corruption policies.

> 'Corruption which drains public resources and takes much needed funds away from national economic development or social services, disproportionately affects women and the poor who are most dependent on them ... Women may also be in less powerful positions to challenge corruption when it occurs...'[52]

Bringing a gender focus to the fight against corruption—or mainstreaming it—ensures that both sexes benefit equally from policy interventions. To be effective, the design, implementation and monitoring of anti-corruption initiatives must consider men's and women's unique concerns and experiences when setting out a course for action[53].

Recent efforts in gender mainstreaming have highlighted three good practices as part of promoting this policy alignment:

- Policy-makers need gender-specific information (e.g. disaggregated data);
- Policy-makers need to combine targeted anti-corruption policies with efforts to empower women in governance; and
- Effective gender-sensitive approaches in anti-corruption efforts must include participatory planning and monitoring activities focused on women.

Key entry points for mainstreaming gender considerations into the design and implementation of anti-corruption strategies have been highlighted by leading bilateral and multilateral organisations, including the Council of Europe (COE), the German Technical Cooperation agency (GTZ) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)[54].

In many cases, the mainstreaming process is divided into different stages and steps. UNDP has developed 10 steps for devising a policy-making cycle that incorporates gender concerns. One of these steps includes developing arguments for gender equality (see Step 6) in order to promote a shift in cultural norms and behaviours. Another crucial consideration is how to incorporate efficiency calculations into mainstreaming efforts: e.g. a cost-benefit analysis of the effectiveness of policy interventions. As part of this assessment, policy-makers and civil society partners must determine the degree to which the goal of mainstreaming can be met, social justice addressed (including gender equality) and the costs minimised (social, political, financial and cultural).

Based on these calculations, gender-sensitive approaches that focus on women's participation tend to be some of the more effective alternatives for gender mainstreaming. GTZ has shown through its fieldwork that participatory budgeting and planning activities aimed at increased transparency and accountability can serve as a good means for incorporating women into anti-corruption efforts.

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[52] Charlie Sever, The Gender, Poverty, Governance Nexus: Key issues and current debates (Dublin, Ireland: Development Cooperation Ireland, 2005). www.dci.gov.ie/uploads/gender-povertygovernance.doc.

[53] The BRIDGE knowledge service, housed within the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) of the University of Sussex, supports gender advocacy and mainstreaming efforts of policy-makers and practitioners by bridging the gaps between theory, policy and practice with gender information. See: www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/index.html.

[54] See: Astrida Neimanis. Gender Mainstreaming in Practice: A Handbook (Bratislava, Slovak Republic: UNDP, 2002). http://www.undp.org/women/docs/RBECGMmanual.pdf. Council of Europe, Gender and Corruption in South East Europe: Making an Impact (Strasbourg, France: COE, 2004). www.coe.int/t/e/legalaffairs/legalcooperation/combatingeconomiccrime/3technicalcooperation/PACO/PACO-Impact/PC-TP(2004)45.pdf; GTZ, Corruption and Gender: Approaches and Recommendations for TA. Focal Theme: Corruption and Trafficking in Women (Bonn, Germany: GTZ, 2004). www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-corruption-and-gender.pdf.

Regardless of the mainstreaming approach embraced, changes in institutional rules and practices are essential if these initiatives are to be lasting, sustainable and successful. Related interventions in countries such as Ghana have showed that targeting women's participation in government will fall short in addressing corruption without equal changes in gender-based attitudes (see sidebar). To promote these, broader institutional and cultural shifts must be pursued to reframe gender roles and society's perceptions of women. Otherwise, mainstreaming gender and anti-corruption efforts is in danger of remaining an elusive end-game.

Mainstreaming gender to combat corruption in Ghana

Data on male and female attitudes of corruption in two public sector institutions in Ghana (police and education system) has raised questions about using gender mainstreaming as the only means for tackling corruption.

Findings showed that targeting women's participation in the public sector as an anti-corruption strategy would not likely address the problem unless paired with complementary initiatives. To combat public sector corruption in Ghana, the gender system—the roles and responsibilities ascribed to males and females—would need to equally undergo reforms[55].

[55] For more information, see: U4 Helpdesk Query, Gender and Corruption. (Bergen, Norway: U4 Helpdesk, 2006). www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query98.cfm.

STATE OF RESEARCH ON GENDER AND CORRUPTION

U4 Expert Answer
Transparency International / U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre

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QUERY

1. What is the state of research knowledge about gender and corruption – both in terms of its impact on women and how a gender-disaggregated approach can make progress against corruption?
2. What are the 'quick wins' on this issue for our country offices, including what has been done by donors to date that has proved successful?
3. What about gender in fragile states?

PURPOSE

I am trying to establish a baseline on what research exists on this topic.

SUMMARY

Corruption may affect progress towards gender equality and women's empowerment by limiting women's capacities to claim their rights. Evidence is inconclusive on whether women are more or less prone to corruption than men. A review of recent literature indicates that a more important dimension is corruption's disproportionate impact on women. This appears to be particularly the case in fragile state settings. Research shows that good practice to mitigate the effects of corruption on women include improved female participation in oversight processes and accountability systems.

PART 1: GENDER AND CORRUPTION

Gendered perceptions of corruption

Until recently, the debate on gender and corruption was focused on the gender-specific causes of corruption, and whether there is a relationship between gender equality in public and political life and levels of corruption in a given society.

During the early 2000s, many research reports claimed the existence of a link between low levels of corruption and more women in government. A study published in 1999 by the World Bank claimed that women are more trustworthy and public-spirited than men. They found that in a large cross-section of countries, greater representation of women in parliament led to lower levels of corruption. (David Dollar et al, 1999, "Are Women Really the Fairer Sex? Corruption and Women in Government", World Bank Working Paper Series No. 4; Swamy et al, 2000, "Gender and Corruption", IRIS Centre Working Paper No. 232; Mason and King, 2001, "Engendering development through gender equality in rights, resources, and voice", World Bank Report No. 21776).

The idea that women inherently possess greater integrity than men and are therefore less corrupt has since been challenged. Anne Marie Goetz questioned the notion that more women in government will result in lower levels of corruption. She noted that the advocates of this notion fail to acknowledge the ways in which gender relations may limit the opportunities for corruption, particularly when corruption functions through all-male networks and in forums from which women are socially excluded. (Anne-Marie Goetz, 2004, "Political Cleaners: How Women are the New Anti-Corruption Force. Does the Evidence Wash?")

In 2003, an alternative explanation was put forward by Hung-en Sung, who argued that it is 'fairer systems', not women's greater integrity, which explains why corruption is lower where more women are in government. She argued that having women in political leadership roles had a far less significant impact on corruption than liberal democratic institutions which had far more explanatory power of lower levels of corruption. (Sung, Hung-En, 2003, 'Fairer Sex or Fairer System? Gender and Corruption Revisited', Social Forces 82: 705-725).

This point of view was reinforced by V. Alatas et al in a 2006 study of individuals' attitudes towards corruption in four countries: Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta), and Singapore. This analysis departs from previous literature on gender and corruption by using experimental methodology, acknowledging that attitudes towards corruption play a critical role in its persistence. The findings suggest that the gender differences found in the previous studies may not be nearly as universal as claimed and may be more culture-specific. Alatas et al found no significant differences between the attitudes of men and women towards corruption across the countries studied. However, larger variations were found in women's attitudes towards corruption across the countries than in men's, which indicates a stronger cultural rather than gender-based explanation. (Vivi Alatas et al, February 2008, "Gender, culture, and corruption: insights from an experimental analysis", Southern Economic Journal; another study along the same lines is Alhassan-Alolo, N., 2007, 'Gender and corruption: testing the new consensus', Public Administration and Development 27).

Differences have, however, been found in gendered perceptions of corruption. Analysing data from Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer, UNIFEM has presented quantitative evidence that women are more likely than men to perceive high levels of corruption and to feel that their lives are affected by it. They found these differences to be statistically significant and consistent across most regions. (UNIFEM's Progress of the World's Women 2008 Report "Who Answers to Women? Gender and Accountability"). Swamy et al., who analysed gender differences in political attitudes about the acceptability of different forms of corruption, found similar results. They concluded that there is a worldwide "gender difference in tolerance for corruption". (Swamy et al, 2000, "Gender and Corruption", IRIS Centre Working Paper No. 232).

Finally, gender influences how effectively corruption is measured and evaluated. Sexual extortion and exploitation is excluded from international legal instruments tackling corruption, such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption. The UNDP has recently flagged this as a significant obstacle in measuring corruption. (UNDP presentation, November 2008, "Gender and Corruption in Development Cooperation: What do we know from UNDP experiences?", online at: http://www.eadi.org/index.php?id=1090).

Gendered impact of corruption

Corruption appears to have different impacts upon and takes different forms for men and women.

Recently, evidence has emerged that corruption has unique impacts on poor women and girls in a variety of sectors. Moreover, conceptualization of the definition of corruption is evolving to include sexual extortion and trafficking, which are forms of corruption disproportionately experienced by women.

The gendered impacts of corruption can be examined in three categories: access to decision-making power, protection, and the advancement of rights and access to resources.

Access to decision-making power

Corruption compounds the already high barriers women face in their empowerment – economic and otherwise. In Africa, for example, most women do not have the right to own property due to cultural constraints. They also do not have access to capital due to lack of collateral. Under these circumstances, corruption in financial schemes set by governments for women's economic empowerment has a hugely negative impact on women as this is their only hope for capital.

Corruption stifles women's voices in accountability mechanisms – not only are women disproportionately affected by corruption, they also have the lowest ability to change their own situations. When political parties can be bought and sold and public officials are elected through vote-buying, or when advancement within the civil service or corporate sector is contingent upon personal connections rather than merit, there are fewer chances for poor women. (Ngotho wa Kariuki, 2008, "Impact of Corruption on Women's Economic Empowerment in Africa").

Protection of women's rights

Corruption severely impacts on the extent to which women's rights are ensured and protected. Corruption in law enforcement - police and security forces and the justice system - has specific gender dimensions. For example, corruption can provide protection to trafficking networks of poor women and girls, perpetrators of sexual violence can avoid punishment by bribing the police. In some cases sexual harassment and rape can even be perpetrated by the police.

The processes used by law enforcement institutions to process cases are also vulnerable to corruption. These processes often rely heavily on evidence that, in cases of sexual extortion – from harassment to assault - are usually anecdotal, which leaves a lot of room for discretion by officials and, potentially, for bribe seeking. (Celestine Nyamu Musembi and Naomi Hossain, UNIFEM/UNDP primer on gender and corruption, forthcoming).

Access to resources

Women's access to resources is an area where corruption has profound gendered impacts, especially in access to public services. While corruption affects the access of all citizens to these resources and services, women are particularly disadvantaged in at least three ways: First, resources intended to benefit poor women may be more vulnerable to 'grand' corruption, especially in the form of 'leakages', since this is particularly common with ear-marked resources for marginalized groups. Bribes requested for the delivery of basic services such as health, education and water and sanitation affect women in a significant way since their income level tends to be lower and they have fewer alternatives to acquire these services. However, limited

evidence is available on the relationship between grand corruption and delivery of public services to women.

Second, corruption in accessing services and resources are less likely to be reported than other forms of corruption due to their sexual nature. For example, some of the most serious evidence of sexual extortion for access to services can be found in cases of sexual abuse in schools; in instances where such abuse results in pregnancy, a common response is to expel the pregnant girl, rather than to punish the responsible teacher. In this case, the impact of corruption is doubled on girls: not only are they required to pay 'bribes' in the form of sex, they also run the risk of being deprived of an education for doing so.

Third, the perception that women are less able to pay bribes can lead to them being 'excused' from paying bribes. However, this does not always mean that women access the required services without paying bribes. In many cases they simply cannot access the services since they are unable to find the adequate entry-point to the network where bribes can be paid. (Celestine Nyamu Musembi and Naomi Hossain, UNIFEM/UNDP primer on gender and corruption, Forthcoming).

The literature reviewed for this query frequently calls for further research into the gendered impact of corruption. There is a great need for gender disaggregated corruption statistics which can enable analysis on how responses to corruption can be tailored to the needs of different groups. Research also needs to take into account social causes of corruption, which has gendered dimensions.

PART 2: GOOD PRACTICE IN RELATION TO GENDER AND CORRUPTION

For many donors this is a relatively new area of programming and there is limited evidence on the impact and effectiveness of interventions. Most of the information available suggests that, in terms of punitive and preventative measures, three dominant strategies have been used: creating or strengthening oversight mechanisms with women's participation; enactment and use of access to information laws; and increased representation and participation of women in decision-making positions and civil service. It should be noted that, thus far, most gender-sensitive anti-corruption initiatives have been initiated by civil society organisations, communities or by individual women at both grassroots level and in senior government positions.

In 2004, GTZ published a report on approaches and recommendations for technical assistance with respect to gender and corruption. In this document they endorse approaches such as gender-sensitive participatory budget planning and analysis, and gender- sensitive approaches to corruption in connection with trafficking in women. (Bianca Schimmel and Birgit Pech, 2004, "Corruption and Gender: Approaches and Recommendations for Technical Assistance" GTZ Report). Similarly, the UNDP's 2001 handbook on gender mainstreaming contains recommendations on how to integrate gender in policy formation in various sectors. Corruption, however, is not the focus of the recommendations and is treated rather as a cross- cutting issue that affects all policy areas and sectors. (Astrida Neimanis, 2001, "Gender Mainstreaming in Practice: A Handbook", UNDP Handbook)

UNIFEM's 2008/2009 Progress Report provides a wide range of practical suggestions for preventing corruption, such as including gender-sensitive accountability systems in justice system reform, law enforcement reform, economic regulation, electoral oversight, public service delivery, and international aid and security provision. The report states that women need to have improved access to the institutions that provide these services in order to make their priorities known.

Women's participation in oversight mechanisms is an effective way to ensure that their voice is heard. In order to fulfil this goal, the report recommends strengthening gender-responsiveness of public accountability institutions. Accountability systems that impact on women's experience include elections, judicial review, public audit, and promotion and performance review systems within public governance structures, ombudspersons or human rights commissions and

market regulation. Corruption in any of these institutions has negative impacts on accountability to women.

Gender-responsive anti-corruption reforms need to take place in a broader policy context that strives towards gender equality. The report states that in order to achieve this, institutional mandates must contain commitments to promote gender equality – adequate training needs to be provided on gender-sensitive issues, performance measuring and monitoring systems need to record and reward actions promoting women's rights, and, most importantly, systems need to be in place to monitor abuses of women's rights or neglect of their needs. Mechanisms also need to be put in place to correct problems and provide redress to victims. (UNIFEM's Progress of the World's Women 2008 Report "Who Answers to Women? Gender and Accountability").

The following are some practical examples of strategies that have been used to tackle the gendered dimensions of corruption:

- **Right to information campaigns.** This area is particularly important because women often have limited access to information, which is essential to scrutinize the quality of public services and policy decisions that affect their lives. The Mazdoor Kisan Sakti Sangathan (MKSS), in Rajasthan, India, is a well-known instance of an anti-corruption movement led and substantially driven by women that tackled this very issue. Led by a woman ex-bureaucrat, this organisation of landless people exposed corruption in public works programmes that particularly affected poor women, by establishing citizens' right to access information about public budgets and public spending. The organisation attracted a lot of attention nationally and internationally and eventually led to a movement that successfully fought for the Constitutional amendment that created the Right to Information Law in India. Their example is now being emulated elsewhere in the world.
- **Gender budgets.** These initiatives aim to build demand among citizens for gender-responsive public spending, as well as the supply of more robust institutional procedures and frameworks that ensure spending plans target gender equality and support women's rights from the concept and planning stage. UNIFEM has funded a number of initiatives which have focused on tracking gaps between budget allocations (planned) and budget expenditures (actual), in order to identify instances where funds intended for women's needs and priorities have gone missing. For example, in Mexico, a civil society group (Fundar) that was part of a gender-responsive budget initiative supported by UNIFEM investigated the loss of 30 million pesos from the federal budget that were intended for programmes in the health sector. They documented the evidence in detail, compiled a case, and tabled it before the Chamber of Deputies.
- **Public advocacy by women's organisations.** A good example of public advocacy against corruption led by women can be found in the Philippines. Women members of PSLINK, a confederation of public sector unions of Philippine government employees, led an initiative against corruption. PSLINK has been involved in a range of corruption control initiatives, including exposing a high-level criminal network that was trafficking women through the Technical Education Skills Department Authority. These initiatives were undertaken even under threats against the Secretary General of PSLINK.
- **Use of information communication technologies for naming and shaming.** Exposure of corruption using local radios and the internet is becoming more frequent. This is a good avenue for women who often do not have access to other means for redress. One good example is the use of videos broadcasted in YouTube to denounce persecutions of individuals exposing corruption. For example, in India, the wife of a government official denouncing corruption set up a website and videos in an attempt to make sure that he is not punished or murdered.
- **Increasing number of women in security forces.** Sexual corruption in law enforcement institutions have been shown to decrease when women personnel handle crimes of sexual violence. A good example of this is the all-women police contingent sent by India to Liberia in

2007 for the United Nation's peace-keeping mission. The effects of this intervention were two-fold: the recruitment of women to the Liberian national police increased, and gender-based violence reportedly declined in areas patrolled by women. (Celestine Nyamu Musembi and Naomi Hossain, UNIFEM/UNDP primer on gender and corruption, Forthcoming)

UNIFEM repeatedly highlights that gender-sensitive anti-corruption efforts are still islands in a sea of large, gender-neutral (or gender-biased) anti-corruption programming. This is a problem because without a compendium of successfully applied approaches it is difficult for policy makers to formulate programs they feel confident of succeeding. Gender issues need to be more systematically understood and integrated into these larger programmes. UNIFEM's report stresses that greater resources need to be allocated to review gender-sensitive anti-corruption approaches and initiatives, regardless of their size and scope. (UNIFEM's Progress of the World's Women 2008 Report "Who Answers to Women? Gender and Accountability").

PART 3: GENDER AND CORRUPTION IN FRAGILE STATES

Research on gender and corruption in the context of conflict and post-conflict states is even more limited than in the context of 'normalised' state settings. Fragile and post-conflict states tend to be accompanied by various levels of weakness in government capacity and a very limited rule of law. Corruption in conflict and post-conflict settings often take the form of gross abuses of women's human rights.

Human rights violations in fragile states affect women and men differently. In some situations, women and girls are vulnerable to rape and other forms of gender- based violence, as well as to forced displacement. Some documentation can be found on sexual extortion of women and girls during conflict and post-conflict peace-keeping and reconstruction efforts. Examples include 'sex-for-food' scandals in which refugees and other vulnerable women and children have been forced to perform sexual favours for peacekeeping forces and aid workers in return for food and other resources. (Celestine Nyamu Musembi and Naomi Hossain, UNIFEM/UNDP primer on gender and corruption, Forthcoming).

Extreme poverty and corruption are common features of post-conflict and fragile states. Women are particularly hard hit by poverty in such contexts since they are likely to be excluded from full participation in the labour force or credit markets, either by law or in practice. Corruption in these circumstances therefore prohibits the realisation of basic rights to food, clothing, housing and medical care. A 2005 report by the North South Institute emphasised that tackling corruption in service delivery in post-conflict states in fundamental to ensuring gender equity. (Stephen Baranyi and Kristiana Powell, 2005, "Fragile States, Gender Equality and Aid Effectiveness: A Review of Donor Perspectives").

PART 4: FURTHER READING

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GENDER, CULTURE, AND CORRUPTION: INSIGHTS FROM AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT:

A substantial body of recent research looks at differences in the behavior of men and women in diverse economic transactions. We contribute to this literature by investigating gender differences in behavior when confronted with a common bribery problem. Our study departs from the previous literature on gender and corruption by using economic experiments. Based on data collected in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta), and Singapore, we show that while women in Australia are less tolerant of corruption than men in Australia, no significant gender differences are seen in India, Indonesia, and Singapore. Hence, our findings suggest that the gender differences reported in previous studies may not be as universal as stated, and may be more culture specific. We also explore behavioral differences by gender across countries and find larger variations in women's behavior toward corruption than in men's across the countries in our sample.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a substantial body of work has explored the differences in the behavior of men and women in various economic transactions. This paper contributes to the literature by investigating gender differences in behavior when confronted with a common bribery problem.

Due to the negative impact of corruption on economic development, eliminating corruption is a major concern for many countries. Two recent empirical papers have examined the relationship between gender and corruption. Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001) use country-level data for a sample of more than 100 countries and find that the greater the representation of women in the country's legislative body, the lower the country's level of perceived corruption. This finding is consistent with the results of Swamy et al. (2001), who use both micro-level survey data from a range of countries and country-level data. They also find that, on average, women are less tolerant of corruption than men[56].

Our study departs from these two papers by using economic experiments, which allows us to explore individuals' attitudes toward corruption[57]. One issue with drawing conclusions on the basis of surveys is that actual behavior (especially when confronted with nontrivial amounts of money) may be quite different from survey responses. Experiments differ from surveys and perception indices in that the participants in the experiments receive actual monetary payments, the amounts of which depend on the decisions they make during the experiments. Hence, we explore whether the gender differences reported in the previous studies on corruption are also evident in an experimental setting[58].

Gender differences may be the result of both biological and social differences, that is, differences in social roles of men and women. An individual's social role and presence in the public domain may play an important part in that individual's exposure to corruption. Hence, if women and men differ in their social roles, one may also expect them to differ in their attitudes toward corruption. Higher levels of exposure to corruption in daily life may promote a tolerance and an acceptance of corruption that are reflected in norms of behavior. In addition, women may be more victimized by (and, therefore, less tolerant of) corruption in countries where their presence in the public domain is lower[59],[60].

To investigate whether consistent gender differences are evident across countries, we conducted experiments in four countries: Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta), and Singapore. Two of the countries in our sample are consistently ranked among the least corrupt countries in the world (Australia and Singapore, with scores of 8.7 and 9.4 out of 10. respectively), and two of them are consistently

[56] Their micro-level data are based on surveys that ask respondents about the acceptability of various dishonest or illegal behaviors. They find that a larger proportion of women than men believe that illegal or dishonest behavior is never justifiable. These results are consistent with those of Glover et al. (1997) and Reiss and Mitra (1998), who find that gender affects whether an individual regards certain workplace behavior as unacceptable.

[57] In the experimental literature, behavioral differences between men and women have been studied using public goods, ultimatum, dictator, and trust games. The results have been mixed, with some studies suggesting that women are more socially oriented, others finding that men are more socially oriented, and still others finding no significant gender differences. See, for example, Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993), Nowell and Tinker (1994), Bolton and Katoc (1995), Cadsby and Maynes (1998), Eckel and Grossman (1996, 1998), Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), and Solnick (2001). Croson and Gneezy (2005) provide an excellent survey.

[58] There is a growing literature that analyzes corruption using experimental methodology. See Abbink (3005) for a survey. However, except for Frank and Schulze (2000), none of these papers explores the relationship between gender and corruption. Frank and Schulze (2000) analyze whether economists behave in a more self-interested way than other people. They find that economics students are significantly more corrupt than others, with male economists being the most corrupt and male noneconomists the least corrupt.

[59] Although all of the participants in our experiments were upper-level undergraduate or graduate students, their expectations and attitudes would nevertheless be influenced by the differing roles of men and women in their society.

[60] We discuss in section 4 possible explanations for why gender differences may vary across cultures.

ranked among the most corrupt (India and Indonesia, with scores of 3.3 and 2.4, respectively)[61].

Our results show that the gender differences found in the previous studies, which are largely based on data from Western countries, are also evident in the experimental data from Australia. That is, Australian men are more likely to engage in and be more tolerant of corruption than are Australian women. However, we find no systematic gender differences in the three Asian countries included in our study. Thus, gender differences in attitudes toward corruption appear not to be as robust as suggested by the previous evidence and may be culture specific.

We also investigate whether cross-country variation in behavior is similar for men and women. We find greater variation in the behavior of women across the four countries we study than in the behavior of men. Cross-country variation in attitudes toward corruption may reflect the differing levels of exposure to corruption in the different countries[62]. Women may react differently to this exposure than men since there may be a larger variation in the social roles of women than in the social roles of men across countries.

The paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the experimental design in section 2 and present the results in section 3. We then discuss the implications of our results. possible explanations for why gender differences may vary across cultures, and avenues for future research in section 4.

[61] These rankings are based on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), released annually by Transparency International. The CPI ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among politicians and public officials, based on the views of analysts and business people around the world. See www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices for more information. The Appendix contains a selective list of country rankings from the latest (2006) Corruption Perceptions Index.

[62] See Cameron et al. (2006) for a detailed discussion of how attitudes toward corruption vary across the four countries considered in this study.

2. Experimental Design and Procedure

Since different cultures may have different perceptions of corruption, we wanted to capture in our experimental design behavior that would be viewed as corrupt in all of the countries included in our study. One of the fundamental aspects of corruption is that the parties who engage in it benefit from it at the expense of parties external to the corrupt transaction. We wanted to examine the behavior of parties on both sides of the corruption problem—those who are perpetuators of it as well as those who are victims of it. Our experiment is based on a game in which two players can act corruptly to increase their own payoff at the expense of a third player. The bribery that takes place between the first two players harms the third player and is illegal. Hence, the third player, the victim, is allowed to punish the first two players at a cost to the victim[63].

More specifically, the experiment is based on a three-person, sequential-move game. The first player in the game is called the firm and is given the option to initiate a corrupt act by offering a bribe to a government official. The second player. whom we call the official, can either reject or accept the bribe. If the bribe is accepted, both the firm and the official are monetarily better off at the expense of the third player, the citizen. The citizen can, however, respond to the corrupt act by choosing to punish both the firm and the official. The punishment is costly to the citizen but imposes a much larger monetary sanction on the firm and the official[64].

This setup allows us to examine two types of behavior: (i) the incentive to engage in a corrupt act from which one reaps benefits and (ii) the incentive to incur a cost to punish a corrupt act that decreases one's payoff. This distinction enables us to examine whether individuals behave differently depending on whether they directly benefit from a corrupt act. Figure 1 contains an extensive-form representation of the game, where all of the payoffs are denoted in experimental dollars. We constrain the amount of the bribe that the firm can offer to $\boldsymbol{B} \in [4, 8]$. It costs the firm two experimental dollars to offer a bribe, and the firm incurs this cost regardless of whether the bribe is accepted. This cost represents, for example, the cost of finding the right official to bribe[65].) If a bribe is offered, the official decides whether to accept it. If the official decides to accept the bribe, the payoffs to the firm and the official increase by $3\boldsymbol{B}$. The payoff to the citizen decreases by the amount of the bribe, $\boldsymbol{B}$. Hence, the net benefit to the firm from paying the bribe is $3\boldsymbol{B} - 2$. This may, for example, represent the benefit the firm gets from avoiding a regulation. We assume that the official's payoff also increases by $3\boldsymbol{B}$, even though the amount of bribe paid by the firm is B, due to an assumption of difference in the marginal utilities of income. Since the income earned in public service is likely to be lower than that earned in private firms, the same amount of money can be assumed to have a lower marginal utility value to the firm than to the official[66].

[63] Note that the World Values Survey also assesses the attitudes of people in different countries by asking their views on how justifiable it is to accept a bribe. See www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.

[64] We chose to use emotive terms such as "bribe" and "punishment" in the instructions because our aim was to simulate a real-life corrupt transaction. Cooper and Kagel (2003) consider the role of loaded language in signaling games and suggest that the use of a meaningful context might better capture behavior in field settings than the use of neutral language. On the other hand. Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2002) find that the use of words like "bribe" does not make a difference in the corruption game that they study.

[65] To offer a bribe, firms usually have to incur some transaction costs. These costs are usually constant and have to be incurred irrespective of the size of the bribe being offered.

[66] The choice of multipliers has the additional advantage of helping us prevent negative total payoffs.

Figure 1. The Game Tree



If a bribe has been offered and accepted, the citizen, who moves last after observing the choices made by the firm and the official, is given a chance to punish the firm and the official for the corrupt transaction. The citizen can choose an amount ***P*** in punishment. Such punishment is costly for the citizen and reduces the citizen's payoff by the amount of the punishment, ***P***. We assume punishment is costly to the citizen for two reasons. First, the cost may represent the amount of tax the citizen has to pay for a legal system to exist. Second, it may represent the costs of filing a police report, appearing in court, and so forth. Since in most cases, these costs are much less than the amount of punishment actually imposed on the parties, we assume that if the citizen chooses a punishment amount of ***P***, the firm and the official suffer a payoff reduction of 3***P***.

In the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, regardless of the parameters chosen, a payoff-maximizing citizen chooses not to punish. Knowing this, the official accepts the bribe and the firm offers the bribe. Moreover, the firm offers the maximum amount of bribe it can because its payoff is increasing in the amount it offers.

We have deliberately chosen to conduct a one-shot game because in a one-shot game the punishment has no economic benefit to the citizen. The decision to punish is not affected by the anticipation of possible future economic gains. This implies that if we observe any punishment by the citizens, we can infer that it is motivated by either negative reciprocity or moral considerations. Hence, with a one-shot game, a comparison of the citizens' willingness to punish across different countries reveals the differences in the tolerance of corrupt acts in those countries.

The one-shot nature of the game also helps us avoid issues associated with repeated games, such as signaling, reputation formation, and serial correlation in decisions. Each subject in our database participated in the experiment only once and played only one role[67]. The subjects playing the three roles

[67] One standard response in cases such as these is to have random rematching of subjects. Kandori (1992) states that it is not clear whether

were grouped anonymously in the experiment to avoid conscious or unconscious signaling.

The experiments were conducted at the University of Melbourne, the Delhi School of Economics, the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, and the National University of Singapore using third-year undergraduate or postgraduate students. In order to minimize the experimenter effects, we made sure that one of the authors (the same one) was present in all the countries where we ran the experiment[68].

All the sessions were run as noncomputerized experiments. At the beginning of each session, subjects were asked to come to a large lecture theater. Each session consisted of at least 30 subjects. These subjects, on entering the room, were randomly designated as firms, officials, or citizens. Each group was located far apart from the others in a recognizable cluster. Thus, each group could see the members of the other groups, but individual subjects were unaware of which three specific subjects constituted a particular firm-official-citizen trio.

At the beginning of each session, each subject received a copy of the instructions, which were then read out loud to them. They were also given a number of examples explaining how the payoffs would be calculated for specific bribe and punishment amounts. Then, the subjects playing the role of a firm were asked to decide whether or not to offer a bribe. If they chose to offer a bribe, they also had to choose an amount. After they made their decision, the record sheets with the bribe amounts were collected by the experimenter and distributed to the corresponding officials. After the officials made their decision on whether to accept the bribe, the record sheets of both the firms and the government officials were given to the corresponding citizens. Hence, the citizens learned whether a bribe was offered and whether it was accepted. The game ended after the citizens decided whether to punish by choosing a punishment amount. All the subjects were then asked to fill out a demographic survey, which included questions on age, gender, income, education stream, employment history, and frequency of exposure to corruption. Those in the role of the citizen were also asked to explain the motivation for their decision.

Each experiment lasted about an hour. At the end of each session the decisions made by all of the subjects were entered into a spreadsheet that generated their payoffs. The payoffs were converted into cash using an appropriate conversion rate, taking into consideration purchasing power parity across the countries where the experiment was conducted[69]. These conversion rates were public information. To guarantee parity in the payoffs to the different types of players (firm, official, and citizen), we used a different conversion rate for each type[70].

random rematchings actually succeed in eliminating supergame; effects. However. Duffy and Ochs (2005) consider an experiment with an indefinitely repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma game and find that, contrary to Kandori's theoretical conjecture, a cooperative norm does not emerge in the treatments where players are matched randomly. In the current paper, we decided to adopt a conservative stance and have players participate in pure one-shot games to avoid any repeated game effects.

[68] See Roth et al. (1991) and Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) for a discussion of the methodological issues arising in multisite experiments.

[69] The conversion rates in each country were based on (i) the standard hourly wage paid for a student research assistant in each country and (ii) a typical basket of goods bought by students in each country. This approach is similar to the procedure used by other researchers who have conducted cross-cultural studies (e.g.. Carpenter and Cardenas 2004; Cardenas and Carpenter 2005).

[70] In Australia, the conversion rates were 3 experimental currency = 1 real currency for the firms, 2 experimental currency = 1 real currency for the officials, and 1.5 experimental currency = 1 real currency for the citizens. Each subject made, on average, AU$20. This amount is approximately equivalent to US$15. In India, subjects were paid an average of US$11, in Singapore US$13. and in Indonesia US$9. Different conversion rates for different player types are sometimes used in experiments if the payoffs are expected to be very different across the subjects. Davis and Holt (1993) recommend that average payments in experiments should be high enough to compensate all participants for the opportunity cost of their time. Having different conversion rates for different types of players helped us achieve this goal because the equilibrium payoffs were highly asymmetric across the different player types (firm, official, and citizen) in the experiment.

3. RESULTS

With our experimental design, we are interested in exploring two issues. In the first subsection we start by investigating whether, controlling for culture (i.e., within each country), women are less tolerant toward corruption than men. We then control for gender in the second subsection and investigate whether larger cross-country variations exist in the behavior of women than in the behavior of men in the context of our game.

A total of 1326 subjects participated in the experiments. Of these, 596 (45%) were men. The number of participants in Australia, India, Indonesia, and Singapore were 642, 309, 180, and 195, respectively[71].

We report results based on *t*-tests and multivariate regression analysis, where we estimated binary probit models for the bribe, acceptance, and punishment rates and ordinary least square models for the bribe and punishment amounts[72]. The regression results control for variables not accounted for in the *t*-tests, such as field of study (whether it is economics) and percentage of each Australian subject's life that has been spent outside of Australia[73]. Of the variables on which we collected information in the surveys, these were the only ones that were found to be consistently significant determinants of subject behavior. In the regressions for the officials' and citizens' behavior, we also control for the bribe amount.

The reported results are based on two different treatments that were conducted. In the Indian experiments and a subset of the Australian sessions, the citizens' punishment range was restricted to $P \in [2, 8]$[74]. We refer to this treatment as Treatment 1. In the other countries and the remaining Australian sessions, the punishment range was extended to $P \in [2, 12]$[75]. This is Treatment 2. The *t*-tests, the results of which are shown in the tables below, make comparisons within treatment, and the regression results include a control for treatment. The variation in treatment design enabled us to examine the effectiveness of the punishment regime. We discuss the treatment effects in detail in Cameron et al. (2006). Since the focus of the current paper is gender differences and because gender differences do not vary across the treatments, we do not discuss the treatments effects here[76].

[71] In Australia, 107 men and 107 women made decisions as firms, 89 men and 95 women as officials, and 59 men and 99 women as citizens. In India, 49 men and 54 women made decisions as firms, 39 men and 58 women as officials, and 44 men and 43 women as citizens. In Indonesia, 32 men and 28 women made decisions as firms, 22 men and 26 women as officials, and 17 men and 20 women as citizens. In Singapore, 23 men and 42 women made decisions as firms, 26 men and 30 women as officials, and 23 men and 27 women as citizens. As is clear from the design of the experiment, not all officials and citizens got the opportunity to make a decision, which is the reason we did not have a complete gender balance across the different roles.

[72] We also estimated ordered probit models for positive bribe and punishment amounts. These models recognize that the dependent variable is not continuous. The results were very similar to the reported results from the estimation of ordinary least squares models.

[73] The last variable controls for the high number of foreign students who study in Australian universities. The majority of these students come from Asia. We find this variable to be insignificant in explaining behavior in most of the regressions. This outcome is possibly because those who choose to study in Australia are more Westernized than their counterparts and/or quickly absorb the social norms of the new environment.

[74] Due to resource constraints, we do not have data for all treatments from all the countries.

[75] These values were chosen to guarantee two outcomes. First, we wanted to ensure that no one obtained a negative payoff. Second, we wanted to make sure that the average earning was high enough to offset the participants' opportunity cost of time (Davis and Holt 1993).

[76] Cameron et al. (2006) also present and discuss results from a third treatment. In both Treatments 1 and 2, the bribe is welfare enhancing in that the total payoff gains to the firm and the official exceed the payoff loss to the citizen. In Treatment 3, the payoffs are altered so that the combined gains to the firm and the official are less than the payoff loss to the citizen. Hence, the bribe is welfare reducing. Since the gender differences are similar across all three treatments, we chose not to discuss Treatment 3 in this paper for ease of exposition.

Are Women Less Tolerant of Corruption than Men?

As stated above, both Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) find that women are less tolerant of corruption than are men. Within the design of our experiment, this finding is equivalent to asking whether female participants in the four countries in which we ran our experiment had a lower propensity to pay bribes, a lower propensity to accept bribes, and a higher propensity to punish bribery than the male participants.

Table 1 presents the results of *t*-tests for differences in the means of the behavior of the male and female participants in the three roles. Panel A of Table 1 pools the data and shows that overall the male participants have a higher propensity to bribe than the female participants ($p = 0.04$) but shows no other statistically significant gender differences in behavior. However, if we break the data down by individual countries (Panels B–E), we observe that the difference in the bribe rates is driven by Australia. In Australia, 91.6% of male participants offered bribes, compared with 80.4% of female participants ($p = 0.02$). In none of the other countries do we see any significant gender differences in the propensities to offer bribes. Further, in Australia, the male subjects also had higher acceptance rates and lower punishment rates than the female subjects. The bribe was accepted 92.1% of the time when it was offered to a male participant in Australia, while it was accepted 80% of the time when it was offered to a female participant. This difference is statistically significant according to a test of difference of means ($p = 0.02$). The Australian male participants in the role of the citizen chose to punish 49.2% of the time, while the Australian female participants chose to punish 62.6% of the time. This difference is marginally significant at the 10% level.

Table 1. Gender Differences

	Male	Female	*p*-value
A. All Countries, Treatments 1 and 2			
% firms bribing	90.52	83.98	0.04
Bribe amount (if >0)	7.59	7.55	0.63
% officials accepting	88.64	84.21	0.21
% citizens punishing	44.06	51.85	0.16
Punishment amount (if >0)	6.05	5.37	0.24
B. Australia, Treatments 1 and 2			
% firms bribing	91.59	80.37	0.02
Bribe amount (if >0)	7.63	7.72	0.42
% officials accepting	92.13	80.00	0.02
% citizens punishing	49.15	62.63	0.10
Punishment amount (if >0)	6.48	5.34	0.12
C. India, Treatment 1			
% firms bribing	95.92	92.59	0.48
Bribe amount (if >0)	7.57	7.18	0.10
% officials accepting	89.74	89.66	0.99
% citizens punishing	27.27	20.93	0.50

	Male	Female	*p*-value
Punishment amount (if >0)	3.25	4.33	0.30
D. Indonesia, Treatment 2			
% firms bribing	78.13	82.14	0.70
Bribe amount (if >0)	7.40	7.61	0.47
% officials accepting	77.27	76.92	0.98
% citizens punishing	76.47	70.00	0.67
Punishment amount (if >0)	7.00	4.29	0.12
E. Singapore, Treatment 2			
% firms bribing	91.30	83.33	0.38
Bribe amount (if >0)	7.67	7.60	0.77
% officials accepting	84.62	93.33	0.30
% citizens punishing	39.13	48.15	0.53
Punishment amount (if >0)	7.00	7.38	0.82

In India, Indonesia, and Singapore, we find no significant differences in the behavior of the male and female participants in the three roles. The point estimates also do not vary systematically by gender. For example, in India, men bribe more often, but also punish more often.

The regression results presented in Table 2 confirm the results from the *t*-tests. Panel A pools all the data across all the countries. Overall, men offer bribes with a higher frequency (significant at the 5% level) and punish corrupt acts by higher amounts (significant at the 10% level). In Panel B, the effect of gender is allowed to differ by country. For example, the coefficient on the variable male-Australia captures the difference between men and women in Australia. The results show that in Australia men bribe approximately 8 percentage points more often, accept bribes approximately 8 percentage points more often, and punish bribery about 14 percentage points less often than women. However, if the Australian men do punish, they do so by a larger amount than the Australian women. In the other countries, no significant gender differences are seen in the bribe, acceptance, and punishment rates. The only significant differences we find are in the bribe and punishment amounts. Specifically, the Indian male subjects, when they bribe, offer larger bribes than the Indian female subjects, and the Indonesian male subjects, when they punish, choose higher punishment amounts than the Indonesian female subjects.

A possible criticism of our results is that the difference we observe in the behavior of men and women in Australia may be the result of gender differences in other-regarding preferences, such as inequity aversion, or in motivations for punishment, such as negative reciprocity. To examine this issue further, we conducted a set of experiments with Australian subjects using neutral language, where we replaced the words "bribe" and "punishment" with "transfer" and "forgo money to reduce others' payoff," respectively[77]. Moreover, instead of designating different types of players as firms, officials, and citizens, we referred to them as players 1, 2, and 3.

[77] The neutral-language experiments were run with Treatment 2 only, in which a larger range of punishments was allowed.

Table 2. Multivariate Regression Results

A. Pooled Regression Results										
	Bribe (0/1)		Bribe Amount (>0)		Accept (0/1)		Punish (0/1)		Punishment Amount (>01)	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	M. effect[a]	*p*-value	Coeff.	p-value	M. effect[a]	p-value	M. effect[a]	*p*-value	Coeff.	*p*-value
India	0.059	0.32	-0.456	0.03**	0.012	0.86	-0.277	0.01***	-2.154	0.05**
Indonesia	0.073	0.08*	-0.254	0.23	0.025	0.68	0.045	0.72	-1.068	0.30
Singapore	0.105	0.00***	-0.096	0.64	0.100	0.06*	-0.224	0.04**	0.665	0.53
Male	0.063	0.04**	0.089	0.35	0.035	0.31	-0.062	0.29	1.008	0.08*
Economics major	0.026	0.42	0.200	0.05**	0.082	0.03**	-0.159	0.01***	-0.380	0.58
% life out of Australia	0.148	0.01***	-0.119	0.55	0.092	0.14	-0.060	0.56	-0.730	0.42
Treatment 1	0.148	0.00***	0.031	0.82	0.090	0.08*	-0.105	0.20	-0.741	0.32
Bribe amount					0.007	0.71	-0.035	0.27	0.191	0.55
Constant			7.641	0.00***					4.797	0.05**
R-squared	0.102		0.012		0.056		0.102		0.046	
N	440		383		384		332		161	

[a] We report marginal effects for the probits. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 2. Continued

B. Pooled Data. Gender-Country interaction (Australian female subjects are the reference category)										
	Bribe (0/1)		Bribe Amount (>0)		Accept (0/1)		Punish (0/1)		Punishment Amount (>0)	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	M. effect[a]	*p*-value	Coeff.	p-value	M. effect[a]	p-value	M. effect[a]	*p*-value	Coeff.	*p*-value
India	0.074	0.26	-0.725	0.00*"	0.036	0.61	-0.367	0.00***	-0.95	0.50
Indonesia	0.105	0.02*	-0.179	0.49	0.051	0.44	-0.047	0.76	-1.85	0.12
Singapore	0.110	0.01***	-0.181	0.45	0.135	0.02*	-0.237	0.07**	1.33	0.28
Male-Australia	0.083	0.02*	-0.044	0.74	0.084	0.06**	-0.143	0.08**	1.34	0.09**
Male-India	0.048	0.44	0.472	0.01***	-0.024	0.73	0.073	0.54	-0.95	0.54
Male-Indonesia	-0.030	0.68	-0.203	0.43	-0.008	0.92	0.070	0.69	2.74	0.04*
Male-Singapore	0.060	0.33	0.110	0.66	-0.121	0.30	-0.101	0.48	0.497	0.74
Economics major	0.027	0.39	0.198	0.05*	0.083	0.03*	-0.160	0.01***	-0.364	0.59
% life out of Australia	0.152	0.01***	-0.135	0.50	0.078	0.21	-0.063	0.54	-0.793	0.38
Treatment 1	0.145	0.00***	0.040	0.76	0.077	0.13	-0.101	0.22	-0.777	0.29
Bribe amount					-0.007	0.72	-0.035	0.28	0.192	0.55
Const			7.719	0.00***					4.728	0.06**
R-squared	0.110		0.022		0.069		0.108		0.055	
N	440		383		384		332		161	

[a] We report marginal effects for the probits. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 2. Continued.

C. Pooled Data. Gender-Country Interaction (Australian male subjects are the reference category)										
	Bribe (0/1)		Bribe Amount (>0)		Accept (0/1)		Punish (0/1)		Punishment Amount (>0)	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	M. effect[a]	*p*-value	Coeff.	p-value	M. effect[a]	p-value	M. effect[a]	*p*-value	Coeff.	*p*-value
Female-Australia (α_1)	-0.117	0.02*	0.044	0.74	-0.112	0.06**	0.145	0.08**	-1.34	0.09**
Female-India (α_2)	-0.011	0.89	-0.681	0.00***	-0.067	0.46	-0.237	0.06**	-2.30	0.13
Female-Indonesia (α_3)	0.049	0.38	-0.135	0.60	-0.044	0.64	0.098	0.53	-3.19	0.02*
Female-Singapore (α_4)	0.055	0.28	-0.137	0.55	0.085	0.24	-0.102	0.47	-0.019	0.99
Male-India (β_1)	0.040	0.59	-0.209	0.36	-0.036	0.69	-0.172	0.17	-3.244	0.02*
Male-Indonesia (β_2)	0.029	0.62	-0.338	0.18	-0.054	0.59	0.166	0.31	-0.452	0.74
Male-Singapore (β_3)	0.089	0.08**	-0.027	0.92	0.016	0.85	-0.196	0.17	-0.507	0.74
Economics major	0.027	0.39	0.198	0.05*	0.083	0.03*	-0.160	0.01***	-0.364	0.59
% life out of Australia	0.152	0.01***	-0.135	0.50	0.078	0.21	--0.063	0.54	-0.793	0.38
Treatment 1	0.145	0.00***	0.040	0.76	0.077	0.13	-0.101	0.22	-0.777	0.29
Bribe amount					-0.007	0.72	-0.035	0.28	0.192	0.55
Const			7.719	0.00***					4.728	0.06**
Tests:										
Female: ($\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \alpha_3 = \alpha_4$)		0.04*		0.02*		0.12		0.01***		0.11
Male: ($\beta_1 = \beta_2 = \beta_3$)		0.35		0.48		0.86		0.08**		0.14
R-squared	0.110		0.022		0.069		0.108		0.055	
N	440		383		384		332		161	

[a] We report marginal effects for the probits. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 3 presents the results from these experiments. In comparison, both genders offer and accept transfers more often in the neutral-language treatment than they offer and accept bribes in the loaded-language treatment. They also punish less often. However, the gender differences in behavior are much less in the neutral-language treatment than they are in the loaded-language treatment. In the neutral-language treatment, women's propensity to offer a transfer is not significantly different from the men's (100% of the time instead of 94%). Their propensity to punish is not different, either (30% in both cases). These results suggest that the use of loaded language stimulates a reaction to corruption and that Australian women react more strongly against a corrupt transaction than do Australian men.

Table 3. Neutral versus Loaded Language (Australia, Treatment 2)

	Loaded Language			Neutral Language		
	Male	Female	*p*-value	Male	Female	*p*-value
% firms offering a bribe (transfer)	87.3	71.2	0.032	94.4	100	0.22
Bribe (transfer) amount {if >0)	7.67	7.64	0.85	7.71	7.37	0.23
% officials accepting	85.7	78.3	0.38	100	84.4	0.08
% citizens punishing	50.0	68.6	0.11	30.4	30.0	0.98
Punishment amount (if >0)	7.08	5.57	0.22	6.71	5.66	0.71
% participating in a corrupt act	86.7	74.6	0.03	97.2	92.5	0.34

The only exception is in the acceptance rates. Women still accept less often than men (85% vs. 100%), and the difference remains statistically significant ($p = 0.08$). It is not clear why the acceptance rate decision would differ from the other two decisions. If women are more risk averse or more concerned about fairness than men, this would also lead them to "bribe" less often in the neutral-language treatment, which they do not do. The difference in the decision to accept is driven by the behavior of only four (out of 26) women. In fact, if we group the decision to offer and accept a transfer together, we find that the probability of engaging in a transaction to increase one's own payoff at the expense of another player is very similar across the genders (92% for women vs. 97% for men, $p = 0.34$). Doing the same exercise with the loaded-language data reveals that the difference is large and statistically significant (75% for women vs. 87% for men, $p = 0.03$). Hence, we conclude that the neutral-language treatment supports our contention that the gender differences we observe in the loaded-language experiments reflect different reactions to the corrupt context[78],[79].

[78] As further evidence, we also checked for any significant gender differences in the reasons the citizens gave for their decision to punish in the post-experimental survey we asked them to fill out. If it is the case that .Australian women differ from Australian men in terms of their other-regarding preferences or motivations for punishment, one would expect them to cite reasons of fairness or negative reciprocity more frequently while explaining their decision to punish. However, we find this not to be the case. On the contrary, the Australian women cite punishing for moral reasons more often than the Australian men (*39%* of the female citizens who had the chance to punish vs. *25%* of the male citizens who had the chance to punish). The difference is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.07. Hence, our view that it is the Australian women's lower tolerance of corruption that causes the gender differences in behavior was further strengthened.

[79] Note that it is possible that men and women react differently to the framed context and that what we observe is not the real difference in their tolerance of corruption. Although it is not clear why this would be the case, we cannot rule this reason out as a possible explanation of the gender difference we observe.

Does the Cross-Country Variation in Behavior Differ by Gender?

Our finding in the previous section is that the differences between men and women do not necessarily lead to statistically significant behavioral differences in terms of corruption. Another way to think of the impact of social roles is to observe how it affects the behavior of one gender across countries. To determine this impact, we start by discussing the variations in the behavior of men. Table 4A, Panels i–iv, compares the means of behavior across the Australian, Indian, Indonesian, and Singaporean male subjects. These pairwise country comparisons show no significant differences in the propensities to bribe, the bribe amounts, and the propensities to accept. Hence, in terms of the propensities to engage in corrupt behavior, the male subjects in all four countries display similar tendencies.

It is only when we consider the propensities to punish corrupt behavior that we see some significant differences in the behavior of male subjects in the four countries. Specifically, the Indonesian male subjects have the highest rate of punishment, followed by the Australian male subjects (76.5% and 50%, respectively). This difference is significant at the 10% level. The Singaporean male subjects punished in 39.1% of the cases. Although their rate of punishment is not statistically significantly different from that of the Australian male subjects ($p = 0.46$), it is significantly less than that of the Indonesian male subjects ($p = 0.02$). The Indian male subjects have the lowest punishment rate of all (27.3%), which is significantly less than the punishment rate of the Australian male subjects ($p = 0.06$).

The regression results presented in Table 2, Panel C, confirm the results from the *t*-tests[80]. We test for equality of coefficients across the four countries for each gender. As shown in the table, the tests indicate that we are unable to reject the hypothesis that male behavior in each of the countries is the same, except in the case of punishment rates ($p = 0.08$). In the case of punishment rates, the regression results show that, once we control for the field of study (that is, whether it is economics), the percentage of each Australian subject's life that has been spent outside of Australia, and treatment effects, the punishment behavior of the male subjects in Australia is not significantly different from that in any of the other countries. However, since the male subjects in Indonesia have significantly higher rates of punishment than those in India and Singapore, we get the result that the coefficients in this case are not equal to each other[81].

[80] These results are the same as those presented in Table 2, Panel B. However, they are configured (by interacting both the male and female dummies with the country dummies) to enable an easier interpretation of within-gender cross-country differences.

[81] The pairwise regression tests give p-values of 0.058 and 0.028. respectively. The high rate of punishment we observe among the Indonesian male subjects is an unexpected outcome given the high level of corruption in this country. One possible explanation for this outcome is the recent institutional changes that have occurred in Indonesia. Since the introduction of democracy in Indonesia in 1998 and the relaxation of media restrictions, corruption has received a lot more negative media attention. This trend may have resulted in a hardening of attitudes against corruption. See Cameron et al. (2006) for a more detailed discussion of this point.

Table 4A. Differences between Males across Countries

i	Australia (Treatment 1)	India (Treatment 1)	*p*-value
% of firms bribing	96.15	95.92	0.95
Bribe amount (if >0)	7.60	7.57	0.89
% of officials accepting	96.30	89.74	0.21
% of citizens punishing	48.48	27.27	0.06
Punishment amount (if >0)	6.00	3.25	0.01
ii	Australia (Treatment 2)	Indonesia (Treatment 2)	*p*-value
% of firms bribing	87.27	78.13	0.27
Bribe amount (if >0)	7.67	7.40	0.22
% of officials accepting	85.71	77.27	0.42
% of citizens punishing	50.00	76.47	0.09
Punishment amount (if >0)	7.08	7.00	0.97
iii	Australia (Treatment 2)	Singapore (Treatment 2)	*p*-value
% of firms bribing	87.27	91.30	0.62
Bribe amount (if >0)	7.67	7.67	1.00
% of officials accepting	85.71	84.62	0.91
670 of citizens punishing	50.00	39.13	0.46
Punishment amount (if >0)	7.08	7.00	0.97
iv	Indonesia (Treatment 2)	Singapore (Treatment 2)	*p*-value
% of firms bribing	78.13	91.30	0.20
Bribe amount (if >0)	7.40	7.67	0.38
670 of officials accepting	77.27	84.62	0.53
% of citizens punishing	76.47	39.13	0.02
Punishment amount (if >0)	7.00	7.00	1.00

In contrast, the *t*-tests reported in Table 4B and regression results reported in Table 2, Panel C, reveal differences in female behavior across the four countries in all categories of comparison. Testing for equality of regression coefficients, we find that female behavior varies across the four countries in the case of bribe rates, bribe amounts, and punishment rates. All of these differences are significant at the 5% level. In the case of acceptance rates and punishment amounts, we are only narrowly unable to reject a hypothesis of equality of coefficients at the 10% level (with *p*-values of 0.12 and 0.11, respectively). Moreover, unreported pairwise tests of the regression coefficients show that the acceptance rate in Singapore is significantly higher than that in each of the other three countries.

Table 4B. Differences between Females across Countries

i	Australia (Treatment 1)	India (Treatment 1)	*p*-value
% of firms bribing	95.12	92.59	0.62
Bribe amount (if >0)	7.82	7.18	0.01
% of officials accepting	82.86	89.66	0.35
% of citizens punishing	56.25	20.93	0.00
Punishment amount (if >0)	5.04	4.33	0.47
ii	Australia (Treatment 2)	Indonesia (Treatment 2)	*p*-value
% of firms bribing	71.21	82.14	0.27
Bribe amount (if >0)	7.64	7.61	0.88
% of officials accepting	78.33	76.92	0.89
% of citizens punishing	68.63	70.00	0.91
Punishment amount (if >0)	5.57	4.29	0.28
iii	Australia (Treatment 2)	Singapore (Treatment 2)	*p*-value
% of firms bribing	71.21	83.33	0.15
Bribe amount (if >0)	7.64	7.60	0.83
% of officials accepting	78.33	93.33	0.07
% of citizens punishing	68.63	48.15	0.08
Punishment amount (if >0)	5.57	7.38	0.13
iv	Indonesia (Treatment 2)	Singapore (Treatment 2)	*p*-value
% of firms bribing	82.14	83.33	0.90
Bribe amount (if >0)	7.61	7.60	0.97
% of officials accepting	76.92	93.3 3	0.08
% of citizens punishing	70.00	48.15	0.14
Punishment amount (if >0)	4.29	7.38	0.04

The magnitude of the cross-country variation in female behavior is quite large. For instance, the regression results show that the female bribe rate in Australia is 16.6 percentage points lower than that in Indonesia and 17.2 percentage points lower than that in Singapore ($p = 0.02$ and $p = 0.007$, respectively). Similarly, the female acceptance rate in Singapore is 19.7 percentage points higher than that in Australia, 15.2 percentage points higher than that in India, and 12.9 percentage points higher than that in Indonesia (with $p = 0.016$, $p = 0.089$, and $p = 0.089$, respectively)[82].

In summary, we find less cross-country variation in the behavior of men than in the behavior of women. When we compare the behavior of the male subjects, we find significant differences only in the propensity to punish

[82] As explained in Cameron et al. (2006), one possible explanation for the relatively higher tolerance of corruption we find in Singapore is the top-down policy approach that has been adopted in this country. Such an approach could have had the effect of eradicating corruption at a faster rate than it takes to fundamentally change society's social norms.

corrupt behavior. In contrast, when we compare the behavior of the female subjects, we find significant differences in both the propensity to engage in corrupt behavior (the bribe rate and amount) and the propensity to punish corrupt behavior. Overall, the Australian female subjects seem to have the lowest tolerance of corrupt behavior.

4. Discussion

Our goal in this paper was to examine gender differences in behavior when confronted with a common bribery problem. We explored two issues. First, we investigated whether women are less likely to offer bribes and more likely to punish corrupt behavior. We find this to be the case in only one of the four countries studied—Australia. We do not find significant gender differences in India, Indonesia, or Singapore.

The results for the only Western country in our study are similar to those found in the existing literature. In both Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001), the Western countries make up a large part of their sample[83],[84]. Our findings suggest that the gender differences found in these previous studies may be culture specific. This is important because the gender differences found in the previous studies on corruption have prompted policy makers in many developing countries to recommend higher rates of female participation in the political and economic institutions. Our results indicate that, although there may be other valid reasons for advocating policy measures that promote female political involvement, some caution needs to be taken in asserting that increased female participation will lower corruption in all countries[85],[86].

Further work is needed to understand the reasons for the variations in gender differences in attitudes toward corruption across countries and to establish in which countries gender differences exist. It is possible that countries with different cultural backgrounds display gender differences to different degrees. For example, Gneezy, Leonard, and List (2006) find that the gender differences in attitudes toward competition that are observed in the Western countries are reversed in matrilineal societies. Their results provide insights into how the existing societal structure is crucially linked to the observed gender differences in competitiveness. In the context of corruption, one possible explanation for the different gender effects that are observed in our data is the differing social roles of women across cultures. In relatively more patriarchal societies where women do not play as active a role in the public domain, women's views on social issues may be influenced to a greater extent by men's views. In such societies, one would expect to see less of a gender difference in behavior toward corruption in comparison with societies where women feel more comfortable in voicing their own opinions[87].

[83] Swamy et al. (2001) present some results disaggregated to the country level. Interestingly, scrutiny of these results reveals no gender differences in tolerance of corruption in the three Asian nations in their sample (China, India, and South Korea). This is also true of Nigeria, the only African nation, other than South Africa, in their sample.

[84] Most of the previous experimental studies that have examined behavioral gender differences have been based on data from the Western nations, with the majority being from the United States.

[85] See Dufio (2005) for a discussion of the various reasons for reserving positions for groups that are perceived as being disadvantaged

[86] In fact, the World Values Survey (WVS, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org/), which asks respondents whether someone accepting a bribe is acceptable, yields results consistent with ours. Specifically, the WVS also shows that while the Australian women are significantly less tolerant of corruption than the Australian men (88% of the women stated that accepting a bribe is never acceptable vs. 83% of the men. $p < 0.01$), no statistically significant gender differences are seen in India and Singapore. However, according to the WVS, the Indonesian women are significantly less tolerant of corruption than the Indonesian men (86% vs. 19%, $p < 0.01$). The WVS was also conducted in Vietnam, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and China, where the results again yield no statistically significant gender differences. These figures are all for the most recent survey conducted in each country.

[87] See, for example, Chan (2000). Ganguly-Scrase (2000). and Bessell (2005) for discussions of the limited roles of women in the public domain in Singapore, India, and Indonesia, respectively. Australia, in contrast, has historically had a pioneering role in the advancement of women's rights (Sawer 1994). See also Nelson and Chowdhury (1994) for a discussion of the variation in women's altitudes toward participation and activism in societal affairs across different cultures.

The second issue we investigated is whether cross-country variation in behavior is similar for men and women. The behavior of the male subjects was shown to be quite similar in all four countries. In contrast, important differences are seen in the behavior of the female subjects across the four countries. One possible explanation for these results is that greater variations exist in women's social roles across countries than in men's. Understanding why the cross-country variation in attitudes toward corruption differs by gender is another important agenda for future research.

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Appendix. The 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index

Rank	Country	Score
1	Finland Iceland New Zealand	9.6
4	Denmark	9.5
5	Singapore	9.4
9	Australia Netherlands	8.7
11	Austria Luxembourg United Kingdom	8.6
20	Belgium Chile USA	7.3
45	Italy	4.9
54	Greece	4.4
70	Brazil China Egypt Ghana India Mexico Peru Saudi Arabia Senegal	3.3
130	Azerbaijan Burundi Central African Republic Ethiopia Indonesia Papua New Guinea Zimbabwe	2.4
163	Haiti	1.8

Source: Transparency International (2006).